Public Goods and Social Contracts Karl Sigmund University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg.

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Presentation transcript:

Public Goods and Social Contracts Karl Sigmund University of Vienna and IIASA, Laxenburg

Evolutionary games with cultural transmission

Simple cases

Prisoner‘s Dilemma

Example: Mutual Aid Game

Mutual Aid Game For 2-player groups, PD game Reciprocation helps (sometimes) to overcome the social dilemma But what if more than 2 players? Many economic experiments in game labs

Herrmann, Thöni, Gächter (Nature 2009)

Peer Punishment (self-justice)

Fehr and Gächter (Nature 2002)

Costly Peer Punishment To be a punisher is costly Opportunity for second-order free-riders (who contribute to Mutual Aid, but not to punishment) They do better than punishers if free-riders around (and equally well if not)

Peer Punishment vanishes Infinite population Strong selection Stationary distribution: 100 percent freeriders

Peer Punishment vanishes

Optional Mutual Aid Game

Optional Mutual Aid

Optional Public Good game

Optional, with peer punishment

Peer Punishment

Voluntary vs Compulsory Games

Peer punishment? Reputation effects (Hauert, Hilbe, Barclay) Consensus (Boyd, Gintis, Ertan, Puttermann…) Asocial punishment (Herrmann, Gächter, Nikiforakis…) Hardly any second order punishment Little peer punishment of free riders (Guala)

Peer punishment? Counter-punishment, asocial punishment John Locke (Two treatises on government, 1689): ‚…resistance (by defaulters) many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive, to those who attempt it‘.

Pool punishment

Optional Pool Punishment

Competition of pool with peer Second order free riders, Free riders, Non-participants, Peer punisher Pool punisher: without second order punishment stationary distribution

Competition of pool with peer

Without or with second order punishment Sigmund, DeSilva,Hauert, Traulsen (Nature 2010)

Mutual coercion, mutually agreed Whether in conditions of anarchy (peer punishment, i.e. self-justice) Or if institutions provide the sanctions, voluntary participation promotes cooperation self-committment No rational deliberation, just social learning

Du Contrat Social Jean-Jacques Rousseau ( ) ‚L‘homme est né libre, et les hommes sont partout dans les fers.‘

Experiments? Experimental Economics (2013) The evolution of sanctioning institutions. An experimental approach to the social contract (with Boyu Zhang, Cong Li, Hannelore DeSilva, Peter Bednarik)

Traulsen, Röhl, Milinski (Proc. Royal Soc. B, 2012) Kamei, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011) Markussen, Putterman, Tyran (preprint 2011) ‚Formal‘ vs. ‚Informal‘ sanctions Other experiments on Peer vs Pool

On offer: Peer Punishment Players see number of freeriders Can decide: Punish freerider? It costs a punisher 0.5 MU (Monetary units) to substract 1 MU from a freerider

On offer: Pool Punishment Alternatives: Contribute nothing (Freerider) Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game (2nd order free rider) Contribute 1 MU to Mutual Aid Game AND 0.5 MU to Punishment Pool (punisher) (for each 0.5 to Punishment Pool, each freerider is fined 1 MU) Two versions: First and second order punishment

25 practice rounds 5 rounds (a) Mutual Aid without punishment 5 rounds (b) Mutual Aid with peer punishment 5 rounds (c) Mutual Aid with pool punishment 10 rounds full game: choice between (a),(b),(c) and (d) (no participation)

50 rounds experiment 9 groups of play first-order version 9 groups of play second-order version

50 rounds experiment 9 groups of play first-order version 9 groups of play second-order version 6 end up with peer regime: 3 from each version 6 end up with pool regime: all second-order

Parallel histories

Time evolution

Contribution to Mutual Aid

Social learning of social contract Decisions to switch: 70 percent to higher payoff Decisions NOT to switch: 76 percent had optimal payoff After optimal payoff: 81 percent do not switch

Social learning of social contract ‚social learner‘ if at least 90 percent of decisions can be explained as switching towards higher payoff, or sticking with optimal payoff 80 percent of players social learners

Sanctioning institutions

Self-domestication? Blumenbach ( ): Humans as ‚the most perfect domestic animal‘ Konrad Lorenz ( ) ‚Verhausschweinung‘ (Fat belly, soft skin, neoteny, infantility)