Daisuke Mashima and Arnab Roy Fujitsu Laboratories of America, Inc. Privacy Preserving Disclosure of Authenticated Energy Usage Data.

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Daisuke Mashima and Arnab Roy Fujitsu Laboratories of America, Inc. Privacy Preserving Disclosure of Authenticated Energy Usage Data

Background Utilization and sharing of fine-grained energy usage data by third-party service providers have been increasing. E.g., Green Button Visualization, analytics, advise for energy efficiency, gaming for fun, etc. Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 1

Motivation Energy usage data collected at unprecedented granularity would cause privacy risks (e.g., Non-intrusive Load Monitoring) Life style of residential customers Appliances used in each household 2All Right Reserved, Copyright FUJITSU LABORATORIES LTD Source: Sleeping? Not at home?

Motivation (Related Work) While privacy preservation in collection of smart meter data has been explored, privacy issues in sharing of energy usage data between customers and third-parties are not enough explored. A. Rial and G. Danezis, “Privacy-preserving smart metering” (ACM WPES 2011) E. Shi, T.-H. H. Chan, E. G. Rieffel, R. Chow, and D. Song, “Privacy- preserving aggregation of time-series data.” (NDSS 2011) A. Molina-Markham, G. Danezis, K. Fu, P. J. Shenoy, and D. E. Irwin, “Designing privacy-preserving smart meters with low-cost microcontrollers.” (FC 2012) and more (including other papers presented in this session) Our work is orthogonal to these and aims at privacy control when sharing the collected energy usage data. 3All Right Reserved, Copyright FUJITSU LABORATORIES LTD. 2013

Customer-centric Data Management “Customer-centric Energy Usage Data Management and Sharing in Smart Grid Systems” (ACM SEGS 2013) Customer’s electricity data is collected by utility, then is downloaded by Customer. Downloaded data is stored on “Repository”, which managed under Customer’s control. Upon sharing with Service provider, data can be “pre-processed” for privacy, without losing data authenticity E.g., Redactable Signatures 4 Customer Repository Smart Meter Signed energy usage data Signed & pre-processed Energy usage data Service Provider (Data Consumer) Privacy Control Customer (Data Subject) Utility (Data Issuer) Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 4

Customer-centric Data Management Limitations Pre-processing using Redactable Signatures can hide arbitrary portion of data, without invalidating digital signature, and thereby customers can limit privacy risks. At the same time, it could lower the capability of data analytics E.g., disconnected series of data would prohibit application of some popular machine learning techniques, such as ARIMA While minimized, disclosed portion may still leak some privacy sensitive information, e.g., by means of NILM Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 5

High-level Idea of Proposed Mechanism By adding artificial, controlled noises, allow customers to hide details in consumption patterns to enhance privacy Customers can add arbitrary amount of nose based on the service agreement with service providers, privacy preference, and level of trust on service providers At the same time, loose authenticity of noisy data should be verifiable by data consumers Original, read energy consumption data was issued by a trustworthy entity (e.g., utility) Added noise is bounded to the amount claimed by each customer Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 6

High-level Idea of Proposed Mechanism E.g., add noise up to 10% of individual values Can hide fluctuation and exact height of peaks in high-usage periods. Effective to counter NILM attacks, re-identification attacks etc. Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 7

Primitives for Construction Digital signatures (Integrity and authenticity) Public-key encryption (Confidentiality) Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proofs Language for NIZK Proof System: m is a energy consumption value(s) Sig is utility’s digital signature on it Added noise is bounded by ε e is ciphertext of a pair of m and sig encrypted with customer’s public key Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 8

Security Properties Correctness of the protocol: If the data consumer (third party) accepts the proof and m′, then the deviation of m′ is bounded from data signed by the data issuer (utility). By the soundness of the NIZK proof system for L, we have: there exists (m, sig), such that m′ is within a noise bound of m and sig passes the verification test with the data issuer’s verification key for the message m and that e is an encryption of such a message-signature pair. Hiding of original data: The data consumer (third party) learns nothing beyond correctness about the real m. By the zero-knowledge property of NIZK proof system and IND- CPA property of public key encryption scheme, we can show that the distribution of the message sent by customer to third party is computationally indistinguishable from a distribution which doesn’t use m at all. Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 9

Protocol Definition Utility (Data Issuer)Customer (Data Subject) Third Party (Data Consumer) Utility signs energy usage data to be downloaded Customer can verify signature on downloaded data. When sharing is necessary, customer can generate noisy data and prepare NIZK proof. Third Party verifies the NIZK proof. When successful, data can be used for later processing Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 10

Conclusions Designed a privacy-preservation scheme for sharing of energy usage data, using Non-interactive Zero-knowledge Proof system. Mitigate privacy risks by added noise Allow the pre-processed data to be for services that require trustworthy data Allow broader range of machine learning techniques to be applied Future Work Practical implementation of the proposed scheme and evaluate its overhead and effectiveness is needed. Implementation on the popular data sharing scheme like Green Button Quantitative evaluation of how much NILM can be made difficult Explore an optimal way to add noise for privacy goals Combination with other privacy-preserving schemes, e.g., Redactable Signatures, to further enhance the privacy control Copyright 2014 Fujitsu Laboratories of America 11

Copyright 2010 FUJITSU LIMITED