The Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID) Report for 2010 Ryan Barnett WASC WHID Project Leader Senior Security Researcher

Ryan Barnett - Background Trustwave SpiderLabs Research Team Web application firewall research/development ModSecurity Community Manager Interface with the community on public mail-list Steer the internal development of ModSecurity Author “Preventing Web Attacks with Apache”

Community Projects Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Project Leader, ModSecurity Core Rule Set Project Contributor, OWASP Top 10 Project Contributor, AppSensor Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) Project Leader, Web Hacking Incident Database Project Leader, Distributed Web Honeypots Project Contributor, Web Application Firewall Evaluation Criteria Project Contributor, Threat Classification The SANS Institute Courseware Developer/Certified Instructor Project Contributor, CWE/SANS Top 25 Worst Programming Errors

Session Outline OWASP Risk Rating Methodology The Challenge of Risk Analysis for Web Applications WASC Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID) Overview 2010 Status Report Top Trends Comparing the OWASP Top 10 vs. the WHID Top 10

OWASP Risk Rating Methodology #Step 1: Identifying a Risk #Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood #Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact #Step 4: Determining Severity of the Risk #Step 5: Deciding What to Fix #Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model

OWASP Risk Rating Methodology

The Challenge of Risk Analysis for Web Applications: Analyzing Public Incidents

Risk Rating Problem Instead of being concerned about what CAN happen (theoretical scenarios), perhaps we should first be dealing with what IS happening (analysis of real-world web compromises)…

Publicly Quantifying Web Incidents is Challenging Incidents are not detected ~156 day lapse between compromise and detection* Vast majority of cases the merchant did not identify the intrusion – a 3rd party did based on fraud detection (card brands and banks)* Logging Issues - poor logging and/or no one reviewing them for signs of compromise

Publicly Quantifying Web Incidents is Challenging Victims hide breaches Defacement (visible) and information leakage (regulated) are publicized more than other breaches Example - Banks are not forced to disclose when individual customer funds are stolen

Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID)

WASC Web Hacking Incident Database (WHID)

Tracking Public Web Compromises

WHID Goals Raise awareness of real-world, web application security incidents Provide data for the following Risk Rating steps: #Step 2: Factors for Estimating Likelihood What application weaknesses are actively being targeted? #Step 3: Factors for Estimating Impact What outcome are you worried about? #Step 5: Deciding What to Fix Prioritized listing of remediation issues #Step 6: Customizing Your Risk Rating Model Customized view based on your vertical-market

WHID Data Data Samples (statistically insignificant) Focus on % rather than raw numbers Inclusion Criteria Only publicly disclosed, web related incidents Incidents of interest Defacements of “High Profile” sites are included Ensure quality and correctness of incidents Severely limits the number of incidents that get in

WHID Data: Community Submittal Form Community incident submission leverages crowdsourcing Project team validation ensures quality

WHID Database Content ~216 incidents for 2010 Incidents since 1999 Each incident is classified Attack type Application Weakness Outcome Country of organization attacked Industry segment of organization attacked Country of origin of the attack (if known) Vulnerable Software Additional information: A unique identifier: WHID 200x-yy Dates of occurrence and reporting Description Internet references

Real-Time Statistics Browse real-time data Drill down in to incident details Pivot on key variables (year/vertical market)

Real-time, Searchable DB WHID data is available year-round Useful for application developers and researchers Search by Attack method Outcome Source geography and many more…

Geographic Views

Monitoring WHID Updates

WHID 2010 Status Report

What Vertical Markets are Attacked Most Often?

What are the Goals for Web Hacking?

What Attack Methods do Hackers Use?

Which Application Weaknesses are Exploited?

Top Trends

Denial of Service

Banking Trojans

#Step 5: Deciding What to Fix Prioritized listing of remediation issues

OWASP vs. WHID Top 10 OWASP Top 10WHID Top 10 1InjectionInsufficient Anti-Automation (Brute Force and DoS) 2Cross-site Scripting (XSS) Improper Output Handling (XSS and Planting of Malware) 3 Broken Authentication and Session Management Improper Input Handling (SQL Injection) 4Insecure Direct Object Reference Insufficient Authentication (Stolen Credentials/Banking Trojans) 5CSRF Application Misconfiguration (Detailed error messages) 6Security Misconfiguration Insufficient Process Validation (CSRF and DNS Hijacking) 7Insecure Cryptographic Storage Insufficient Authorization (Predictable Resource Location/Forceful Browsing) 8Failure to Restrict URL AccessAbuse of Functionality (CSRF/Click-Fraud) 9Insecure Transport Layer ProtectionInsufficient Password Recovery (Brute Force) 1010 Unvalidated Redirects and ForwardsImproper Filesystem Permissions (info Leakages)

Questions? WASC WHID Project Site eb-Hacking-Incident-Database – Twitter