ASSESSING FACTORS THAT MAKE FOR EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING BY JUDE COCODIA Presented at University of Nottingham PGR Conference, Politics Without Borders

TABLE OF FACTORS INSTITUTIONAL POLICY 1.MANDATE 2.FUNDING 3. SIZE OF CONTINGENT 4.INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION 5.INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL WILL 6.SETTING TIME FRAMES 1.PEACEKEEPER TRAINING 2.LOCAL INITIATIVE 3.WOMEN PARTICIPATION ETHICAL STRUCTURAL 1.STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP (Lead State and Individuals in the field) 2. IMPARTIALITY OVER NEUTRALITY 1. DOMESTIC/NATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE 2.SIZE AND DEMOGRAPHY OF MISSION AREA

INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS MANDATES: Precise Mandates = Tallying with realities on the ground Porous Mandates = Exceeding Peacekeepers Capacity FUNDING: Manpower, Finance and Equipment. INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION: Often tied with funding, but support comes in various forms, eg, sharing intel & logistics SIZE OF CONTINGENT: Conveys Force Posture which prompts settlement and provides assurance to parties willing to peace. Recommended size: 1 soldier – 200 civilians (AU Operation Democracy Comoros (+), Somalia (-)) INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL WILL: Often tested by rapid deployment of peacekeepers once decision to intervene is taken. ENTRY/EXIT & SETTING TIME FRAME: When an aggressor has been established and to prevent genocide (Burundi (+) CAR (-)). Setting a time frame for missions.

POLICY FACTORS PEACEKEEPER TRAINING: Adequate training for military, police and civilian peacekeepers. Getting the right civilian expertise and keeping military role streamlined to providing security rather than expanding it to encompass diplomacy and welfare LOCAL INITIATIVE: Involvement of the local people in the peace process. This makes them see the peace as theirs rather than imposed (Burundi and Rwanda (+)) WOMEN PARTICIPATION: Encouraging women participation in the peace process (Burundi and Comoros (+))

ETHICAL STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: Peacekeeping especially in Africa has been dependent on the presence of a Lead State. They fill the gap on order from the authorising IGO pending when the coalition can deploy (South Africa in Burundi, Ethiopia in Somalia, Nigeria in Liberia). Individual Leadership: Charisma and Expertise of Field Commanders often contributes to success (Gen Shagasha in Somalia (+). Lacking this often facilitates failure (Nigerian Generals in Sierra Leone (-)). IMPARTIALITY OVER NEUTRALITY: The need to stay impartial to mission mandate, in today’s many brutal civil conflicts, often stands opposed to being neutral (Mali and the DRC)

STRUCTURAL DOMESTIC/NATIONAL POLITICAL CLIMATE: Cooperation among national elites facilitates the peacekeeping process towards success. (Eg. Rwanda after the genocide (+), South Sudan (-)) Size and Demography of Mission Area: The size of the country and its population, its population distribution facilitate peacekeeping’s success. (ie the smaller the area and more compact the population the better). Some experts disagree with this however and contend that more depends on a state’s natural wealth which encourages external interference from MNC’s.

RATING EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS HYPOTHESIS SUMMARYMAESAMIBAMISOM Mandates tailored to realities on ground and mission capacity, make for effective peace operations Adequate funding leads to effectiveness of PSO. The more proportionate the size of the PS contingent to the population, the more effective a PSO. More international collaboration means better PSO’s Greater international political will, better PSOs Set times for entry and duration enhances PSO effectiveness Peacekeepers trained for expanded roles, enhances PSOs. More local initiative means greater efficiency Incl More women participation leads to better PSOs. Having a lead state augurs for effective PSO. Impartiality over Neutrality makes PSOs more effective. Domestic political support enhances PSOs Size of conflict area affects PSO effectiveness.

CONCLUSION I HOPE YOU HAVE ENJOYED THIS PRESENTATION.