Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks in the EU Gillian G.H. Garcia IMF Rosa M. Lastra Queen Mary University of London ESFRC.

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Bankruptcy and reorganization procedures for cross-border banks in the EU Gillian G.H. Garcia IMF Rosa M. Lastra Queen Mary University of London ESFRC María J. Nieto Banco de España

The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necesssarily represent those of their institutions 5/5/20152

Outline Motivation What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? A review of the literature Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? Policy recommendations 5/5/20153

Motivation First, it assesses the economic efficiency of the institutional framework defined by the Reorganization and Winding-Up Directive (2001/24/EC) in light of the relevant literature Second, it explores areas of coordination with other EU directives that also deal with relevant aspects in the bank financial crisis management Third, identifies aspects that can hamper efficient cross-border bank resolutions, on which policy makers should focus at the time of reforming the present framework. 5/5/20154

Motivation Despite the existence of a single market in financial services, supervision and crisis management in the EU remains nationally based constrained by the domain of domestic jurisdictions (Lastra, 2003) Under a threat to the systemic stability, EU Ministers of Finance committed to the recapitalization of sound “vulnerable systemically relevant financial institutions” However, in this new environment, it may still be possible that cross-border banks may be reorganized or wound up. It is in the unwinding of the present government support measures where conflicts might arise among national regulators and tax payers. 5/5/20155

Outline Motivation What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? A review of the literature Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? Policy recomendations 5/5/20156

A review of the literature What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? – Eisenbeis and Kaufman (2006) claim that the public policy objective of resolving banks should be to reduce costs (public and private –liquidity and credit-) and permit free entry and exit of failed banks at minimal cost to society. – Hüpkes (2003) argues that the public policy objective should be to preserve critical functions two legal approaches for dealing with banks in crisis: – Lex generalis (the general insolvency law with exceptions) – Lex specialis (special laws designed for banks, which still may include some involvement of the courts of Justice in the actual insolvency procedures) – Campbell (2003) identifies the main obstacle to achieving major progress towards the international harmonization of bank insolvency laws as deciding whether to utilize a "special resolution regime" or a general bankruptcy law. 5/5/20157

A review of the literature What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? – Lex generalis: Insolvency law (special exceptions for banks) o Narrowly defines specific conditions that trigger bank intervention o Requires generally that creditors or management petition the court to intervene (exceptions) o Differences in the pre insolvency regime regarding differential treatment of shareholders and creditors  need to observe certain procedural requirements and publicity limits objective of minimizing credit and liquidity losses  Bliss (2007) "rush to the exit" that bankruptcy attempts to avoid o Not particularly aimed at preserving financial stability 5/5/20158

A review of the literature What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? – Lex specialis: Under special administrative rules o Supervisors´ involvement in the bank resolution process  Broad discretion to decide when to intervene o To the extent that action is prompt and there is no supervisory forbearance (more in a cross border environment, Mayes, Nieto and Wall, 2008), limited (if any) losses to insured depositors and to qualified borrowers to continue to use their existing credit lines  bank privatization o The authorities take control of all or part of a bank (or of its assets and liabilities) through a "bridge bank” o The resolution authority aims primarily at maintaining depositor and creditor confidence and financial stability 5/5/20159

A review of the literature What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? – Recent challenge: systemically important non-bank institutions Should they also be subject to a lex specialis that would allow for the efficient management of their reorganization and winding up? 5/5/201510

Outline Motivation What should the objectives of the policy maker be in the banks´ reorganization and winding up ? A review of the literature Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? Policy recomendations 5/5/201511

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? Directive 2001/24/EC: Objectives are rather narrow: “elimination of any obstacles to the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services within the Community " 5/5/201512

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? What Directive 2001/24/EC does? It ensures mutual recognition and co-ordination of these procedures by the Member States, based upon the principle of home-country control It embraces the principles of unity and universality, single entity approach to liquidation, and the equal treatment of creditors (Campbell, 2003, Hadjiemmanuil, 2005 and Nierop and Stenström, 2002) 5/5/201513

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? What Directive 2001/24/EC does not do? Harmonize national legislation concerning re-organization measures and winding-up proceedings  EU Countries vary on their perception of what falls under the Directive's definition of reorganization measures and winding up proceedings (Table 5) Harmonize the authority (administrative or judicial) and the grounds that trigger the reorganization and winding up procedures Define a common rule of bank closure Establish the obligation to inform third parties (OJ of the EU) Have a group-wide approach to winding up and reorganisation Have a consistent approach with the other two safety net regulators: prudential supervision, and deposit insurance…particularly relevant when reorganization /winding up authorities excluded from 2008 MoU 5/5/201514

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? 5/5/ The 2001 Directive is neither aimed at preserving EU financial stability nor at limiting public and private costs of bank crisis resolution EU Directives on supervision, reorganization and winding up, deposit insurance lack consistent and comprehensive approach to cross border banks´ crisis management

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? Table : Coordination between supervision, deposit insurance and crisis resolution 5/5/201516

Does the existing EU institutional framework guarantee those objectives? 5/5/ Table: Supervisor´s remedial powers as the situation deteriorates

Policy recomendations 5/5/ Need of a comprehensive approach to the reform of the reorganization and winding up of cross border banks (ECOFIN acknowledges) Priority to ensuring the convergence of supervisory powers and disciplinary actions  framework for early intervention by colleges of supervisors based on common triggers (acknowledging limitations in the case of systemic crisis) Greater harmonization of depositor protection schemes is also warranted and, among other aspects, in relation of their role as resolution agencies

Policy recomendations 5/5/ The reform of the reorganization and winding Directive should focus, in the short term, on: (a) The broad and clear definition of reorganization and winding up that encompasses the varied existing procedures; (b) The common definition of bank insolvency  Trigger the deposit guarantee; (c) The inclusion of subsidiaries and, possibly, of systemically important investment firms; (d) The creation of a coordinating structure among resolution authorities and deposit guarantee schemes that would facilitate a coordinated action if not their inclusion in the 2008 MoU; (e) Common and precise information requirements (including time limits) to host member states (common formats) even before the intervention as well as to the Official Journal of the European Union once the intervention has taken place.

Policy recomendations 5/5/ The reform of the reorganization and winding Directive should focus, in the medium term, on: (a)Establishing a "special resolution regime" for cross- border EU banks in which prudential supervisors of the home and hosts countries (colleges) would be heavily involved Confer upon the competent authorities a wide range of tools that can be applied with flexibility and regulatory discretion (b) Contemplate the possibility of delegation of the host resolution authority (if the scope of the Directive is widened to include the subsidiaries) to the home country resolution authority