Of 7 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Dov Gordon & Jonathan Katz University of Maryland.
Advertisements

Quantum t-designs: t-wise independence in the quantum world Andris Ambainis, Joseph Emerson IQC, University of Waterloo.
Of 23 09/24/2013HLF: Reliable Meaningful Communication1 Reliable Meaningful Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA.
Ulams Game and Universal Communications Using Feedback Ofer Shayevitz June 2006.
Of 35 05/30/2012CSOI-Summer: Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: Universal Semantic.
Of 12 12/04/2013CSOI: Communication as Coordination1 Communication as Coordination Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA -
Of 19 03/21/2012CISS: Beliefs in Communication1 Efficient Semantic Communication & Compatible Beliefs Madhu Sudan Microsoft, New England Based on joint.
Mixed Strategies.
Of 13 10/08/2013MSRNE 5 th Anniversary: Communication Amid Uncertainty1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research.
Of 29 12/02/2013Purdue: Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: -Universal Semantic.
Of 24 11/20/2012TIFR: Deterministic Communication Amid Uncertainty1 ( Deterministic ) Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, New England.
Of 30 10/31/2013Cornell: Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: -Universal Semantic.
Of 30 09/16/2013PACM: Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: -Universal Semantic.
C&O 355 Mathematical Programming Fall 2010 Lecture 12 N. Harvey TexPoint fonts used in EMF. Read the TexPoint manual before you delete this box.: AA A.
Other Issues in Game Theory BusinessNegotiationsContracts.
Negotiating a stable distribution of the payoff among agents may prove challenging. The issue of coalition formation has been investigated extensively,
ECO290E: Game Theory Lecture 5 Mixed Strategy Equilibrium.
EC3224 Autumn Lecture #04 Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
Of 30 09/04/2012ITW 2012: Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: Universal Semantic.
Of 29 May 2, 2011 Semantic Northwestern1 Universal Semantic Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research Joint with Oded Goldreich (Weizmann)
Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Lecture 12 Secure Multi-Party Computation.
Of 27 01/06/2015CMI: Uncertain Communication1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research Based on Juba, S. (STOC 2008, ITCS 2011) Juba,
ECO290E: Game Theory Lecture 4 Applications in Industrial Organization.
Of 13 October 6-7, 2010Emerging Frontiers of Information: Kickoff 1 Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research + MIT TexPoint fonts used in EMF. TexPoint fonts used.
Cheap Talk. When can cheap talk be believed? We have discussed costly signaling models like educational signaling. In these models, a signal of one’s.
Ecs289m Spring, 2008 Non-cooperative Games S. Felix Wu Computer Science Department University of California, Davis
Of 14 01/03/2015ISCA-2015: Reliable Meaningful Communication1 Reliable Meaningful Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA.
Of 32 October 19, 2010Semantic U.Penn. 1 Semantic Goal-Oriented Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research + MIT Joint with Oded Goldreich.
Of 10 Uncertainty in Communication1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: Universal Semantic.
Of 12 03/22/2012CISS: Compression w. Uncertain Priors1 Compression under uncertain priors Madhu Sudan Microsoft, New England Based on joint works with:
Amparo Urbano (with P. Hernandez and J. Vila) University of Valencia. ERI-CES Pragmatic Languages with Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach.
Games as Systems Administrative Stuff Exercise today Meet at Erik Stemme
PRISONER’S DILEMMA By Ajul Shah, Hiten Morar, Pooja Hindocha, Amish Parekh & Daniel Castellino.
Oded Regev (Tel Aviv University) Ben Toner (CWI, Amsterdam) Simulating Quantum Correlations with Finite Communication.
DANSS Colloquium By Prof. Danny Dolev Presented by Rica Gonen
UNIT III: COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
Communication Networks A Second Course Jean Walrand Department of EECS University of California at Berkeley.
Anonymizing Web Services Through a Club Mechanism With Economic Incentives Mamata Jenamani Leszek Lilien Bharat Bhargava Department of Computer Sciences.
Of 30 September 22, 2010Semantic Berkeley 1 Semantic Goal-Oriented Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research + MIT Joint with Oded Goldreich.
Of 33 March 1, 2011 Semantic UCLA1 Universal Semantic Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research + MIT Joint with Oded Goldreich (Weizmann)
Of 35 05/16/2012CTW: Communication and Computation1 Communication amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft, Cambridge, USA Based on: Universal Semantic Communication.
Public-Key Encryption with Lazy Parties Kenji Yasunaga Institute of Systems, Information Technologies and Nanotechnologies (ISIT), Japan Presented at SCN.
Digital Communications Math class.
Of 19 June 15, 2015CUHK: Communication Amid Uncertainty1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research Based on joint works with Brendan.
Bargaining with uncertain commitment: An agreement theorem
ECO290E: Game Theory Lecture 12 Static Games of Incomplete Information.
Learning in Multiagent systems
Communication & Computing Madhu Sudan ( MSR New England ) Theories of.
Toward a Secure Data-Rate Theorem Paul Cuff. Control Setting Controller Encoder System (Plant) Sensors Rate R UiUi XiXi YiYi.
Topic 3 Games in Extensive Form 1. A. Perfect Information Games in Extensive Form. 1 RaiseFold Raise (0,0) (-1,1) Raise (1,-1) (-1,1)(2,-2) 2.
Modeling Reasoning in Strategic Situations Avi Pfeffer MURI Review Monday, December 17 th, 2007.
Game Theory, Part 2 Consider again the game that Sol and Tina were playing, but with a different payoff matrix: H T Tina H T Sol.
Of 27 August 6, 2015KAIST: Reliable Meaningful Communication1 Reliable Meaningful Communication Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research.
The Price of Uncertainty in Communication Brendan Juba (Washington U., St. Louis) with Mark Braverman (Princeton)
Of 22 10/07/2015UMass: Uncertain Communication1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research Based on Juba, S. (STOC 2008, ITCS 2011)
Of 22 10/30/2015WUSTL: Uncertain Communication1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Harvard Based on Juba, S. (STOC 2008, ITCS 2011) Juba, S. (STOC.
Interactive Channel Capacity. [Shannon 48]: A Mathematical Theory of Communication An exact formula for the channel capacity of any noisy channel.
Gillat Kol (IAS) joint work with Anat Ganor (Weizmann) Ran Raz (Weizmann + IAS) Exponential Separation of Information and Communication.
CSI 4118Fall Part 1.1 Signals, Media, And Data Transmission.
Cheap Talk. When can cheap talk be believed? We have discussed costly signaling models like educational signaling. In these models, a signal of one’s.
By: Donté Howell Game Theory in Sports. What is Game Theory? It is a tool used to analyze strategic behavior and trying to maximize his/her payoff of.
Advanced Subjects in GT Outline of the tutorials Static Games of Complete Information Introduction to games Normal-form (strategic-form) representation.
Communication Amid Uncertainty
Communication Amid Uncertainty
Communication Complexity as a Lower Bound for Learning in Games
Communication Amid Uncertainty
Communication amid Uncertainty
Communication Amid Uncertainty
Uncertain Compression
Communication Amid Uncertainty
Presentation transcript:

