Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010 Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

Session Outline Limitations under CSAs The Additional Protocol Information on mines and concentration plants Information on imports/exports Information on future plans

Limitations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

Objective of Safeguards Provide Assurances on the Correctness and Completeness of a State’s nuclear material declarations

What kind of assurances? Under a CSA alone, only credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material can be provided More information and access is required to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole

Some of the limitations under CSAs Focuses on declared materials at strategic points in declared facilities (access limited) Covers only partially the nuclear fuel cycle No assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities (completeness)

Political changes in 1990-1995 Dissolution of the former Soviet Union South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme DPRK Indefinite extension of NPT

IAEA Board of Governors (March 1995) “…the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities”

Strengthening Programme June 1995 Programme 93+2 measures divided into Part I (within existing authority) and Part II (new authority needed) June 1996 An open-ended committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate the legal instrument for additional authority

The Additional Protocol

The Model Additional Protocol New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540) Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement

better tools for verifying the correctness and completeness Objective Provide the IAEA with better tools for verifying the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations

Measures of the additional protocol State’s provision of extended declaration Inspector’s broader access rights Better administrative arrangements, e.g. visas The Secretariat’ proposal for the early provision of design information was accepted by the BOG but it has to be incorporated in the general part of Subsidiary Arrangements (SA) before it becomes an obligation for the State. At this point, every State with significant nuclear activities has so amended their SAs. The additional information sought under CSA legal authority was specifically information on SSAC, information on past nuclear activities including closed-down and decommissioned facilities and available historical records to the extent relevant to assessing the completeness of current declarations description of nuclear fuel cycle and other nuclear activities with nuclear material Unannounced inspections provided for in paragraph 84 INFCIRC/153, emphasis was given to them as a Part I measure because of administrative (e.g. multi-entry visas) and technical obstacles we hoped to deal with Environmental sampling approved as an objective measure shown to be technically feasible paragraph 74 (e) INFCIRC/153 Remote monitoring to include unattended equipment, remote transmission of inspection date, remote monitoring of SGs egp.

Coverage under a CSA CSA If we go back to the picture of the nuclear fuel cycle. Waste Storage CSA

Expanded coverage with an AP And look at the expanded coverage with an AP. We now cover the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and the back end. Also, importantly, we get information and access to equipment manufacturers and locations where R&D on the nuclear fuel cycle not involving nuclear material is taking place. Waste Storage CSA AP

Extended declaration on nuclear material Domestically produced source material Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes Locations and uses of exempted material Waste containing terminated nuclear material

Extended declaration on nuclear-related facilities and activities Co-located nuclear infrastructure Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated) Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material State’s future plans

Example (Training Map – Artificial Information) RBA, RURITANIA 1 APRIL 2001 (Training Map – Artificial Information)

Broader access rights All places in nuclear installations or on sites All other places where nuclear material is located Decommissioned facilities Some locations where nuclear-related activities are conducted Other locations, under certain circumstances

Better administrative arrangements Simpler inspector designation No visas or multi-year multiple entry visas Modern communications capabilities

mines and concentration plants Information on mines and concentration plants

Mining U and Th naturally occurring Uniformly distributed on Earth in rock forming minerals, sands Various techniques: Open Pit Underground In-situ leach Tails reworking 22

Open Pit Mine Arlit mine, Niger Large wide pit dug to reach orebody. Ore mined from pit bottom - hauled by road up sides. Most suitable for orebodies: near the surface Large volume - low grade A solid volume (not long and thin or fragmented veins) Orebody oriented horizontally Waste to ore ratio generally increases with depth Examples: Rössing, Ranger, Akouta 23

Underground Mine Shaft head frame at Dolní Rožínka, Czech Republic Underground at MacArthur River, Canada Ore mined orebody below ground and hauled through shafts or declines to surface. Most suitable for orebodies that are: Deep Narrow/vertical High grade Fragmented Waste to ore ratio not depth dependent Examples: MacArthur River, Olympic Dam 24

In-situ Leach Yellowcake drying and packaging Reagent Supplies * Control room Monitoring wells Well house Injection well Recovery well Uranium deposit Uranium Extraction Thickeners Evaporation ponds Upper Aquifer Impermeable Zone Mineralized Aquifer Leach solution injected into the orebody through wells and extracted through others dissolving uranium from the ore between. Mining method with least physical impact Suitable for orebodies that are: In porous host material In confined aquifers Examples: Smith Ranch, Beverley * Acid or alkaline depending on chemistry of Uranium layers 25

Tailings reworking Tailings (waste) material from old uranium or other mines may be processed again for uranium. Stored in large piles or dams. Advantage is material at surface and milled. Suitable when: Technology/price has improved Uranium was not previously extracted Tailings are old (oxidised) Examples: WERGO (West Rand) 26

Reporting of mining materials and activities Safeguards activities are currently limited Nuclear material accountancy is not applied to uranium ore concentrates (UOC) but exports are reported Mine and mills sites annual production are declared under an additional protocol.

Information required under Article 2.a.(v) Location, operational status, and production capacity Approximate annual production for the State as a whole Annual production for individual mines or plants if requested by the Agency

Information on imports / exports

Information required under Article 2. a Information required under Article 2.a.(ix) - Exports of Annex II Items Annex II lists “nuclear use” equipment and non-nuclear material in 7 major categories Information required about the identity, quantity, location of intended use for each export of Annex II equipment or material Agency may request confirmation by importing State Reporting on a quarterly basis

2.a.(ix) – Reactor Components

2.a.(ix) – Non-Nuclear Material

2.a.(ix) – Reprocessing

2.a.(ix) – Fuel Fabrication

2.a.(ix) – Enrichment

2.a.(ix) – Heavy Water Production

2.a.(ix) – Uranium Conversion Plants

Information on State’s future plans

Information required under Article 2.a.(x) - Fuel Cycle Plans Government approved plans for nuclear fuel cycle Fuel cycle R&D specifically included For next 10-years

Conclusion

The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the strengthened safeguards system The Additional Protocol increases Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities

The tools of additional protocol allows the Agency to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a pre-requisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards Close cooperation with SSACs is necessary