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1) Why is Non-Profit Dominant? 2) What is their Objective? 3) Cost Shifting vs. Price Discrimination 4) How do Hospitals Compete? 5) Consolidation 6) Pricing 2
Downward trend in the number of hospitals Expected to continue as consolidation continues and care moves out of the hospital. For-profit hospitals are on the rise, but Nonprofits are still a large majority, why? 3
NFP do not distribute accounting profit to individual equity holders Rather it goes as a dividend to its sponsors NFP exempt from corporate income and property taxes Better access to tax exempt bond financing Eligibility for private donations For-profits have access to tax exempt bonds and can raise equity capital through sale of stock 4
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Contract failure Asymmetric information Shopping problem Trust between patient and physician Public goods Inertia Many “nonprofits” make a large profit Tax exempt vs. nontax exempt 6
Most firms exist to maximize profits But for a NFP, what is their objective? “Profit” Maximization No Margin, no mission? Utility Maximization Physician Control 7
Costs and Pricing Uncompensated Care 4.5% vs 4% Quality Entry and Exit NFP quicker to enter a new market and slower to exit Bottom Line: Very hard to “see” a difference 8
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Price Discrimination – Selling different units of output at different prices based on the buyer’s willingness/ability to pay Senior citizen discounts, hardback vs. paperback books, new car prices, hospital pricing Cost Shifting – special case of price discrimination where the lower price from one group causes the firm to charge higher prices to another Both require some degree of market power, but cost shifting implies more Firm not maximizing profits to begin with Payer is passive/powerless 11
Hospital are victims of inadequate public spending “hospitals shifting costs from Medicare to private payers and employers is seen as the number one reason for higher medical cost trends [of private insurers].” PwC A dollar reduction in public payment will result in a dollar increase in private payment 2007 study estimates $88.8 Billion shifted to private insurers $51.0 from hospitals (24.8 Medicare, 16.2 Medicaid) 37.8 from physicians (14.1 Medicare, 23.7 Medicaid) Relying on the private sector to curb health care spending will be inadequate. 12
Most economist don’t buy it Thought experiment Empirical support is limited Some evidence prior to the 1990s Much less evidence in recent research Unless…. Hospital consolidation 13
Normally competition leads to lower prices and decreased costs. In hospitals it is often argued the opposite occurs. Some research shows that when hospital markets become more competitive there is increased costs and higher prices to consumers Policy implications are to discourage competition 14
Medical Arms Race “Consumer-Driven” Competition Hospitals compete not in the price/quality space but in a “relative” competition Physicians Perceived quality relative to competitors Incentive to over-invest in technology and expand into “unprofitable” services 15
Policy Reaction to MAR CON Laws Hospitals must justify the need is there for a particular service or facility prior to adding it. Non CON states such as Texas have seen some of the largest examples of this type of behavior Anti-Trust Policy Implication is that monopolies are not so bad Mergers that would have been blocked in other industries have been allowed in hospitals 16
Evidence on MAR Research prior to the 1990s tends to find that when markets become more competitive, then there is an increase in costs and consumers face higher prices. Contrary to standard economic theory Research looking at data in the 1990s found the opposite: More competitive markets resulted in lower prices and costs 17
Payer Driven Competition When hospitals compete for patients via insurance contracts, we find markets tend to work well. In most markets the individual paying the bill and consuming the product are the same so this is not an issue Selective contracting By the end of the 1990s the Medical Arms Race was considered dead But as consumers have demanded choice in providers, selective contracting has become much less selective Robotic Surgery Proton Beam Therapy Children’s hospitals Policy should be focused on getting providers to compete for contracts. 18
Consolidation Trends in the 1990s 19
Rise of Local Hospital Systems 20
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The Affordable Care Act represented a "tectonic shift" in the way hospitals do business and many are left with few choices but to be acquired or merge with another entity. 22
Affiliation Most flexible form of consolidation Utilized to increase footprint, gain economy of scale, create referrals, etc. Do not necessarily change management or governance Joint Venture Mildly flexible Used to create something new that might be overwhelming to do solo Shared governance Some form of profit/risk sharing 23
Joint Operating Agreement Virtual mergers – assets may separate but services are coordinated New overarching governance board, but hospitals maintain independent boards as well May borrow for capital investments as one organization Similar to JV but larger 24
Merger Mutual decision of two companies to combine Leadership may be a combination of the two hospitals or from an outside source Hospitals absorb each other’s assets and debts Acquisition Purchase of one hospital by another 25
Horizontal Consolidation Hospital to hospital Vertical Consolidation Hospital to physician practice Hospital to long-term care Hospital/physician group to payer 26
Economies of Scale As the size of the organization increases the average cost of producing the good declines Specialization of labor Efficient use of capital Lower input prices for buying in bulk HITECH ICD-10 (18,000 to about 150,000 codes) New forms of financing Accountable Care, Bundled Payment and other forms of capitation Consolidations lead to lower costs, benefit consumers 27
“Hospitals with private rates below 160 percent of Medicare will have difficulty” Journal of Healthcare Management 28
Bargaining power If consolidation helps hospitals by allowing them to negotiate better rates from payers, then this is not good for the consumer. From the hospital’s perspective it doesn’t matter if it is economies of scale or bargaining power, but from society’s perspective it matters 29
Coordination Essential for delivering high quality care Breaking down the silos Competition Essential for innovation and driving higher value There needs to be a balance If coordination leads to integration that can reduce competition Need to watch quality and quantity as well as price 30
Hospital pricing has received much attention lately Prices that private plans pay are opaque to both consumers and to payers Details of contracts are kept secret Complexity of medical care Employers and employees pay the prices but are not aware of the contract details Silos in health care 31
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It is clear that high prices lie at the heart of the health spending problem in the US We don’t fully understand why prices vary across services and across providers. Research from the Center for Studying Health System Change, September 2013 Examined 13 metropolitan areas 34
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High degree of variation in pricing both within and across markets Larger for outpatient than inpatient 5 of the 13 markets are in Michigan which has an unusually concentrated insurance market One insurer has 70% of market share Yet even here there is large variation 37
Reference Pricing Payer sets a maximum amount for a specific procedure Other “value based” insurance contracts “Nudge” consumer to high value providers – similar to prescription drug formularies Return to selective contracting Regulation All-Payer Model Price Transparency 38
1) Dominance of Non-Profit – contract failure most logical, although less likely to apply today 2) Non-profits competing goals of profit and utility maximization 3) Cost Shifting and Price Discrimination are two different things 4) How hospitals compete makes a difference 5) Trend in consolidation is a two-edged sword 6) Pricing?? 39