Outcomes in Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE Program Post-2000 Judith Mashinya World Wildlife Fund

Outline  Background  Case studies Mahenye (2004) Nyaminyami (2006)  Findings

Governance  Current focus on governance  Complex bundle of interacting variables Devolution, participation Transparency, corruption control Accountability, capacity

conservation Logic of CBNRM development governance revenue adverse external changes incentives +

CAMPFIRE  First National CBNRM  Major donor funding  Limited devolution  Substantial success through 2000  90% of revenue from sport hunting

Post-2000 changes  End of donor funding Withdrawal of NGOs End of oversight and support  Beginning of national crisis Political struggle Economic collapse

Mahenye case study (2004)

Mahenye case study  Cited as model project up through 2000  After 2000, CAMPFIRE leadership taken over undemocratically  Decline of social and economic benefits  E.g. household dividends <US$1/household; no new community projects  Elite capture

Nyaminyami case study (2006)

Nyaminyami case study  Also highly regarded up through 2000  After 2000, lack of accountability of councilors  Decline of social and economic benefits  E.g.: 2005 hunting revenue ~US$750k, no disbursements, no investment in community projects  Elite capture

Summary of post-2000 outcomes Evidence from Mahenye and Nyaminyami External conditions Donor funding ends; national crisis begins. Local governanceElites capture benefits; end to transparency, accountability, participation Project revenuesRevenue reduced, but still sufficient to provide useful benefits. Development outcomes Household dividends decline to ~0; community investments decline to ~0 Conservation outcomes Poaching remains minor; key wildlife populations stable or growing.

Conclusions  Some mechanism to ensure good governance — transparency, accountability, devolution and participation — is essential  Current conditions in Zimbabwe make progress unlikely over the short term