C HARLES R IVER A SSOCIATES Strengthening the Micro Foundations for Coordinated Interaction in Merger Analysis Andrew R. Dick Vice President.

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Presentation transcript:

C HARLES R IVER A SSOCIATES Strengthening the Micro Foundations for Coordinated Interaction in Merger Analysis Andrew R. Dick Vice President

Updated Approach to Coordinated Interaction  DOJ and FTC initiatives to modernize CI analysis  Moving from probabilistic statements to fact-specific inquiries  Stylized facts / correlations to micro-economic foundations  Theories focused on maverick firms, competitor asymmetries, and opportunities for mavericks to disrupt CI  Recent examples: label stock (DOJ), cruise lines (FTC)

Two Areas Warranting Further Analysis I. Should history matter, and if so, how? II. How will a merger affect transparency?

Three Steps Reality check Does the general phenomenon apply in the specific market? Micro-economic foundations How does the merger affect the phenomenon? Sensitivity check How big is the effect ?

I. Should History Matter, And If So, How?  In practice, courts have placed substantial weight on history  History of price-fixing (FTC v. Elders Grain)  History of tacit coordination (FTC v. Cardinal Health)  History of price leadership (FTC v. H.J. Heinz)  History of cooperation in general (Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC)  History has shaped how agencies have heard evidence and influenced where they have set the bar  These approaches appear to be guided by correlations, rather than micro-economic theory  History used as a summary statistic for unobservables

Reality Check  Empirical evidence is very mixed  Seemingly low recidivism rates in time series studies (Dick JLE 1996)  Recidivists tend to be shorter-lived (Dick JLE 1996)  But, some case studies do suggest learning by doing (Baker JLE 1989 and Alexander REStat 1994)

Micro-economic Foundations for History  Agencies must ask: “Has history mattered in this market?” and “How will history affect CI after this proposed merger?”  Empirical evidence that history has mattered  E.g., CI continued after the demise of suspect practices  Incorporation of micro-economics of history into the specific competitive effects theory  History can help build current understandings  History can reveal firms’ “types”  History can “teach” firms how to coordinate  History can improve the accuracy of current and future monitoring

Sensitivity Check  Have “salient characteristics of the market changed appreciably” since the historical episode? (HMG  §2.1) Has entry occurred ? Has the geographic market broadened ? Have power buyers emerged ? Have capacity constraints been relaxed ?

II. How Will a Merger Affect Transparency?  Courts give substantial weight to transparency “Secrecy is the antithesis of successful collusion” (US v. ADM)  Agencies also highlight transparency Relevant factors include “the availability of key information concerning market conditions, transactions and individual competitors” (HMG § 2.1)  Intuition: transparency improves reaching terms of coordination, detecting deviations, and punishing deviations

Reality Check  How accurate is competitor intelligence? Compare merging parties’ actual prices against pre-merger intelligence Compare prices against third-party industry intelligence  Have changes in transparency led to changes in pricing? Danish antitrust agency published cement transaction prices, leading average prices to rise 15-20% (Albaek, Molgaard & Overgaard JIE, 1997)  Have transaction prices closely tracked announced prices? In US v. ADM, court noted that while price changes were routinely pre- announced, transaction prices differed substantially.

Micro-economic Foundations for Transparency  Explain how this merger will increase transparency E.g., Premdor-Masonite CIS (DOJ)  Transparency of what ? Direct information: strategy choices (price, output) ? Indirect information: payoffs (profits, market shares) ?  Discount appropriately for strategic customers and signal jamming incentives

Sensitivity Check  How much better informed will merging parties (or other firms) be after the merger?  Can we quantify the merger’s impact on the signal-to-noise ratio?

Should History Matter, And If So, How?  Courts have placed substantial weight on history  History shapes how agencies hear evidence and where they set the bar  History has been used as a summary statistic for unobservable factors  Reality check: empirical evidence is very mixed  Goal: incorporate micro-foundations for history into the competitive effects theory

How Will a Merger Affect Transparency?  Courts and agencies give substantial weight to transparency  Intuition: transparency improves reaching terms of coordination, detecting deviations, and punishing deviations  Reality check: how good is the evidence in fact?  Goal: explain how this merger will increase transparency