Neighbourhood Structure in Games Soumya Paul & R. Ramanujam The Institute of Mathematical Sciences Chennai ACTS 2011.

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Presentation transcript:

Neighbourhood Structure in Games Soumya Paul & R. Ramanujam The Institute of Mathematical Sciences Chennai ACTS 2011

Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

The Model Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Related Work Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Michael J. Kearns, Michael L. Littman, and Satinder P. Singh. An efficient, exact algorithm for solving tree-structured graphical games. In NIPS, pages 817–823, 2001 Michael J. Kearns, Michael L. Littman, and Satinder P. Singh. Graphical models for game theory. In UAI, pages 253–260, 2001 H. Peyton Young. The evolution of conventions. In Econometrica, volume 61, pages 57–84. Blackwell Publishing, 1993 H. Peyton Young. The diffusion of innovations in social networks. Economics Working Paper Archive 437, The Johns Hopkins University, Department of Economics, May 2000 Heiner Ackermann, Heiko Röglin, and Berthold Vöcking. On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games. In In Proc. of the 47th Ann. IEEE Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), pages 613–622, 2006 Heiner Ackermann, Simon Fischer, Petra Berenbrink, and Martin Hoefer. Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games, 2008 Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Weighted Coordination Games Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

/5 3/5 Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

/5 3/5 x1x1 y2y2 y1y1 x2x2 Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Static Neighbourhoods Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Description of type t If payoff in round k > 0.5 then –play same action a in round k+1 else if all players with the maximum payoff in round k played a different action 1-a –play 1-a in round k+1 Else play a in round k+1 EndIf Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: Let G be a neighbourhood graph and let m be the number of neighbourhoods (cliques) and let M be the maximum size of a clique. If all the players are of the same type t then the game stabilises in at most mM steps. Proof Idea: Associate a potential with every configuration of the graph Show that whenever the configuration changes from round k to k+1 the potential strictly increases The maximum possible potential of the graph is bounded Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: Let G be a neighbourhood graph and let m be the number of neighbourhoods (cliques) and let M be the maximum size of a clique. If all the players are of the same type t then the game stabilises in at most mM steps. Proof Idea: Associate a potential with every configuration of the graph Show that whenever the configuration changes from round k to k+1 the potential strictly increases The maximum possible potential of the graph is bounded A weight or value unique for every configuration; independent of the history Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: Let G be a neighbourhood graph and let m be the number of neighbourhoods (cliques) and let M be the maximum size of a clique. If all the players are of the same type t then the game stabilises in at most mM steps. Proof Idea: Associate a potential with every configuration of the graph Show that whenever the configuration changes from round k to k+1 the potential strictly increases The maximum possible potential of the graph is bounded Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: Let G be a neighbourhood graph and let m be the number of neighbourhoods (cliques) and let M be the maximum size of a clique. If all the players are of the same type t then the game stabilises in at most mM steps. Proof Idea: Associate a potential with every configuration of the graph Show that whenever the configuration changes from round k to k+1 the potential strictly increases The maximum possible potential of the graph is bounded Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Dynamic Neighbourhoods Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Description of type t If payoff > 0.5 then –Stay in the same neighbourhood X ElseIf there is a player j in a different visible neighbourhood X’ who received the maximum (visible) payoff in round k and this payoff is greater than my payoff then –Join X’ in round k+1 Else –Stay in X EndIf Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: Let a game have n players where the dynamic neighbourhood structure is given by a graph G. If all the players are of the same type t, then the game stabilises in at most n n(n+1)/2 steps. Proof Idea: Same as before Associate a potential with every configuration of the graph Show that whenever the configuration changes from round k to k+1 the potential strictly increases The maximum possible potential of the graph is bounded Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

General Neighbourhood Games Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Theorem: A general game with n players and with either a static or a dynamic neighbourhood structure eventually stabilises if and only if we can associate a potential Φ k with every round k such that if the game moves to a different configuration from round k to round k + 1 then Φ k+1 > Φ k and the maximum possible potential of the game is bounded. Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Proof Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Unfolding of the game - configuration tree

Unfolding of the game - configuration tree Finite

M = max Φ CkCk

M+1

M = max Φ M+1

C k+1

Cycle!

Generalising Stability Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

√ √

√ √

√ √ √

√ √ √

√ √ √ √

X

X

X X

X X

X X X

Theorem: A general game with n players and with either a static or a dynamic neighbourhood structure eventually stabilises if and only if we can associate a potential Φ k with every round k such that the following holds: 1.If the game has not yet stabilised in round k then there exists a round k 0 > k such that Φ k0 > k 2.There exists k 0 ≥ 0 such that for all k, k’ > k 0, Φ k = Φ k’. That is, the potential of the game becomes constant eventually 3. The maximum potential of the game is bounded Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Proof Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Configuration tree (with simple cycles) Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Finite Configuration tree (with simple cycles) Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

No cyclic configuration implies simple cycle implies unfolding was not correct Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

No cyclic configuration implies simple cycle implies unfolding was not correct Cyclic configuration implies complex cycle present contradicts definition of stability Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games

Questions? Neighbourhood Sturcture in Games