Qualifiers and Caveats James J.F. Forest, Ph.D. Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program Conference on the The Nexus Between Terrorism and Trafficking February 22, 2013

Criminals and Terrorists  Much in common – rational actors, operate secretly, use similar tactics (kidnapping, extortion, assassination) to obtain resources, power Conceptual paradigms offered:  Nexus, intersections, hybrids  Continuum (groups shifting incrementally)  Transformation (become less one, more the other)

Researching a “Nexus”  Lots of specific conditions involved  No formula, no perfect predictors  Any common patterns? If the “Nexus” exists, what do we need know?  Who  Where  When  Why  How  What kinds

Who? (Group & Individual Characteristics)  Group characteristics Goals, capabilities, leadership, areas of operation, support networks, interpersonal relationships  Less “Organization” more “Networked individuals”  Individual facilitators are the heart of collaboration  “Trusted handshake” based on:  Mutual friends/acquaintances who vouch for you w/their life  Family ties, clan, tribe, etc.  Religious beliefs (doctrinal knowledge, credentials, etc.)  Battlefield veteran status (Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq)  Shared experiences (prison, battlefield, oppression)

Where? (Location-related conditions)  Global access to banking systems, materials, weapons, technologies, knowledge, infrastructure, etc....  Access to markets (incl. pipelines, routes, conduits); Global markets = more opportunities for profit  Internationally linked criminal markets in which various actors, including terrorists and insurgents, engage in profit- seeking activities  Domestic cash economies, shadow economies, depressed/dysfunctional economies  Physical terrain for illicit crops, smuggling  State weakness (limited intell, security capabilities), border insecurity, ongoing conflicts, safe havens  Corruption, kleptocracy, low development/high need and other “legitimacy grievances”, and much more...

When? (Temporal/Event-related Conditions)  Inter-state or intra-state conflicts  Coup/regime collapse, foreign military occupation, other events that enhance the perceived need for action within a particular environment;  Transitioning state governments (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya);  Governance challenges in dozens of countries worldwide;  Long-term projections: No indication that demand for drugs, weapons, illicit sexual services, etc. will decline any time soon  Experiences lead to expansion of trusted handshakes; patterns of successful collaboration can lead to more trust & willingness for future collaboration

Why? (And if not, why not?)  Power, resources, operational capacity common goals  Money is centrifugal force that brings them together  Expertise (money laundering, travel document forgery)  Relatively few “strategic alliances”, more tactical, transactional, sub-contract kinds of relationships Even if we see many of these conditions, we may not see a terrorist-trafficking nexus. Why not?  Trust is much harder to build than destroy  Once you become involved in trafficking, difficult to get back out (much different from disengagement from political violence)  Failed states less hospitable than weak states  OPSEC: Risk aversion regarding money, resources

How?  Money laundering dimensions  Diaspora network connections  Individual trusted relationships  Profit sharing?  Operational security?  Impact of arrests, operations interrupted?

What kinds? (Short-term / Long-term & other characteristics)  Strategic alliances  Long-term commitments; shared intelligence, revenues, etc.  Transactional supply chain relationships  Often based on territorial control by each group  Tactical alliances  Short-term, in response to perceived mutual threat  Sub-contract relationships  Often based on unique/specialized capabilities  Spot sales and barter agreements  Like drugs for explosives (Madrid 2004: 66 lbs. hashish = 440 lbs. explosives) - Adapted from Phil Williams (2002) and Annette Idler (2012)

Summary  At minimum, broad stroke characterizations of a “terrorism trafficking nexus” require significant qualifiers and caveats  Occasional convergence based on a variety of contexts and group/individual attributes  This is a very contextual phenomenon  Reinforces a common truth – there is no “one size fits all” kind of policy solution or universal strategy to deal with this problem

Qualifiers and Caveats James J.F. Forest, Ph.D.