Trusting the Vote Ben Adida - Cryptography and Information Security Group MIT Computer Science and Artificial.

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Presentation transcript:

Trusting the Vote Ben Adida - Cryptography and Information Security Group MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Lab 10 December 2004

Trusting the Vote The people have spoken…. the bastards! -Dick Tuck, 1966 California State Senate Concession Speech

Why is Voting so Difficult? Stakes are high –Presidency of a large nation –Budgets in the $100M Problems are not easily detected –Incomplete audit, by design! Experts vs. Electorate –New technology vs. Public audit

The Secret Ballot Australian Ballot –Australia in 1850s –UK in 1870s –US in : Grover Cleveland Critical for trust: prevents coercion Source of most complexity!

Voting Integrity

Polling Station Voting Cast as Intended? Butterfly Ballots in Florida Recorded as Cast? No Voter-Verifiable Audit Trail Tallied as Recorded? Equipment Audit and Certification

Internet Voting Cast as Intended? Viruses Recorded as Cast? Trusted Platform / Voter Verification Tallied as Recorded? Protocol Review and Auditing What about Coercion?

Absentee Voting Coercion problem is the same as Internet Voting

Cryptography & Universal Verifiability Every step is observable. Trust shifts from election officials to cryptographers.

So…? Voting is Difficult - Secret Ballot Transparency is Key Universal Verifiability is Possible Voting is not Commerce