of 7 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty1 Communication Amid Uncertainty Madhu Sudan Microsoft Research

of 7 Uncertainty in Communication? Always an issue … but usually uncertainty in channel of communication. Always an issue … but usually uncertainty in channel of communication. Lately, however … Also have to worry about uncertainty of communicating “agents” about each other. Lately, however … Also have to worry about uncertainty of communicating “agents” about each other. E.g.: How would you like to archive your family photographs “digitally” when you are uncertain which format will be viewable? Would you compress? E.g.: How would you like to archive your family photographs “digitally” when you are uncertain which format will be viewable? Would you compress? New class of questions … new solutions needed. New class of questions … new solutions needed. First, a new model. First, a new model. 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty2

of 7 Modelling uncertainty Classical Shannon Model 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty3 A B Channel B2B2B2B2 AkAkAkAk A3A3A3A3 A2A2A2A2 A1A1A1A1 B1B1B1B1 B3B3B3B3 BjBjBjBj Uncertain Communication Model New Class of Problems New challenges Needs more attention!

of 7 Example: Compression 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty4

of 7 Misunderstanding and Meaning Bits lead to action Bits lead to action How can sender ensure receiver understands instruction and acts accordingly? How can sender ensure receiver understands instruction and acts accordingly? Incentive? Incentive? Receiver may not want to follow sender’s instructions. Receiver may not want to follow sender’s instructions. Or receiver may not understand … Or receiver may not understand … Goal-oriented comm. [GoldreichJubaS.12] Goal-oriented comm. [GoldreichJubaS.12] Sender must have goal + sense progress. Sender must have goal + sense progress. Achievement of goal is “functional” defn. of communicating meaningfully. Achievement of goal is “functional” defn. of communicating meaningfully. Sufficient conditions for comm. meaningfully. Sufficient conditions for comm. meaningfully. 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty5

of 7 Communication as Coordination Game [Leshno,S.’13] Two players playing series of coordination games Two players playing series of coordination games Coordination? Coordination? Two players simultaneously choose 0/1 actions. Two players simultaneously choose 0/1 actions. “Win” if both agree : “Win” if both agree : Alice’s payoff: not less if they agree Alice’s payoff: not less if they agree Bob’s payoff: strictly higher if they agree. Bob’s payoff: strictly higher if they agree. How should Bob play? How should Bob play? Doesn’t know what Alice will do. But can hope to learn. Doesn’t know what Alice will do. But can hope to learn. Can he hope to eventually learn her behavior and (after finite # of miscoordinations) always coordinate? Can he hope to eventually learn her behavior and (after finite # of miscoordinations) always coordinate? Theorem: Theorem: Not Deterministically (under mild “general” assumptions) Not Deterministically (under mild “general” assumptions) Yes, with randomness (under mild restrictions) Yes, with randomness (under mild restrictions) 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty6

of 7 Thank You! 10/01/2013LIDS Lunch: Communication Amid Uncertainty7