Mind and Body Clark Wolf Department of Philosophy Iowa State University

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Cognitive Computing 2012 The computer and the mind DUALISM Professor Mark Bishop.
Advertisements

Zombies Philosophy of Mind BRENT SILBY Unlimited (UPT)
The value of certainty. Foundationalists suppose that true beliefs held with certainty (indubitable) together with logical and linguistic analysis offer.
What is it like to be me? Trying to understand consciousness.
Lecture 20 Theories of Consciousness, Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem.
The Cogito. The Story So Far! Descartes’ search for certainty has him using extreme sceptical arguments in order to finally arrive at knowledge. He has.
Michael Lacewing Is the mind the brain? Michael Lacewing © Michael Lacewing.
Metaphysics Part II. Thought Experiment: Physical & Mental Properties A1. 2 more objects: quarters, books, grass… A2. 2 more physical descriptors: green,
HUMAN NATURE AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY HUME PHILOSOPHY 224.
Philosophy 1010 Class 7/17/13 Title:Introduction to Philosophy Instructor:Paul Dickey Tonight: Finish.
Philosophy 4610 Philosophy of Mind Week 12: Qualia Friends and Foes.
Consciousness A Hard Question. New Area for Psychology Philosophers have long discussed consciousness. Philosophers have long discussed consciousness.
Consciousness and The Self Joe Lau Philosophy HKU.
Mind and Body I Bodies and Ghosts, Qualia, and Mind-Brain identity.
Substance dualism: do Descartes’ arguments work? Michael Lacewing
The Modal Argument. Review: The “Hard Problem”  Remember that there are three arguments that make consciousness a ‘hard’ problem. 1. Knowledge Argument.
Terminology Materialism: The universe consists entirely of physical stuff. Normally associated with the contemporary scientific view of the world.
Mind, Body and Philosophy
Preliminary For our purposes, Physicalism = Materialism. Jackson is a “qualia freak”; he believes qualia are non-physical.
The metaphysics of mind: an overview Michael Lacewing
The knowledge argument Michael Lacewing
Descartes argument for dualism
Doubting Mind-Body Dualism
Philosophy of Mind Matthew Soteriou.
Philosophy of Mind Week 3: Objections to Dualism Logical Behaviorism
Finding our way back  The initial result of Descartes’ use of hyperbolic doubt is the recognition that at least one thing cannot be doubted, at least.
“Epiphenomenal Qualia”. Book is in the Bookstore!
Announcements A draft of the review sheet is online. Check back on Friday for the complete version. The final exam is Wednesday June 10 th from 4-7 PM.
This week’s aims: To set clear expectations regarding homework, organisation, etc. To re-introduce the debate concerning the mind-body problem To analyse.
Mind-Body Dualism. The Mind-Body Problem The problem of explaining how a mind is connected to and interacts with a body whose mind it is, or the problem.
Human Nature 2.3 The Mind-Body Problem: How Do Mind and Body Relate?
René Descartes ( AD) Meditations on First Philosophy (1641) (Text, pp )
The argument from neural dependency A natural consequence of dualism should be that the mind itself is not damaged whenever the brain is damaged. A natural.
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 14 Minds and Bodies #3 (Jackson) By David Kelsey.
© Michael Lacewing Substance and Property Dualism Michael Lacewing
MIND April 30, 2011 Phil 233. Central Question A chief feature of the mind is consciousness. And a central philosophical question concerning the mind.
Descartes’ Interactionist Dualism. Overview Descartes’ general project Descartes’ general project Argument for dualism Argument for dualism Explanation.
Philosophy of Mind: Theories of self / personal identity: REVISION Body & Soul - what makes you you?
Property dualism Key Words Learning objective:
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 13 Minds and Bodies #2 (Physicalism) By David Kelsey.
Descartes’ divisibility argument
Thought experiment Consider whether the person next to you might be a philosophical zombie. 1.List the evidence you have for thinking they have a mind.
Blindsight, Zombies & Consciousness Jim Fahey Department of Cognitive Science Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute 10/4/2007.
The Mind-Body Problem & What it is like to be a bat.
The Mind And Body Problem Mr. DeZilva.  Humans are characterised by the body (physical) and the mind (consciousness) These are the fundamental properties.
Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience Topic 1: An Overview.
An Outline of Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy
Substance and Property Dualism Quick task: Fill in the gaps activity Quick task: Fill in the gaps activity ?v=sT41wRA67PA.
This week’s aims  To test your understanding of substance dualism through an initial assessment task  To explain and analyse the philosophical zombies.
Substance and Property Dualism
Personal Identity.
Perception, the Brain, and Consciousness
Minds and Bodies.
The Search for Ultimate Reality and the Mind/Body Problem
Descartes’ conceivability argument for substance dualism
The zombie argument: responses
Descartes, Meditations 1 and 2
Introduction to Philosophy Lecture 14 Minds and Bodies #3 (Jackson)
The Problem of Consciousness
Describing Mental States
Michael Lacewing The zombie argument Michael Lacewing
Unscramble The Words What are these key terms from the current theory we’re looking at? Finicalmounts Callaroues Ipunt Optutu Relegatedgunkmown Nupmat.
Get Yourself Thinking…
What did I google to find this picture?
What keywords have we used so far
Property Dualism - Recap
What is good / bad about this answer?
Perception, the Brain, and Consciousness
The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness:
Presentation transcript:

