1 NDAA 2012 Section 818 Further Implementation for Trusted Suppliers March 27, 2014 Fred Schipp Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division 812-854-5848.

Slides:

Advertisements

Similar presentations

NACLA – NAVY PARTNERSHIP

Advertisements

Policies and Procedures for Proper Use of Non-DoD Contracts Revised April 19, 2005 Deidre A. Lee Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Office.

No U.S. Government export controlled content. No U.S.G. export restrictions apply 1 DoD Public Meeting: Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic.

Hot Topics Executive Compensation Caps Department of Labor Initiatives Safeguarding Information Supply Chain Risk Counterfeit Electronic Items Fair and.

1 Confidential PCR Process Change Request Mike Rizuto Supplier Development Technologist March 16, 2015 Rev 3.

Public Meeting – Detection & Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts – Further Implementation Dan Deisz Cell: March 27th,

NCMA Philadelphia Lunch & Learn What Does the Contract Say? E. Jean Labadini, Senior Advisor November 25, 2014.

G-12 Counterfeit Parts Activity Prepared for PSMC Meeting San Diego, CA October 25, 2007 Presenter Boeing G-12 Committee Vice Chair.

Counterfeiting Update NAVAIR DMSMS Team AIR NAVAIR DMSMS Team Lead Cleared for Public Release: NAVAIR

Counterfeits and the U.S. Industrial Base Office of Technology Evaluation.

1 Vigilance–Enforcement–Abatement World Micro Training Program Diane Hummer, Mahendran Sanggaren 23 rd, July, 2012 Ministry of Domestic Trade Cooperatives.

Federal Acquisition Service U.S. General Services Administration Information Technology Government Council ITIGC Quarterly Meeting Policy Update Mark J.

Western Region Manufacturing Technology Transfer Center 1 (URS234042) Copyright 2012 California Institute of Technology. Government sponsorship acknowledged.

© The Aerospace Corporation 2013 Recommendations for changes to the Counterfeit Avoidance and Detection of Electronic Parts DFARS David Meshel Sr. Project.

Hot Compliance Topics in the Supply Chain 1.Human trafficking 2.Conflict minerals 3.Counterfeit goods 4.Whistleblower / Suspension /Debarment Topic overview.

Defense Contract Management Agency Quality Assurance Directorate Presented By: Michael Shields Executive Director, Quality Assurance March 15 th, 2011.

OPEN _ESCO Conference - Supply Chain Counterfeit Avoidance.ppt ESCO 6 th Anti Counterfeiting Forum London, Thursday 19 th February 2015 Avoidance.

Liaison to DASN AP. The Small Business Program promotes acquisition opportunities where small business can best support the needs of our Sailors and Marines.

E y e s o f t h e E a g l e Air Force Office of Special Investigations Current Investigative Trends SA James P. Stoddard 30 March 10 National Contract.

CENTRAL CONTRACTOR REGISTRATION (CAGE CODES) DFARS Case 2003-D040 DFARS Parts 204, 212, 213 and 252 are amended to remove policy on Central Contractor.

Variation Management of Key Characteristics

BTA Supply Chain Update for L&MR

KaufCAN.com 1 Tidewater Government Industry Council Third Annual Small Business Regulatory Update: A Must for Small and Large Businesses Alike Terence.

5-1 DoD Risk Management Policies and Procedures. 5-2 Risk Assessment and Management (DoD ) “Program Managers and other acquisition managers shall.

QLF Contract Quality Clauses Working Group QUALITY LEADERSHIP FORUM CONTRACT QUALITY CLAUSES WORKING GROUP Ken Crane MSFC September 24, 2002.

1 Highly Accelerated Life Test (HALT) Wayne Bradley 8 April 2014.

TS16949 requirements Subjects –Audit planning –Recertification audit requirements –Auditing Remote supporting functions.

DoD Public Meeting: Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts Storme Street Director, Government Relations, Policy BAE Systems, Inc. March.

Company Confidential Registration Management Committee 1 Auditing the Implementation of Counterfeit Electronic Parts Control Plan Requirements Bill Zint,

Lead Standardization Activity for Soldering Technologies Parts Standardization Management Committee Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release,

Five Star Quality Consultants Implementing ISO 9001 Corrective and Preventive Action.

National 8(a) Fall Summit Changing Landscape in Government Subcontracting Presented by: Susan King October 30, 2013 © BAE Systems 2013 Cleared for Public.

Company Confidential Registration Management Committee Counterfeit Parts Jason Dickstein, General Counsel Aviation Suppliers Association What Does “Counterfeit”

1 1 Update on DoD Progress in Anti-Counterfeiting April 12, 2011 L&MR/SCI.

AS Aerospace AS 9100, was originally released in 1999 and revised in 2001 to align with the ISO 9001:2000 Standard format, is the international.

DMSMS: Counterfeits and the Industrial Base Brad Botwin Director, Industrial Base Studies Office of Technology Evaluation September 23, 2008.

Federal Acquisition Service U.S. General Services Administration What’s New In The World of GSA Dan Briest GSA Management Services Center (Auburn WA) April.

Supplier Change Request (SCR) Process. Supplier Change Request Process ECPS recognizes that changes made within the supply chain can adversely impact.

