Operational Security Risk Metrics: Definitions, Calculations, Visualizations Metricon 2.0 Alain Mayer CTO RedSeal Systems

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Presentation transcript:

Operational Security Risk Metrics: Definitions, Calculations, Visualizations Metricon 2.0 Alain Mayer CTO RedSeal Systems

2 Overview Operational Security Metrics -Objectives -Definitions -Calculations Visualizing Metrics -Objectives -Paradigm -Examples

3

4 External threat Limited to DMZ External threat Limited to DMZ

5 This second hop looks mild enough, but ….

6 This (and only this) third hop breaks in!

7 4 th hop is anywhere you want to go

8 Metrics: Goals and Non-Goals We believe that useful metrics need to include the following: Relative scoring of hosts: allow the user to assess which networked machines are the most exposed; which are the most at risk, etc. Trending: allow the user to track the all metrics of a network host over time. Prioritization of workload: allow the user to decide what mitigation actions are the most overall effective in reducing risk in the environment Scalability: allow the user to quickly find the needle in a large haystack We decided not to focus on the following None of our metrics convey any absolute semantic None of our metrics involve actual probabilistic calculations None of our metrics represent monetary loss

9 Metrics Choice 4 key metrics for each host in the infrastructure: -Exposure Score -Business Value -Risk Score -Downstream Risk Score

10 “Exposure” Reachability Ease of exploit of vulns Hosts deeper inside Summary of the 4 Key Metrics Threat Source Threat Source Host VulnsServices “Business Value” Default is highest value service “Risk” Exposure X Business Value “Downstream Risk” Cumulative Risk over hosts attackable from here

11 CVSS Temporal Scores for each Vulnerability on Host H Context of Host H in the RedSeal Threat Map Exposure Algorithm Exposure Score of Host H Exposure

12 Exposure Score Exposure is a number between 0 and 1 Exposure measures the likelihood of a host being attacked from an un-trusted source by taking into account: -The distance of a host is to an un-trusted source in the Threat- Map -The number of vulnerabilities on the host -The difficulty of exploiting the vulnerabilities on the host (CVSS) -The difficulty of exploiting the vulnerabilities on other hosts that precede this host in the Threat Map

13 Exposure Score of Host H Business Value of Host H Risk Algorithm Risk Score of Host H Risk

14 Risk Score of Host H Risk Score for each host reachable from H in the RedSeal Threat-Map RedSeal Downstream Risk Algorithm Downstream Risk of Host H Downstream Risk

15 Downstream Risk Score Downstream Risk is an unbounded number Downstream Risk measures accumulative risk to the host itself and all the other hosts that follow this host in the Threat Map -In principle, downstream risk calculations traverse the threat map bottom up, in reverse order to the exposure calculation. -It aggregates risk scores from hosts representing leaves in the threat map towards the predecessor nodes. -Again, we aggregate the risk along strongest paths only. A user typically takes care of the few clearly high-scoring hosts, then re- analyzes and re-assesses the situation.

16 Visualization Scale to tens of thousands of hosts Work with highly complex relationships Highlight patterns and exceptions Enable quick root cause analysis -Interactive drill down Reflect natural hierarchies -Subnets -Locations -Functionality – Service -Platform –OS

17 Tree Maps “Tree Map” is a space-constrained visualization of large hierarchical structures. It is very effective in showing attributes of leaf nodes using size and color coding. Enable users to compare nodes and sub-trees even at varying depth in the tree, and help them spot patterns and exceptions in large data sets. First designed by Shneiderman at Univ of Maryland in the 90’s. By now, this paradigm is being used for visualizing financial markets (see, e.g., gene expression results in bio-technology, daily news, and many more.

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23 Summary Presented a new application for Tree Maps Some users have immediate affinity – some users need more getting used to Effective way in conjunction with more traditional network topology based visualization -Allows to quickly spot patterns and drill down No immediate punch list (a reporting function).

24 Summary / Open Issues Presented 3 security metrics – Exposure, Risk, DownStream Risk -“opinion-based math” -Never questioned by users  good or bad?? Still too complex? Making it even simpler  Hop Count -Closed system – not comparable with any other calculation

25 Most DMZ servers can ONLY attack inside DMZ

26 CVSS CVSS (Common Vulnerability Security Scoring) -Base Metrics: access location, access complexity, authentication, CIA impact -Temporal Metrics Exploitability, Remediation Level (Patch, etc), Confidence in Available Data -Environmental Metrics: Collateral Damage, Target Distribution See

27 Exposure Calculation Aggregate CVSS (temporal) score for each vulnerability Use threat map context for Host X -FOR each predecessor Host A_i in the threat map DO Determine Host X’s accessible vulnerabilities from Host A_i Group the vulnerabilities by service (e.g., all smtp vulnerabilities, all http vulnerabilities, etc) Determine the top vulnerability for each service according to the CVSS temporal scores. Determine which services contain the highest CVSS temporal scores, and keep the top three values (one per service). If there are fewer than three values, then just use as many as there are Perform inclusion-exclusion calculation on the previous scores to arrive at a exposure score from Host A_i to Host X -Compute: Exposure(Host X)  MAX_i (Exposure(Host A_i) * Exposure(Host A_i, Host X));

28 Exposure Note that the above calculation replaces inclusion- exclusion for predecessor nodes with a simple MAX (Last Step). Paths which cause the larger exposure score on their own are favored in the calculation. We found that secondary weaker paths only contributed slightly to the overall score, but were very costly to compute. For similar reasons, the inclusion-exclusion among all vulnerabilities on hosts has been reduced 3 inputs for inclusion-exclusion, using the highest scoring vulnerabilities among each service. became prohibitively expensive in an environments with close to 10K hosts.

29 Risk Score Risk is a number between 0 and 100 Risk measures at the same time the: -The likelihood a successful attack -The impact of a successful attack