Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 8.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
How do you lose property rights over something?. Example 5 A county ordinance requires houses to be set back 5 feet from the property line. Joe Potatoes.
Advertisements

The Role of Custom Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).  Appeal from decree enjoining building of fences.  Court rejected prescription because it.
13-1 Chapter 21 Law of Property: Real, Personal, and Intellectual.
THE LEGAL BASES OF PLANNING. TOPICS KEY QUESTIONS POLICE POWER & PLANNING EMINENT DOMAIN AND PLANNING TAKINGS & PLANNING HOW IS THE “PUBLIC INTEREST”
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2012 Lecture 8 (Two handouts in back of room)
American Free Enterprise. Land of Opportunity… American success due to: – Open land – Abundant natural resources – Talented labor supply fueled by immigrants.
An Economic Theory of Property
 Summary: The government protects the ownership of resources, such as land, personal possessions, physical assets, and intellectual property Examples:
The U. S. Economy: Private and Public Sectors
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2014 Lecture 10.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2012 Lecture 8.
Land Use Control of unreasonable land use * deprive use or value of adjacent land HI * physical vs. “intangible” LO * permanent vs. temporary * hard to.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 7.
The Judiciary and Eminent Domain:
Property II Professor Donald J. Kochan Spring 2009 Class March 2009.
APA Minnesota State Planning Conference St. Cloud, Minnesota September 30, 2011 Jean Coleman, Attorney/Planner CR Planning, Inc.
Chapter 28 Real Property. What Is Real Property Land- Includes not only that surface of the earth, but also the airspace above it and whatever is beneath.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2013 Lecture 9.
ES 6 UNDERSTAND SALES, CONSUMER, PROPERTY AND CYBER LAWS Objective 6.02 Understand property law BB30 Business Law 6.02Summer 2013.
7-1 Chapter 7— The Property-Based Legal System REED SHEDD PAGNATTARO MOREHEAD F I F T E E N T H E D I T I O N McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2010 by The.
Land Resource Economics Wednesday, Feb. 15. Characteristics of Land Unique – fixed in location Heterogeneous in topography, geology, hydrology, fertility.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 11 Land.
McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2011 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved. Chapter 23 Personal Property, Real Property, and Land Use Law.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2012 Lecture 6.
PUBLIC RESTRICTIONS ON OWNERSHIP. FOUR BASIC POWERS OF GOVERNMENT OVER REAL PROPERTY TAXATION ESCHEAT EMINENT DOMAIN POLICE POWER.
Chapter 5 Torts and Civil Law.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2011 Lecture 9.
Eminent Domain Why do we have it and how has it changed over the years?
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2014 Lecture 9.
 Real property is immovable and includes:  Land and Structures: land includes the soil, and all natural and artificial structures on it (unless agreed.
Balancing Private Property Rights and the Public Interest Rebecca Roberts.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2011 Lecture 8.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 6.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2010 Lecture 8.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2011 Lecture 6.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2010 Lecture 9.
Chapter 18 Intentional Torts. Intentionally With Purpose, done deliberately for a specific reason.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 4.
How Should the United States Government Carry Out Its Economic Role?
Balancing Private Property Rights and the Public Interest Rebecca Roberts.
What are Property Rights? 1.What is Property Ownership? 2.The bundle of sticks: a.The right to occupy the property b.The right to exclude others c.The.
Today’s Focus: How does the government use land for building? What rights to people have to stop the government from taking their land?
ARE 309Ted Feitshans07-1 Unit 7 Constitutional Limitations Regulatory Takings: Condemnation, Regulation and Impermissible Takings of Private Property.
Other Bill of Rights Protections Ch. 4, Les. 2. Rights of the Accused  The First Amendment protects five basic freedoms  Equally important is the right.
Takings and Public Trust Doctrine Beth C. Bryant, J.D. University of Washington School of Marine Affairs.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2013 Lecture 10.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2011 Lecture 6.
David H. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council U.S. Supreme Court 505 U.S June 29, 1992.
ES 6 UNDERSTAND SALES, CONSUMER, PROPERTY AND CYBER LAWS Objective 6.02 Understand property law BB30 Business Law 6.02Summer 2013.
Uniform Environmental Covenants Act March 7, 2005.
Published by Flat World Knowledge, Inc. © 2014 by Flat World Knowledge, Inc. All rights reserved. Your use of this work is subject to the License Agreement.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2015 Lecture 9.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2010 Lecture 6.
Eminent Domain Why do we have it and how has it changed over the years?
Chapter 5 The Free Enterprise System. Traits of Private Enterprise Section 5.1.
1 Click your mouse anywhere on the screen to advance the text in each slide. After the starburst appears, click a blue triangle to move to the next slide.
Regulation as Taking Prof. David Glazier April 10, 2007 PropertyProperty.
Power of the Market Free Enterprise.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2017 Lecture 9.
CHAPTER 38 Antitrust.
Injurious Affection and Nuisance
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON REGULATION
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2012 Lecture 9.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2010 Lecture 8.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Spring 2011 Lecture 9.
Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2016 Lecture 9.
Land Use Control of unreasonable land use
Agenda for 8th Class Admin stuff Handouts Slides Easements Nuisance
Slide Set Twenty-Three: Modern Challenges in Property Law – Land Use 3
Part D-I The Economics of Tort Law
Presentation transcript:

Econ 522 Economics of Law Dan Quint Fall 2009 Lecture 8

1  This week:  No office hours  No lecture Thursday  Next week:  Office hours Monday 1:30-3:30, and usual ones on Wednesday  HW #1 due Tuesday at 11 a.m. SHARP  Week after next:  Office hours Monday 1:30-3:30 (instead of Wednesday)  Midterm #1 Tuesday, in class Logistics

2  Intellectual property  What it is, what problem it solves, what other problems it creates  Types of public ownership, when to privatize a resource  Boundary maintenance costs vs cost of congestion/overuse  Fugitive property  First possession versus tied ownership rules  Proving property rights, and ways to lose them  Restraints on alienation  How much owners can restrict their heirs  Private necessity  Inalienability Last week…

3  More ways in which property rights are limited  Unbundling  Eminent domain/takings  Regulation  More on remedies when rights are violated Today, we wrap up property law…

4  Property: “a bundle of rights”  Can you unbundle them?  Separate them, sell some and keep others  Usually, no  Prohibition on perpetuities  I can’t separate the right to own/live on my land from the right to sell it or turn it into a golf course  But in some instances, yes… Unbundling

5  Land ownership consisted of three separable pieces (“estates”)  Surface estate  Support estate  Mineral estate Pennsylvania and coal

6  Free unbundling of property rights generally not allowed under common or civil law Unbundling

7  Free unbundling of property rights generally not allowed under common or civil law  Efficiency: allow unbundling when it increases the value of the property?  But if re-bundling the rights is costly, maybe not  Unbundling  uncertainty about rights  harder to trade Unbundling

8 More on remedies

9  Maximum liberty: owner can do whatever he/she wants, as long as it doesn’t interfere with another’s property  When it does interfere, externality, or nuisance  Affects small number: private externality, or private bad  Transaction costs low  injunctions preferable  Affects large number: public externality, or public bad  Transaction costs high  damages preferable Remedies (review)

10  Compensatory Damages  intended to “make the victim whole”  compensate for actual harm done  make victim as well off as before  Can be…  Temporary – compensate for harms that have already occurred  Permanent – also cover present value of anticipated future harm Types of damages

11  Temporary damages  Require victim to keep returning to court if harm continues  Create an incentive to reduce harm in the future  Permanent damages  One-time, permanent fix  No incentive to reduce harm as technology makes it easier Temporary versus permanent damages

12  If a nuisance affects a small number of people (private nuisance), an injunction is more efficient  If a nuisance affects a large number of people (public nuisance), damages are more efficient  If damages are easy to measure and innovation occurs rapidly, temporary damages are more efficient  If damages are difficult/costly to measure and innovation occurs slowly, permanent damages are more efficient  What’s done in practice for public nuisances?  temporary damages and injunction against future harm  but… Efficient nuisance remedies

13  Atlantic owned large cement plant near Albany  dirt, smoke, vibration  neighbors sued  plant was found to be a nuisance, court awarded damages  neighbors appealed, requesting an injunction  Court ruled that…  yes, this was a valid nuisance case  and yes, nuisances are generally remedied with injunctions  but harm of closing the plant was so much bigger than level of damage done that court would not issue an injunction  ordered permanent damages, paid “as servitude to the land” Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co (NY Ct of Appeals, 1970)

14  Atlantic owned large cement plant near Albany  dirt, smoke, vibration  neighbors sued  plant was found to be a nuisance, court awarded damages  neighbors appealed, requesting an injunction  Court ruled that…  yes, this was a valid nuisance case  and yes, nuisances are generally remedied with injunctions  but harm of closing the plant was so much bigger than level of damage done that court would not issue an injunction  ordered permanent damages, paid “as servitude to the land” Boomer v Atlantic Cement Co (NY Ct of Appeals, 1970)

15  One role of government: provide public goods  When public goods are privately provided  undersupply  Defense, roads and infrastructure, public parks, art, science…  To do this, government needs land  (which might already belong to someone else)  In most countries, government has right of eminent domain  Right to seize private property when the owner doesn’t want to sell  This type of seizure also called a taking Takings

16  U.S. Constitution, Fifth Amendment: “…nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”  Government can only seize private property for public use  And only with just compensation  Consistently interpreted to mean fair market value – what the owner would likely have been able to sell the property for Takings

17  Why allow takings? Takings

18  Why allow takings?  Why these limitations?  why require compensation? Takings

19  Why allow takings?  Why these limitations?  why require compensation? Takings $3 MM$1 MM $9 MM $10 MM

20  Why allow takings?  Why these limitations?  why require compensation?  why only for public use? Takings

21  Why allow takings?  Why these limitations?  why require compensation?  why only for public use?  The government should only take private property (with compensation) to provide a public good when transaction costs preclude purchasing the necessary property through voluntary negotiations Takings

