Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control Piotr Faliszewski University of Rochester Jörg Rothe Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.

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Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Control Piotr Faliszewski University of Rochester Jörg Rothe Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Lane A. Hemaspaandra University of Rochester Edith Hemaspaandra Rochester Institute of Technology COMSOC-08, Liverpool, UK, September 2008 My sincere apologies if you heard some of these results already at AAAI-07 Dagstuhl 2007 or AAIM-08.

Outline  Introduction Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) Control, bribery, and manipulation  Llull and Copeland Elections Model of elections Representation of votes Llull/Copeland rule  Results Control of elections Bribery and microbribery Hi, I am Ramon Llull. In 1299, I came up with the voting system that these guys now study!

Introduction  Computational Social Choice Applications in AI  Multiagent systems  Multicriteria decision making  Meta search-engines  Planning Applications in social choice theory and political science  Computational barrier to prevent cheating in elections Control Bribery Manipulation Computational agents can systematically analyze an election to find the optimal behavior.

Introduction  Many ways to affect the result of an election The Bad Guy wants to make someone win (constructive case) or prevent someone from winning (destructive case). The Bad Guy knows everybody else’s votes. Control  The Chair modifies the structure of the election to obtain the desired result. Bribery  The Briber, an external agent, bribes a group of voters and tells them what votes to cast  The briber is limited by some budget. Manipulation (not considered here)  Coalition of Agents changes their vote to obtain their desired effect. In my times it was enough that we all promised we would not cheat...

Outline  Introduction Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) Control, bribery, and manipulation  Llull and Copeland Elections Model of elections Representation of votes Llull/Copeland rule  Results Control of elections Bribery and microbribery Let me tell you a bit about my system...

Voting and Elections  Candidates and voters: C = {c 1,..., c m } V = {v 1,..., v n }  Each voter v i is represented via his or her preferences over C. Assumption: We know all the preferences  Strengthens negative results  Can be justified as well  Voting rule aggregates these preferences and outputs the set of winners. Hi v 7, I hope you are not one of those awful people who support c 3 ! Hi, my name is v 7. How will they aggregate those votes?!

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Not all voters are rational though! People often have cyclical preferences! Irrational voters are represented via preference tables.  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Irrational preferences  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Irrational preferences  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Irrational preferences  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Irrational preferences  Example > >

C = {,, } Representing Preferences  Rational voters Preferences are strict linear orders No cycles in single voter’s preference list  Irrational preferences > > >  Example > >

Llull/Copeland Rule  The general rule For every pair of candidates, c i and c j, perform a head-to-head plurality contest. The winner of the contest gets one point. The loser gets zero points. There are also tie-related points. At the end of the day, the candidates with most points are the winners.  Difference between the Llull and the Copeland rule? What happens if the head-to-head contest ends with a tie? Llull: Both get 1 point Copeland 0 : Both get 0 points Copeland 0.5 : Both get half a point Copeland  : Both get points, for a rational

Llull/Copeland Rule  For FIFA World Championships or UEFA European Championships: Simply use  = 1/3 as the tie value.  Difference between the Llull and the Copeland rule? What happens if the head-to-head contest ends with a tie? Llull: Both get 1 point Copeland 0 : Both get 0 points Copeland 0.5 : Both get half a point Copeland  : Both get  points, for a rational , 0<<1

Outline  Introduction Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) Control, bribery, and manipulation  Llull and Copeland Elections Model of elections Representation of votes Llull/Copeland rule  Results Control of elections Bribery and microbribery How will your system deal with my attempts to control, Mr. Llull...?

Control  Control of elections The chair of the election attempts to influence the result via modifying the structure of the election Constructive control (CC) Destructive control (DC)  Candidate control Adding candidates  Limited number (AC)  Unlimited number (AC u ) Deleting candidates (DC) Partition of candidates  with runoff (RPC)  without runoff (PC)  Voter control Adding voters (AV) Deleting voters (DV) Partition of voters (PV) My system is resistant to all types of constructive control!! Okay, almost all.