Mind and Body Clark Wolf Department of Philosophy Iowa State University

Body and Mind:

Dualism and Monism Dualism: Mind and body are different substances that interact but which are essentially different Monism: There is only one “substance” involved in mind/body. Mind and body are not distinct entities.

Monism: ultimate reality is all one kind of thing. Physicalism: Mind and body are both physical entities. Idealism: Mind and body are both mental entities. Neutral Monism: The ultimate ‘stuff’ of reality is neither mental nor physical.

DESCARTES: Mind and Body: Descartes is a Dualist: he argues that mind and body are different, separate substances. Here is one Cartesian argument for Dualism: 1) If one substance has a property P while another substance lacks property P, then the two substances are not identical. 2) I can doubt the existence of my body: my body has the property of 'dubitability'. 3) I can't doubt the existence of my mind: my mind lacks the property of dubitability. 4) Therefore my mind is a different substance from my body.

Descartes’s Argument for Dualism: Reservation: is 'dubitability' a property of things or of thinkers? Perhaps premises two and three say more about Descartes thought processes than about the things Descartes is considering.

Considerations Suggesting Physicalism: Contemporary Neuroscience assumes physicalism. Physical Evidence (Anasthesia, etc) Mind-Brain Identity and “Split Brain” cases.

Split Brain

KEY RING EXPERIMENT: ‘Key ring’ is flashed on a screen for a tenth of a second so that ‘key’ appears in the left visual field and ‘ring’ in the right. If split-brain subjects are asked to say what they saw, they respond that they saw ‘ring’ and show no sign of seeing ‘key’. But, if they are asked, instead, to retrieve with their left hands the object named on the screen from an array of items concealed from sight, they will pick out a key while rejecting a ring. Asked to point with the left hand to the object named on the screen, they point to a key or a picture of a key and not to a ring or a picture of a ring. If they are allowed to use both hands to pick out the object named from an array of items hidden from sight, their left and right hands work independently, the right settling on a ring while rejecting a key and the left doing the opposite. Someone seems to have seen ‘key’. Someone else seems to have seen ‘ring’. No one seems to have seen ‘key ring’. With suitable controls, input from the other sensory modalities, except taste, can also be confined exclusively to one hemisphere. When a response depends upon it, split-brain patients behave in similar abnormal ways.

