1 © Cooley Godward 2001 PKI A SSESSMENT The process of evaluating, verifying, and certifying your PKI Presented by: Randy V. Sabett Vanguard Enterprise Security Expo 2001 June 5, 2001

2 © Cooley Godward 2001 Introduction l Dichotomy l Challenges l Models l Mechanisms and criteria l Path forward

3 © Cooley Godward 2001 Dichotomy l “UBIQUITOUS PKI!!!!!” l …but many barriers è Need: common recognition mechanism

4 © Cooley Godward 2001 Challenges - traditional technology vs. PKI l Traditional technology

5 © Cooley Godward 2001 Challenges - traditional technology vs. PKI l Public key infrastructure l CP and CPS l Complicated by varied requirements of particular sectors (verticals)

6 © Cooley Godward 2001 Challenges - recognition l No universally acceptable mechanism for recognizing the sufficiency of a PKI deployment l Uncharted legal waters l Several efforts and proposals - most focus on technical and business l General model

7 © Cooley Godward 2001 Models - Simple assessment model Assessment Criteria Assessor PKI System or Component assesses develops influences Key Subject Object

8 © Cooley Godward 2001 Mechanisms and criteria l PAG l RFC 2527 l WebTrust l Common Criteria l BS7799 l FIPS l Gatekeeper l Others

9 © Cooley Godward 2001 PKI Assessment Guidelines (PAG) l Five year project of the Information Security Committee of the American Bar Association l Follow up work to the Digital Signature Guidelines (1996) l Participation by over 400 legal, technical, and business people

10 © Cooley Godward 2001 PAG (cont’d) l D The Effect of Contractual Privity Upon Relying Party’s Responsibilities Expressed as Covenants or Imposed by Law l Issue Summary. This section discusses the issue of whether the relying party is in privity of contract with the other PKI participants… l Relevant Considerations. Threshold question is whether the PKI attempts to create contractual privity between the CA and the relying party… l Appropriate Requirements and Practices. It is necessary for the PKI to decide how to present relying party covenants; unlike other participants, however, relying party covenants tend to be small enough in number to make it feasible to list in this section, or perhaps cross reference.

11 © Cooley Godward 2001 Detailed model Note Vanguard advice: “avoid complicated charts…”

12 © Cooley Godward 2001 RFC 2527 l Framework for PKI policy documents l Certificate Policies l Certification Practice Statements

13 © Cooley Godward 2001 RFC 2527 (cont’d) l 1. INTRODUCTION l 2. GENERAL PROVISIONS l 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION l 4. OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS l 5. PHYSICAL, PROCEDURAL, AND PERSONNEL SECURITY CONTROLS l 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS l 7. CERTIFICATE AND CRL PROFILES l 8. SPECIFICATION ADMINISTRATION

14 © Cooley Godward 2001 WebTrust l Framework to assess adequacy and effectiveness of controls employed by CAs l Designed specifically for the examinations of CA business activities l Builds on X9.79 work of the American Banker’s Association

15 © Cooley Godward 2001 WebTrust (cont’d)

16 © Cooley Godward 2001 X CA Control Objectives l National standard - approved by ABA (the other ABA - American Banker’s Association) and ANSI l Being proposed to ISO TC68 as an international work item

17 © Cooley Godward 2001 X9.79 (cont’d)

18 © Cooley Godward 2001 Common Criteria l Some view as replacement for the Orange Book, ITSEC, etc. l International acceptance l Focus on protection profile

19 © Cooley Godward 2001 BS Code of Practice for Information Security Management l British Standard being used in several other European countries l General Information Security standard, not focussed on PKI l Certification scheme called c:cure similar to ISO 9000 l Now ISO/IEC 17799:2000

20 © Cooley Godward 2001 FIPS l Security requirements of a cryptographic module utilized for protecting sensitive information l Four increasing levels of security è Covers areas such as roles and authentication; physical security; OS security; cryptographic key management; EMI/EMC; self-tests; design assurance; and mitigation of other attacks

21 © Cooley Godward 2001 FIPS (cont’d) Single-Chip Cryptographic Modules SECURITY LEVEL 2 - All Level 1 requirements plus:  chip covered with tamper-evident coating or contained in a tamper-evident enclosure  coating or enclosure shall be opaque within the visible spectrum. SECURITY LEVEL 3 - All Level 2 requirements plus:  Either: chip covered with hard opaque tamper-evident coating, or  the chip shall be contained within a strong enclosure.  The enclosure shall be such that attempts at removal or penetration shall have a high probability of causing serious damage to the cryptographic module (i.e., the module will not function).

22 © Cooley Godward 2001 Gatekeeper l Australian PKI strategy and enabler for the delivery of Government online l Accreditation Criteria published l Covers procurement, security policy/planning, physical security, technology evaluation, personnel vetting, legal issues, and privacy considerations

23 © Cooley Godward 2001 Path forward l Development of internationally acceptable suite of criteria, NOT development of an international approach to PKI l Common Criteria, WebTrust, & PAG promising l Common Criteria è Industry specific protection profiles è Global recognition l WebTrust è PKI-specific set of criteria

24 © Cooley Godward 2001 On going activities l Update to RFC 2527 l Industry specific protection profiles l Other industry and governmental activities è PAG out for public comment è X9.79 into ISO

25 © Cooley Godward 2001 Resources for more info l ABA - l RFC l WebTrust - l X l Common Criteria - l FIPS l Gatekeeper -

26 © Cooley Godward 2001 Questions?

27 © Cooley Godward 2001 PKI A SSESSMENT The process of evaluating, verifying, and certifying your PKI Presented by: Randy V. Sabett Cooley Godward LLP (phone) (fax)