ICANN’s Preparedness for Signing the Root September 24, 2008 DNS OARC Meeting, Ottawa, CA

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Presentation transcript:

ICANN’s Preparedness for Signing the Root September 24, 2008 DNS OARC Meeting, Ottawa, CA

DNSSEC Activity Calls from the community to sign the root. TLD’s sign their zones Close cooperation with DNSSEC deployment and security experts to develop signing system for.arpa and root Signed root publicly available at ns.iana.org for over a year Presentations describing system and seeking feedback at various fora DNSSEC and root zone management are part of ICANN Strategic Plan – a primary part of our business ICANN paper published (7/24) Interim-TAR (almost there), RZM (ongoing) Kaminsky (8/5) ICANN submits proposal to sign the root (9/2) NTIA response (9/9)

elements of root signing Important elements of a root-signing solution are transparency, public consultation, broad stakeholder participation (e.g. key ceremony), flexibility, reliability, and trust; Solution has to balance various concerns, but must provide for a maximally secure technical solution and one that provides the trust promised by DNSSEC; An open, transparent and international participatory process will allow for root zone management to adapt to changing needs over time as DNSSEC is deployed throughout the Internet and as new lessons are learned.

Preservation of Trust Maintain trust from TLD operator to signed root. Any chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Increased confidence in DNS will depend more on this chain. Eliminate avenues for potential corruption during transmission between organizations. Keys (DS) should not have to go to another organization before being protected by signing. So the validator of changes signs the zone. A conclusion other DNSSEC deployers have come to. Will allow for timely and accurate TLD key replacement in the face of compromise Introduction of new gTLDs will stress this link

Transparency Open and transparent process for technical infrastructure design and signing oversight functions. KSK’s not under control of one organization. No security through obscurity: open source and designs Continuous collaboration with DNSSEC experts to evolve design as lessons are learned. Regular auditing and reports

Preparedness IANA’s “business” is root zone management. DNSSEC is part of ICANN’s Strategic Plan. IANA signed root was developed closely with DNSSEC experts. Publicly available for 15 months. Interim-TAR during the testing period (almost done! delayed by very effective TLD recursive resolver and patch effort – thank you Kim+OARC+operators!) RZM would be modified to be ready to handle DS records incorporating technology and lessons from I-TAR Automation: signing, ZSK rollover (to avoid costly risk of service failures and errors), monitoring, notifications Kept the process and design simple Final design and ongoing modifications would be based on public consultation process with experts Plan on regular audits and reports on system operation and security

Behind ns.iana.org SIGNER HSM KSK HSM ZSK NS TEST A TEST M ADMIN RZM ROOT DB CLASS 5 IPS CONTAINER 2-3 INSTANCES vetting process, accept/reject I-TAR TLDs ns.iana.org pch-test.iana.org anycast SIGNER, NS, ROOT DBs: DELL 1950 /w 2xPS, 2XSAS, 2xCPU HSM: AEP KEYPER FIPS Level 4 (Disposable) System status at: hr manned multiple biometric controlled facility, NSA NSTISSP #10, GSA Class 5 Safe (approved for Top Secret)

Key Ceremony Keys are not under the control of a single organization. IANA is key custodian only. Fresh key generation hardware each KSK gen. Dispose or recycle old. Community decides how, where, when, and who Any Interested stakeholders, auditors, publishers. Key has value only when witnessed and published by all. Filmed and broadcast Keys cannot be extracted, cloned or otherwise. Private key in FIPS level 4 HSM (used by UN treaty org, etc). Key never leaves HSM. Tamper attempt destroys contents. Backup HSM’s configured during Key Ceremony Community decides how, where, and who for backup and disaster recovery Other schemes using other equipment (e.g., M of N) supported via PKCS11 standard interface.

Wasn’t done alone: Thanks to: Paf, Olaf, Roy, Jakob, Dickinson, Russ, Soltero (.pr), Crocker, drc, Don Davis, David Miller, … Thank you for listening Questions ?