22  1981: GM was threatening to close Detroit plant  Would cost city 6,000 jobs, millions in tax revenue  City used eminent domain to condemn entire neighborhood  1,000 homeowners and 100 businesses forced to sell  land then used for upgraded plant for GM  city claimed employment and tax revenues were public goods, which justified use of eminent domain  Mich Sup Ct: “Alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community” valid public purposes; “the benefit to a private interest is merely incidental”  Overturned in 2004 ruling (Wayne v Hathcock)  Similar case, Kelo v. City of New London (2005 US Sup Ct) Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit

23  1981: GM was threatening to close Detroit plant  Would cost city 6,000 jobs, millions in tax revenue  City used eminent domain to condemn entire neighborhood  1,000 homeowners and 100 businesses forced to sell  land then used for upgraded plant for GM  city claimed employment and tax revenues were public goods, which justified use of eminent domain  Mich Sup Ct: “Alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the community” valid public purposes; “the benefit to a private interest is merely incidental”  Overturned in 2004 ruling (Wayne v Hathcock)  Similar case, Kelo v. City of New London (2005 US Sup Ct) Poletown Neighborhood Council v Detroit

24 Regulation

25  1800s: PA Coal purchased mineral and support estates, Mahon owned surface  1921: Kohler Act prohibited “mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation.”  PA Coal sued government, claiming the regulation was same as seizing their land (without compensation)  “…While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Regulation: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon surface estate support estate mineral estate

26  1800s: PA Coal purchased mineral and support estates, Mahon owned surface  1921: Kohler Act prohibited “mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation.”  PA Coal sued government, claiming the regulation was same as seizing their land (without compensation)  “…While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Regulation: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon surface estate support estate mineral estate

27  1800s: PA Coal purchased mineral and support estates, Mahon owned surface  1921: Kohler Act prohibited “mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation.”  PA Coal sued government, claiming the regulation was same as seizing their land (without compensation)  “…While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Regulation: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon surface estate support estate mineral estate

28  1800s: PA Coal purchased mineral and support estates, Mahon owned surface  1921: Kohler Act prohibited “mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation.”  PA Coal sued government, claiming the regulation was same as seizing their land (without compensation)  “…While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.” Regulation: Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon surface estate support estate mineral estate

29  Support compensation for regulatory takings  Shifting burden of regulation from owners of affected property to all taxpayers  Equivalent to selling everyone insurance against harmful regulation  If such insurance were available, people would buy it  But it’s not available, so government should provide it Blume and Rubinfeld, “Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis”

30  Support compensation for regulatory takings  Shifting burden of regulation from owners of affected property to all taxpayers  Equivalent to selling everyone insurance against harmful regulation  If such insurance were available, people would buy it  But it’s not available, so government should provide it Blume and Rubinfeld, “Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis”

31  Support compensation for regulatory takings  Shifting burden of regulation from owners of affected property to all taxpayers  Equivalent to selling everyone insurance against harmful regulation  If such insurance were available, people would buy it  But it’s not available, so government should provide it Blume and Rubinfeld, “Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis”

32  Zoning laws  Distinguish industrial areas from residential areas More on regulation

33  Zoning laws  Distinguish industrial areas from residential areas  Nollan v California Coastal Commission (US Sup Ct, 1987)  Nollans owned coastal property  Asked for permit to expand building, which would diminish view  Commission: donate a public walking path, and you get permit  Supreme Court: such a deal only legal if there is clear connection – a nexus – between the harm being done and the remedy More on regulation

34  Zoning laws  Distinguish industrial areas from residential areas  Nollan v California Coastal Commission (US Sup Ct, 1987)  Nollans owned coastal property  Asked for permit to expand building, which would diminish view  Commission: donate a public walking path, and you get permit  Supreme Court: such a deal only legal if there is clear connection – a nexus – between the harm being done and the remedy More on regulation

35 Recapping property law

36  Why do we need property rights?  Coase: without transaction costs, initial allocation of rights doesn’t matter for efficiency – just need rights to be well- defined and tradable  Transaction costs  Normative Coase, Normative Hobbes Recapping property law

37  What things can be privately owned?  Public vs Private Goods; efficiency: private goods should be privately owned, public goods publicly provided/regulated  Private ownership should begin when boundary maintenance costs are less than losses due to overuse  Property rights over information – patents, copyrights  Different types of public ownership – common access, regulation, unanimous consent Recapping property law

38  What can (can’t) owners do with their property?  Maximum liberty  Nuisances – public and private nuisances  Rules against perpetuities  Emergency exception (private necessity)  Inalienability  Unbundling Recapping property law

39  How are property rights established?  Fugitive property, first possession vs tied ownership  Verifying legal ownership (deeds and car titles), acquiring title  Adverse possession, estray  Eminent domain/takings  What remedy is provided when property rights violated?  Injunctive relief vs damages  Temporary vs permanent damages Recapping property law

40  What are benefits and costs of…  having property rights at all?  expanding property rights to cover more things?  introducing an exception/limitation to property rights?  When will benefits outweigh the costs? Property law: the big-picture question End of material on first midterm  Next week: contract law  HW1 due next Tues, 11 a.m. sharp  Enjoy the day off Thursday, have a good weekend