2 William P. McNally Assistant Administrator for Procurement NASA Procurement Tenets August 4, 2008 NCMA Conference.

Contract Training Class I

SAE International Counterfeit Mitigation Standards Update Parts Standardization and Management Committee April 12, 2011 Director, Washington Operations.

Process System Capability An introduction to 9103 ‘VARIATION MANAGEMENT OF KEY CHARACTERISTICS’ Bernard LAURAS AIRBUS.

Logistics and Supply Chain Management. Introduction to Global Supply Chain Management  What is a Supply Chain ? A system or network consisting of organizations.

Process for COTS Items Requiring IUID. Supplier Fulfills IUID Requirements Customer Requires Warranty Negotiate Purchase Include: DFARS MIL-STD 130M Data.

1 NASA Office of Procurement NASA Procurement Tenets April 15, 2008 SMC Brief Bill McNally Assistant Administrator for Procurement.

2015 Fall PR-MR & Marketing Meeting October 16, 2015 Fairo Mitchell Energy Policy Director, Public Utility Division Oklahoma Corporation Commission.

1 July 12, 2005 AFCEA “Secure the High Ground” 1 ACQUISITION UPDATE: a NEW WORLD IS COMING Mark J. Lumer Contracting Executive (256)

1 1 Detection and Avoidance of Counterfeit Electronic Parts— Further Implementation Public Meeting June 16, 2014 Scott Bousum, Director, National Security.

Connections II Acquisition U.S. General Services Administration Connections II Industry Day April 13th, 2010.

Kenneth Dodds Director, Office of Policy, Planning & Liaison Small Business Administration April, 2016.

National Science Foundation Industry/University Cooperative Research Center for e-Design Taxonomy of Factors for Lifetime Buy Connor Jennings and Janis.

Small Business Insight Into the Business System Review and Audit Process Business Systems Overview.

1 Counterfeit Avoidance Where will the road lead? Bob Bodemuller Supplier Quality Principle Engineer.

Rick Roelecke Director, Corporate Quality Management July 26 th, 2016 L-3 Communications DoD Policy Implementation.

Counterfeit Parts Standards and Certifications Dale K Gordon AS&D Accreditation Manager 20 JUL 2016.

External Provider Control

Industry Expectations for Distributors

NAVSEA Material Fraud and Counterfeit Materiel Manager

COUNTERFEIT PARTS DEFINED RISK FACTORS HISTORY WHAT IS BEING DONE

Protecting the Supply Chain

G-19 Counterfeit Electronic Components Committee Standards Development Progress March 2008 Phil Zulueta CQSDI - March 3 & 4, 2008 NASA QLF - March.

Hidden Risks in the Supply Chain

Supplier Improvement Program Update

Counterfeit Mitigation

Qualification in Clinical Procurement

Presented by Trey Hodgkins SVP of Public Sector June 16, 2014

Anti-Counterfeit Policy Framework

Presentation transcript:

1 NDAA 2012 Section 818 Further Implementation for Trusted Suppliers March 27, 2014 Fred Schipp Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane Division

2 NDAA 2012 Section 818 What does Section 818 (c)(3) require whenever possible? Government and Contractors shall buy in-production electronic parts direct from authorized suppliers, or one level removed via trusted suppliers. Government and Contractors shall buy obsolete parts from trusted suppliers. If the above can’t be met, there shall be inspection, test, and notification of DoD. Government shall establish qualification requirements for trusted suppliers. Contractors may also identify trusted suppliers. Contractors: must use established industry standards, are responsible for authenticity, and choices may be reviewed/audited by Government.

3 NDAA 2012 Section 818 What DO we require of trusted suppliers via DFARS 2012-D055 (May 16, 2013)? Contractors’ Counterfeit Electronic Part Avoidance and Detection System must address the use and qualification of trusted suppliers. What CAN we require of trusted suppliers? Avoidance (supply chain management) Detection (inspection and test) Containment (do not return) Notification (to customer) Reporting (to GIDEP) Trusted suppliers are currently ‘defined’ by DoD (DLA, MDA, Navy, etc.), Prime Contractors, and Subcontractors. How consistent is this?

4 NDAA 2012 Section 818 Avoidance We should tell our trusted suppliers to buy from authorized suppliers as a first priority (whenever possible). Detection We should tell our trusted suppliers how, what, and where to inspect and test parts for authenticity. Containment We should tell our trusted suppliers not to return suspect counterfeit electronic parts. What does ‘whenever possible’ mean? Last resort? Schedule? Budget? Non-competitive? What is the impact of requiring full manufacturer’s warranty for all electronic part purchases?

5 NDAA 2012 Section 818 Notification DFARS 2012-D055 requires DoD notification when suspect counterfeit electronic parts are installed, but not when the contractor plans to buy from untrusted suppliers. Reporting We should tell our trusted suppliers that we expect them to report suspect counterfeit electronic parts to GIDEP. Audits/Review We should tell our auditors what to require in a trusted supplier. Electronic parts intended for DoD systems are seldom reported to GIDEP if they are detected by the ‘trusted supplier’. Why? Contractor does not own the parts Trusted supplier fears retaliation from a valuable supplier Stigma

6 NDAA 2012 Section 818 We should explore the potential flow down (to trusted suppliers) of every subcontractor anti-counterfeit requirement. THANK YOU