 Constructive Control (Bartholdi, Tovey, Trick; 1992) Plurality and Condorcet Voting in seven scenarios of constructive control Introduced the notions of  Immunity  Susceptibility  Resistance  Vulnerability  Bottom line: Plurality resists constructive candidate control and is vulnerable to voter control Condorcet: vice versa Previous Results: Control

 Destructive Control (HHR: AAAI-05, Art.Int. 2007) Plurality, Condorcet, and Approval Voting 20 constructive and destructive control scenarios  Bottom line: Mixed results: „The choice of one‘s voting system depends on the type of control one wants to avoid!“  Constructive Control (Bartholdi, Tovey, Trick; 1992) Plurality and Condorcet Voting in seven scenarios of constructive control Introduced the notions of  Immunity  Susceptibility  Resistance  Vulnerability  Bottom line: Plurality resists constructive candidate control and is vulnerable to voter control Condorcet: vice versa

 Question: Can we find/design a voting system having full resistance to control?  Hybridization Scheme (HHR: IJCAI-07) defines the Hybrid of k given candidate-anonymous election systems studies Hybrid‘s inheritance and strong inheritance of  Immunity  Susceptibility  Resistance  Vulnerability Hybrid Elections

 Question: Can we find/design a voting system having full resistance to control?  Hybridization Scheme (HHR: IJCAI-07) defines the Hybrid of k given candidate-anonymous election systems studies Hybrid‘s inheritance and strong inheritance of  Immunity  Susceptibility  Resistance  Vulnerability Hybrid Elections  Results (HHR: IJCAI-07)  There exists a voting system, the Hybrid of Condorcet, Plurality, and E not-all-one, that is resistant to all 20 standard types of control.  Downside: This hybrid system is rather artificial.  Upside: It proves that an impossibility result about full resistance to control is IMPOSSIBLE.

(FHHR: AAAI-07)  Control Scenarios AC & AC u – adding candidates DC – deleting candidates (R)PC – (runoff) partition of candidates AV – adding voters DV – deleting voters PV – partition of voters Results: Control Llull / Copeland 0 Plurality ControlCCDCCCDC AC u AC VRVR VVVV RRRR RRRR DCRVRR (R)PC-TPRVRR (R)PC-TERVRR PV-TPRRVV PV-TERRRR AVRRVV DVRRVV CC – constructive control DC – destructive control R – NP-complete V – P membership TP – ties promote TE – ties eliminate

The Complete Picture (FHHR: AAIM-08 & Monster-TR) Results: Control Copeland 0 Copeland 1 Copeland  0<  <1 ControlCCDCCCDC AC u AC VRVR VVVV RRRR VVVV DCRVRV (R)PC-TPRVRV (R)PC-TERVRV PV-TPRRRR PV-TERRRR AVRRRR DVRRRR R – NP-complete V – P membership Main Result: Copeland Voting is fully resistant to constructive control.

In addition, we have FPT results for:  All cases of voter control when the number of candidates is bounded, or when the number of voters is bounded.  All cases of candidate control When the number of candidates is bounded.  The above results hold: within Copeland  for each rational  in [0,1], both in the constructive and the destructive case, whether voters are rational or irrational, whether or not the input is represented succinctly, and even in the more flexible model of „extended control.“ Results: FPT & Extended Control  In contrast, Copeland  remains resistant for the table‘s 19 irrational-voter, candidate-control, bounded-voter cases.

Outline  Introduction Computational Social Choice (COMSOC) Control, bribery, and manipulation  Llull and Copeland Elections Model of elections Representation of votes Llull/Copeland rule  Results Control of elections Bribery and microbribery Mr. Llull. Let us see just how resistant your system is!

Bribery  E-bribery (E – an election system) Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of voters specified via their preference lists, p in C, and budget k. Question: Can we make p win via bribing at most k voters?  E-$bribery As above, but voters have possibly distinct prices and k is the spending limit.  E-weighted-bribery, E-weighted-$bribery As the two above, but now the voters have weights. Hmm... I seem to have trouble with finding the right guys to bribe...

