Threat Independent Protection System

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Presentation transcript:

Threat Independent Protection System An active countermeasure system for helicopter applications Christer Zätterqvist October 18 2010 M-00015364 issue A

The objective Complete the mission objectives Achieve the same amount of landings as take-offs… Survivability Increased Aircraft Combat Survivability (PS) Susceptibility to threats (PH) Maximizing PS = 1 - PHPK|H (1- Susceptibility * Vulnerability) Increased likelihood for mission success

The problem A plethora of threats Small arms IR IR imaging RF Laser Multi-mode CLOS LLTV Wire Radio Unguided AIED …

Known threats MANPADS (SA-7, SA-14, SA-16, SA-18, Stinger, Mistral, HN-5, FN-6) IR AAM (AIM-9, AIM-132, IRIS-T, AA-8, AA-11) IR SAM (SA-9, SA-13) RF AAM (AIM-7, AIM-120, AA-9, AA-12) RF SAM (Command typ, SA-2, SA-3, SA-4, SA-5, SA-6, SA-8, SA-10, SA-15) IR/RF AAM (also IR/SARH Semi Active Radar Homing, AA-2, AA-6, AA-7, AA-10 CLOS (LLTV, Wire (RBS56, Bill), Radar (RBS23, Bamse), Radio Beam riders (RBS70/90, Starstreak) AT/RPG (AT4, Carl Gustav, RPG-7)

Non-decoy technology required Known threats Decoys possible Non-decoy technology required BR IR AAM gen. 4 Current capability RF SAM MANPADS gen. 4 CLOS IR AAM gen. 3 Threat technology MANPADS gen. 3 IR SAM IR AAM gen. 2 RF AAM IR AAM gen. 1 MANPADS gen. 2 IR/SARH AAM MANPADS gen. 1 AT/RPG Difficulty to decoy

MANPADS

Less known or emerging threats AIED Known attacks using AIED Envisioned to become more and more used as consumer electronics becomes more and more capable, sample components;

AIED Threat technology AIED Difficulty to decoy

AIED, a design example Verbal description

The problem in a nutshell A plethora of existing and emerging threats Limited knowledge of installed seeker/guidance technology Unguided threats do not respond to decoys Proliferation of developed weapons Development trend of consumer electronics

Downed helicopters in Iraq 1 68 helicopters lost to insurgent fire, resulting in 201 fatalities [1] Source; The Brookings Institution, Iraq Index October 1, 2007

Actions Preventive / Tactical Tactics Technical Layers of protection Arms control Port and border security Tactics Flying tactics and operating procedures Speed / altitude Situational awareness ConOps Technical Hardening of structure Ruggedized airframe Blast protection Signature reduction System redundancy Countermeasures Layers of protection Survivability = 1- (Susceptibility * Vulnerability)

Analysis, threat matrix Analysis of common threat characteristics Highly transportable Designed to fly… On-board propellant Similar physical attributes Similar kinetic energy

Analysis, proliferated threats

Result of analysis No such system exists today for flying platforms A CMDS is needed to address the plethora of current, emerging and future threats Use knowledge of common threat characteristics No such system exists today for flying platforms

TIPS, the idea To physically counter incoming threats regardless of guidance technology, if at all present....

Threat characteristics Counter threats with the following characteristics Portable by a single person Speed: 84 – 600 m/s Mass: 1,9 – 10,8 kg Body/warhead diameter: 4 – 10,5 cm Altitude: 0 – 3500 m Range to shooter: xx – 5000 m

Threat characteristics Threats smaller than 4 cm = HFI Angle/sector indication Range indication

TIPS, one system – all threats System functions Detect Launch Intercept Defeat

TIPS, one system – all threats System functions Detect Radar Short range High resolution 360° coverage Installed on the platform Launch Intercept Defeat

TIPS, one system – all threats System functions Detect Launch A directional launcher Azimuth and elevation Directed towards the incoming threat Launch of counter-projectile Sector inhibit function Intercept Defeat

TIPS, one system – all threats System functions Detect Launch Intercept Counter Projectile Short range Guided towards the incoming threat using own platform guidance data Defeat

TIPS, one system – all threats System functions Detect Launch Intercept Defeat Defeat mechanism The threat defeat mechanism is activated at a suitable distance from the incoming threat Remote or proximity activated Preferably non-explosive

TIPS system building blocks TDCU Tactical Display & Control Unit ADC Active Defense Controller SPU Safety Pin Unit Display Radar sensor Radar sensor Datalink Discrete signal Wireless datalink ADC SPU Sensor Controller Wireless Transceiver Launcher Radar sensor Radar sensor Counter Projectile(s)

TIPS system building blocks

TIPS connected to existing CMDS

Simulation

Sample installation, Super Puma

Conclusion Investigation shows it is possible to develop a system capable of defeating targeted threats Will affect platform ConOps Development cost is significant

Questions?