3/4/2003ISART1 Spectrum Buyouts A Proposal for the Transition to Open Spectrum IKEDA Nobuo Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry.

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3/4/2003ISART1 Spectrum Buyouts A Proposal for the Transition to Open Spectrum IKEDA Nobuo Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry

3/4/2003 ISART2 FCC: “Exclusive Rights” Approach SPTF:end of “command and control” –Technically progressive –Economically poor –Circularity: justify exclusive rights by “scarcity” created by exclusion Property rights for frequency + Incentives for incumbents to relocate –Segmentation and monopoly

3/4/2003 ISART3 False Theories Faulhaber-Farber: confused –Sticks to legacy technologies –Trading private property -> commons? Buyers buy the assets that will become worthless Or monopolize them by proprietary protocols “Big Bang” auctions (Kwerell-Williams) –Buying and selling simultaneously –Dangerous and Irreversible (e.g., 700MHz, NextWave)

3/4/2003 ISART4 Spectrum: Neither Property nor Commons excludablenon-excludable rival non- rival Private goods Public goods national defense mathematical theorem Common Pool Resources (CPR) road, park, fishery Club goods software subscription services

3/4/2003 ISART5 “Commons” Approach Open spectrum as public use –Technically efficient –Politically difficult No valuation and priority –Congestion and interference –Infinite bandwidth: OK, but how? No incentives for relocation –Lack of mechanism to take back spectrum

3/4/2003 ISART6 Spectrum Buyout Transition strategy –Providing incentives without monopoly Reverse auction by government –Buying the spectrum from incumbents –Release for unlicensed band Expense: –General account –“radio tax” for all terminals/Hz

3/4/2003 ISART7 Auction Design The lowest bidder per band: winner –PCS auctions: the most efficient user –Reverse auctions: the least efficient user Band should be vacated nationwide –Price: sum of bidders Continuous band is valuable –Requirement for the minimum bandwidth

3/4/2003 ISART8 Bids for the Band Groups (example) Billion yen GHz

3/4/2003 ISART9 Bids will approach equipment prices Bid = opportunity cost –Q k (x)=v k +(1-q)v k +(1-q) 2 v k +… (1-q) x v k + z k. –q: probability of taking –v: monopoly rent –z: value of equipment Equilibrium price –p* = v k /q + z k v k + z k z k

3/4/2003 ISART10 Hybrid Approach 30MHz 2GHz Legacy Easement Open spectrum (exclusive) (overlay) (public use)