©DNVSlide no: 1 V A L E N C I A, S P A I N J U N E Surface Transport Technologies for Sustainable Development Risk Acceptance Criteria: Current proposals and IMO position Rolf Skjong, DNV
©DNVSlide no: 2 Background- Risk Assessment Nuclear Industry in 60s: Probabilistic Safety Assessments Chemical Industry in 70s: QRA, Seveso Directive I and II Offshore Industry in 80s: QRA, Industrial Self Regulation Regime in Norway, Safety Case Regimes in UK Shipping Industry in 90s: FSA – 92: UK House of Lords, Lord Carver Report – 93, MSC 62: UK proposes FSA concept – 97, MSC 68: FSA Interim Guidelines – 00, MSC 72, Norwegian proposal for acceptance criteria – 01, MSC 74: FSA Guidelines – 02, MSC 76, A number of decisions to be made based on FSA
©DNVSlide no: 3 Formal Safety Assessment Preparatory Step Step 1 Hazard Identification Step 2 Risk Analysis Step 3 Risk Control Options Step 4 Cost Benefit Assessment Step 5 Recommendations for Decision Making
©DNVSlide no: 4 New and Old Process
©DNVSlide no: 5 Methods to establish criteria (details in MSC 72/16) Comparison with other hazards – Is the hazard under consideration contributing significantly to risk? (For example infections, illnesses, home accidents) Comparison with natural hazards – For example earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding, lightening Comparison with risks we normally take – For example crossing the street, driving cars, bicycling Comparison with previous decisions – Present building codes, road standards, train safety, etc. Comparison with well informed decisions in democratic forums – Cases where risk results have been presented, debated, and a decision made
©DNVSlide no: 6 Individual Risk Intolerable ALARP Negligible /year /year /year Crew Passengers&3 rd parties Crew&Passengers Interpretation of HSE, and other standards adopted for ships High Low
©DNVSlide no: 7 Individual Risk
©DNVSlide no: 8 Societal Risk - FN Diagrams
©DNVSlide no: 9 Societal Risk - FN Diagrams
©DNVSlide no: 10 Individual and Societal Risk Individual and Societal risks are in ALARP area Individual and societal risks are not ALARP Cost Effectiveness Assessment (CEA) must be carried out to arrive at recommendations Societal risks for Bulk Carriers were recently close to intolerable or intolerable Note: Not all ship types included
©DNVSlide no: 11 Cost Effectiveness Criteria Changed by FSA to < >
©DNVSlide no: 12 Cost Effectiveness, Published Criteria
©DNVSlide no: 13 Cost Effectiveness, Societal indicators Skjong & Ronold (1998 )
©DNVSlide no: 14 Cost Effectiveness Criteria MSC 72/16 suggests: If health and injuries are not included explicitly, use £ 2 million per averted fatality as criteria, with a range from £ 1 to £ 5 million If health and injury are included explicitly, use £ 1 million as criteria, with a range from £ 0.5 to £ 2.5 million Currently the statistics relating to injuries and ill health is limited, as compared to fatalities
©DNVSlide no: 15 Status Today The new FSA Guidelines mention all proposed decision parameters No acceptance criteria in FSA Guidelines Seems to be accepted that most ship types are in the ALARP area, but not ALARP. Maybe some ship types that was not included in MSC 72/16 is in intolerable area (e.g. fishing vessels, large passenger ships, subgroups of standard ship types ) FSA Studies by Japan, IACS, Norway, and the UK/Int. all use the proposed criteria
©DNVSlide no: 16 Status Today- MSC 75 (May 2002) The committee listed all RCOs with an NCAF < $ 3 million in all studies (IACS, Japan, Norway, UK/Int.) The review process remains, and MSC 76 will decide The criteria may result in: – Double hull – Improved coating – Forecastle, Bulwark or Breakwater – Protected deck fitting – Stronger hatch covers – Hatch cover closing devices, indication of closure – Free fall lifeboat – Water ingress alarms – Immersion suits to all personnel Applicability(TBD) New/Existing, Handy, Panamax, Capesize
©DNVSlide no: 17 Status after MSC 76 (December 2002) IMO has made a well informed decision based on FSA and cost effectiveness assessment Assuming that IMO is rational: This will be the preferred reference point for all risk analysts The implicit or explicit criterion used may be used in later analysis and in safety equivalency documentation