Bribery  E-bribery (E – an election system) Given: A set C of candidates, a set V of voters specified via their preference lists, p in C, and budget k. Question: Can we make p win via bribing at most k voters?  E-$bribery As above, but voters have prices and k is the spending limit.  E-weighted-bribery, E-weighted-$bribery As the two above, but the voters have weights.  Result (AAAI-07 & AAIM-08) For each rational Copeland  is resistant to all forms of bribery, both for irrational and rational voters. Mr. Agent: My system is resistant to bribery!

Microbribery  Microbribery We pay for each small change we make If we want to make two flips on the preference table of the same voter then we pay 2 instead of 1 Comes in the same variants as bribery  Limitations Could be studied for the rational voters But we limit ourselves to the irrational case. We do not really need to change each vote completely... Yeah... It’s easier to work with the Preference Matrix™... Preference Table, I mean …

Microbribery  Microbribery We pay for each small change we make If we want to make two flips on the preference table of the same voter then we pay 2 instead of 1 Comes in the same variants as bribery  Limitations Could be studied for the rational voters But we limit ourselves to the irrational case.  Result (FHHR: AAAI-07 & AAIM-08) For each rational Copeland  is vulnerable to destructive microbribery. Both Llull and Copeland 0 are vulnerable to constructive microbribery. Uh oh... How did they do that?!?!?

Microbribery in Copeland Elections  Setting C = {p=c 0, c 1,..., c n } V = {v 1,..., v m } Voters v i are irrational  For each two candidates c i, c j : p ij – number of flips that switch the head-to-head contest between them  Approach If possible, find a bribery that gives p at least B points, and everyone else at most B points Try all reasonable B’s Validate B via min-cost flow problem

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success Cost = K(n(n-1)/2 - p-score) + cost-of-bribery

Summary  Copeland  elections possess: Broad resistance to control:  Full resistance to constructive control  Full resistance to voter control  Rational/Irrational  Unique/Nonunique winner Full resistance to bribery:  Constructive/Destructive  Rational/Irrational  Unique/Nonunique winner Vulnerability to microbribery:  In some cases for irrational voters  What about the other irrational cases?  Rational voters: ??? Arrgh! Llull, my agents are practically helpless against your system!

... and a Call for Papers „Logic and Complexity within Computational Social Choice“ To appear as a special issue of Mathematical Logic Quarterly Edited by Paul Goldberg and Jörg Rothe Deadline: September 15, 2008

Thank you! I‘d be happy to answer your questions!

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t source sink mesh source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success

Proof Technique: Flow Networks Notation: s(c i ) – c i score before bribery B – the point bound K – large number capacity/cost c1c1 cncn c2c2 p s t s(c 1 )/0 s(c 2 )/0 s(c n )/0 s(p)/0 B/0 B/K source sink mesh 1/p 10 1/p 21 1/p 20 1/p 2n source– models pre- bribery scores mesh – models bribery cost sink– models bribery success Cost = K(n(n-1)/2 - p-score) + cost-of-bribery

Microbribery: Application  Round-robin tournament Everyone plays with everyone else  Bribery in round-robin tournaments For every game there we know  Expected result  The price for changing it We want a minimal price for our guy having most points  Round-robin tournament example FIFA World Cup, group stage  3 points for winning  1 point for tieing  0 points for losing  Microbribery?

Microbribery: Application  Round-robin tournament Everyone plays with everyone else  Bribery in round-robin tournaments For every game there we know  Expected result  The price for changing it We want a minimal price for our guy having most points  Round-robin tournament example FIFA World Cup, group stage  3 points for winning  1 point for tieing  0 points for losing  Microbribery? Applies directly!! Given the table of expected results and prices … … simply run the Microbribery algorithm For FIFA: Simply use  = 1/3 as the tie value.