Split Brain

“The standard explanation of such behaviour is roughly as follows. The structure of the visual system assures that the left half of the field of vision is conveyed to the right hemisphere and vice versa. Normally, information about the contralateral visual field is supplied to each hemisphere by neural communication across the commissures and by subsequent eye movement. Since the commissures of split-brain patients are severed and the short exposure time serves as a control for eye movement, their right hemispheres see only the word ‘key’ and their left only the word ‘ring’. In most people, speech production is localized in the left hemisphere; and so the oral response to the question reports only what the left hemisphere saw: the word ‘ring’. The left hand is primarily controlled by the right hemisphere; so it retrieves the object the right hemisphere saw named – a key – and points to a key or a picture of a key. (Notice that this explanation presupposes speech comprehension in the mute right hemisphere.) Similarly, the right hand is primarily controlled by the left hemisphere, thus accounting for the independent search of items concealed from sight. The failure to elicit any response suggesting that ‘key ring’ was seen is that the contents of the visual field available to each hemisphere are not the same and, because of the severing of the commissures and the experimental controls, not communicated to the opposite hemisphere.”

Split Brain

Split Brain?

Split Brain What do these cases tell us about the relationship between “mind” and “body?” What do these cases tell us about the concept of the “self?”

Unified Self? How Many Minds? Four interpretations of the data: As Nagel points out, there seem to be several different interpretations of the data. He distinguishes the following (I collapse his first two interpretations into (1) below): 1) The patients have one mind associated with the left hemisphere; the responses associated with the right hemisphere are not the activities of a mind at all. 2) The patients have two minds (one associated with each hemisphere), one of which can talk and one of which cannot. 3) The patients have one mind, involving both hemispheres, which is not as well integrated as normal minds. 4) In normal situations, the patients have one normal mind, but the experiments in question cause this mind to split into two.

Nagel’s View: None of these solutions work. This should lead us to call into question the concept of the “self,” or the “unified self” that plays such a role in Descartes. Next: Zombies and Phenomenal Consciousness.

Zombies?

Case 1: Mary (Frank Jackson) “Mary, a leading neuroscientist who specializes in color perception. Mary lives at a time in the future when the neuroscience of color is essentially complete, and so she knows all the physical facts about colors and their perception. Mary, however, has been totally color-blind from birth. (Here I deviate from the story’s standard form, in which—for obscure reasons—she’s been living in an entirely black- and-white environment.)” “Fortunately, due to research Mary herself has done, there is an operation that gives her normal vision. When the bandages are removed, Mary looks around the room and sees a bouquet of red roses sent by her husband. At that moment, Mary for the first time experiences the color red and now knows what red looks like. Her experience, it seems clear, has taught her a fact about color that she did not know before. But before this she knew all the physical facts about color. Therefore, there is a fact about color that is not physical. Physical science cannot express all the facts about color.”

Mary (Frank Jackson) Is there a further fact about that would not be known, even by someone who knew all the physical facts? If so, does this show that physicalism is not true?

Case 2: Zombies? “Consider a zombie. Not the brain- eating undead of movies, but a philosophical zombie, defined as physically identical to you or me but utterly lacking in internal subjective experience. Imagine, for example, that in some alternative universe you have a twin, not just genetically identical but identical in every physical detail—made of all the same sorts of elementary particles arranged in exactly the same way. Isn’t it logically possible that this twin has no experiences?”

Zombies Are zombies conceivable? If they are conceivable, does this show that they are possible? If they are possible, does this show that there is more to consciousness than the physical facts?

P1. I can conceive of zombies (or a zombie world), i.e., creatures that are physically identical to conscious beings but entirely lack consciousness (a world physically identical to ours but entirely devoid of consciousness). P2. If zombies (or a zombie world) are conceivable, then they (it) are metaphysically possible. C1. Zombies (or a zombie world) are metaphysically possible. (P1, P2) P3. If zombies (or a zombie world) are metaphysically possible, then facts about consciousness are facts over and above the physical facts. C2. Facts about consciousness are facts over and above physical facts. (C1, P3) P4. If physicalism is true, then there are no facts (about consciousness) over and above the physical facts. C3. Physicalism is false. (C2, P4)

Case 3: Aristotle’s Brain Suppose I knew all of the physical facts to be known about Aristotle’s brain state, at the time when he was writing Book V of the Nichomachean Ethics. Would I then know everything there is to be known about Aristotle’s conscious state at that moment? Or might I still fail to know what it was like to be Aristotle?