Growth Empirics Key question in growth: What are the underlying, fundamental causes of s, q, A? How have some countries managed to attain high levels of.

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Growth Empirics Key question in growth: What are the underlying, fundamental causes of s, q, A? How have some countries managed to attain high levels of efficiency and investment? This question not likely to be settled purely theoretically – need to look at the data for answers Some theories: geography (Sachs, earlier) genetics (Galor, others) institutions (Acemoglu, others)

Growth Empirics Geography theory (Sachs) Can show geographic variables highly correlated with current income – e.g. latitude, land-locked, etc. Can argue this matters through health and productivity (disease burden), through access to trade/markets, etc. Beauty of this argument is that geography is clearly “exogenous” – there can be no reverse causality argument Ex.Being rich does not affect your latitude, so latitude must affect being rich. (Not necessarily so with institutions) (But even this can be argued: migration  endogenous geography)

Growth Empirics Institutions Acemoglu and others argued against geographic fundamentalism 2001 Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson AER paper, arguably most famous paper of the decade – “AJR” Basic argument: geography influenced institutions, which determined income. So yes, geography mattered, but only in affecting institutions; institutions are the most important fundamental determinant of income.

Growth Empirics AJR paper How do they argue institutions matter? Basic idea:Regress current income on current (or lagged) measures of institutions Income = log PPP GDP/capita 1995 Institutional measure = Freedom from Risk of Expropriation , from Political Risk Services company

Growth Empirics AJR paper

Growth Empirics AJR paper By itself this regression is problematic. Why? 1)Omitted Variables – are there third, unmeasured factors affecting both institutions and income? What might they be? Can they be fully controlled for? Can bias upward coefficient estimate 2) Reverse Causality – maybe richer countries can “afford” nicer institutions? Can bias upward coefficient estimate 3)Measurement error – hard to measure institutions, poor measurement can bias downward estimated coefficient

Growth Empirics AJR paper Their strategy is to instrument for institutions, i.e. to find an instrumental variable (IV) What must an IV do? Two things. Interested in the causal effect of X on Y. Z is a good instrumental variable for X if: 1)Z has a significant effect on X Can check this through looking at goodness of fit measures from a regression of X on Z (plus …) 2) Z must affect Y only through its effect on X, cannot have an independent effect on Y – “Exclusion restriction” Can’t perfectly check this, can argue for it

Growth Empirics AJR paper Their IV strategy uses the history of colonialism. They conjecture that -- where colonizers could safely settle, they settled in large numbers and set up productive institutions that protected property rights and were conducive to decentralized market production -- where colonizers could not safely settle, they did not settle much and set up extractive institutions meant to extract natural resources and stifle local enterprise and human capital IV = colonial-era settler mortality rate – death rate of colonizing settlers in a given colony

Growth Empirics AJR paper IV = colonial-era settler mortality rate – death rate of colonizing settlers in a given colony High death rate  low settlement rate  extractive institutions established  institutions persisted over time  low growth, low income today And the reverse To measure settler mortality, they comb historic records/books for occasionally reported mortality rates for soldiers, priests, settlers They extrapolate from nearby countries when mortality rates are not found

Growth Empirics AJR paper Is this a valid instrument? 1)Does settler mortality have a significant effect on modern-day institutions? They verify strong correlations, step by step: settler mortality predicts historical institutions historical institutions predict modern institutions modern institutions predict current income

Growth Empirics AJR paper Is this a valid instrument? 2) Does settler mortality affect today’s income only through its effect on institutions? How else could it matter? (As a proxy for) modern-day health (As a proxy for) modern-day geography (As a proxy for) mix of modern-day European citizens … AJR address these concerns by including these other variables and showing they do not affect the relationship btw settler mortality, institutions, and income

Growth Empirics AJR paper

Growth Empirics AJR paper

Growth Empirics AJR paper

Growth Empirics AJR paper Why is IV estimate greater than OLS estimate? They argue it is due to measurement error in institutions

Growth Empirics AJR paper – Critiques –Albouy (2012, AER) critiques the settler mortality data More than half the countries have data extrapolated from elsewhere Mortality rates often not comparable – priests vs. soldiers in barracks vs. soldiers on campaign –Glaeser, Shleifer et al. (2004) critique two aspects Measurement of institutions – better to use measures of constraints rather than outcome measures Exclusion restriction – did settlers bring only institutions, or other factors that mattered for economic growth, income? “guns, germs, and steel”, or human capital

Growth Empirics AJR paper – Critiques –Glaeser, Shleifer et al. use human capital instead of institutions

Growth Empirics AJR paper – Critiques –Glaeser, Shleifer et al. (2004) show that settlers may not have just brought different institutions, but different amounts of human capital Do AJR have an answer for this? They show the relationship between settler mortality and current income is not driven by the current European-descent population  it is not the human capital settlers passed down to descendants But, it could be the human capital that spilled over to the local population that is driving the relationship between settler mortality and current income … violating AJR’s exclusion restriction

Growth Empirics In general : problems with cross-country growth research –OLS has problems due to omitted variables and/or reverse causality Ex.Does high human capital cause high income, or the reverse? One way to deal with this has been to run regressions in differences rather than levels: growth of income, rather than level of income (or fixed effect panel regressions) But similar problems: do high rates of investment cause high growth, or does high growth induce high rates of investment?

Growth Empirics In general : problems with cross-country growth research (Partly drawing on Bazzi & Clemens 2013) –IV also has problems 1) Strength of instruments (Z should strongly predict X) Recently, dynamic panel data models developed by Arellano, Bond, Bover, others have become popular in cross-country growth research These use lagged levels of and differences of independent variables as instruments Satisfy the exclusion restriction under plausible assumptions But, often very weak in predicting the independent variable – weak instruments problem, biasing estimated coefficient

Growth Empirics In general : problems with cross-country growth research (Partly drawing on Bazzi & Clemens 2013) –IV also has problems 2) Exclusion restriction often likely to be violated Very hard at the country level to say Z affects Y only through X – countries are complex, and rarely do we know there is only one kind of effect from a given variable Ex.One of the most cited papers on corruption: Mauro (1995) shows that higher corruption associated with slower growth Uses IV = ethnolinguistic fractionalization (probability two randomly chosen citizens belong to different ethnolinguistic groups)

Growth Empirics In general : problems with cross-country growth research (Partly drawing on Bazzi & Clemens 2013) Ex.One of the most cited papers on corruption: Mauro (1995) shows that higher corruption associated with slower growth Uses IV = ethnolinguistic fractionalization (“ELF”) Idea: ELF affects corruption significantly, but affects growth only through its impact on corruption But: ELF could affect other aspects, e.g. provision of public goods, human capital, transaction/trade costs, etc. Indeed, later work found ELF significantly affects public good provision

Growth Empirics In general : problems with cross-country growth research (Partly drawing on Bazzi & Clemens 2013) Sometimes an IV can be a victim of its own success! This happens when later studies use an IV discovered/developed by an earlier paper. Ex.Settler mortality, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, land gradient (instrumenting for dams, electricity placement, etc.) The problem here is, if the IV works for one independent variable, it typically must work only for that one – if it works for others, then the exclusion restriction is violated Conclusion: Much empirical work on growth and development is now at the microeconomic level, not the country level