In-depth look at ISACS Stockpile Management: Weapons Photo: MAG

United Nations framework In the UN Programme of Action, all UN Member States commit: “To ensure […] that the armed forces, police or any other body authorized to hold small arms and light weapons establish adequate and detailed standards and procedures relating to the management and security of their stocks of these weapons.” Section II, Paragraph 17

United Nations framework In the UN Programme of Action, all UN Member States commit: “To regularly review […] the stocks of [SALW] held by armed forces, police and other authorized bodies and to ensure that such stocks declared by competent national authorities to be surplus to requirements are clearly identified, that programmes for the responsible disposal, preferably through destruction, of such stocks are established and implemented and that such stocks are adequately safeguarded until disposal” Section II, Paragraph 18

United Nations framework In the UN Firearms Protocol, all States Parties are required to: “take appropriate measures […] To require the security of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit through its territory” Article 11 [For the complete UN framework on stockpile management, see Clause 4 of ISACS – “Stockpile Management: Weapons”]

 Objective To prevent the diversion of SALW from government and other stocks to unauthorised end-users  Desired outcomes States have clearly identified and defined stockpile composition Stockpiles are situated in secure locations Stockpile facilities carry out risk assessments Stockpiles are physically secure (Depot and Unit Storage) Procedures are in place to account for inventory and report losses Surplus weapons are identified and disposed of Weapons are transported safely & securely Module overview

Stockpile composition The national stockpile should comprise function-specific stockpiles, including  Operational weapons  Operational replacement weapons  Reservist Weapons  Training Weapons  Experimental weapons  Weapons awaiting disposal

Stockpile locations  Should usually be located close to where they are needed  Guidance on centralised vs. decentralised stockpiles  Stockpile location determinants Risk assessment Requirements for access Security response time Local planning & environmental issues Local infrastructure Number of security personnel required

Stockpile risk assessment  Risk assessments of all facilities shall be carried out  A risk assessment should determine Physical threats to the local population The financial value of the facility & its contents Active and passive hazards Likelihood of an internal or external attack Vulnerability to espionage, theft, loss Vulnerability to sabotage or terrorist attack

Stockpile risk assessment  Safety reduction of risk to a tolerable level  Risk Likelihood x Consequence  Tolerable risk risk that is acceptable in a given context  Goal  Risk is “as low as reasonably practicable” – ALARP

Physical Security (Depot) Detailed section providing guidance – inter alia – on: Principles and aims of physical security Physical security systems Regulations and SOPs Security plans Staff vetting and selection Access control Physical security infrastructure (buildings & structures) Perimeter security

Physical Security Principles PS systems are derived from an effective stockpile risk assessment Weapons are stored separately from ammunition Hazardous weapons (e.g. MANPADS) are disassembled and essential components stored in different locations (unless required for current operational needs) Perimeter security infrastructure is in place

Physical Security Principles Access is controlled at all times Access is restricted to authorized personnel only Only authorized personnel with security clearance work within the facility All personnel receive appropriate training Temporary personnel are accompanied at all times

Staff vetting & selection Requirements: No criminal record Security vetting (before and during service) Training (at commencement & during service) Fair wage

Key management Keys to weapons storage areas stored separately from other keys Secured at all times Accessible only to authorized personnel who require access to weapons Regularly updated roster of key custodians Number of keys kept to a minumum… … but no master (skeleton) keys

Physical security infrastructure Buildings and structures Walls and ceilings Doors and gates Windows Locks and padlocks Weapons racks Intrusion detection systems

Perimeter security Fencing (Class 1-4) Clear zones (4m inside, 10m outside fence) Drainage structures (block access) Perimeter llumination Perimeter Intrusion detection systems (PIDS) Visual surveillance Patrols & dogs

Weapons Accounting Guidance on effective inventory management: Separation of powers (checks & balances) Accurate local weapons account Forensic records (IBIS & IBIN) Safe and efficient storage management System for issue and receipt of weapons System or regular / periodic stock checks Mechanism for reporting and investigating thefts & losses

Determination of Surplus Stocks SURPLUS: Functioning SALW in the national stockpile that are no longer required by the armed services of the State in order to ensure internal and external security Planning criteria should determine equipment needs Parameters for equipping security forces Calculation of weapons requirements (Annex B matrix)

Transport of Weapons General Requirements Risk assessment Prohibit transport by suspect companies, personnel, routes Weapons separate from ammunition Locks, seals & verification Guidance on safe & secure transport by road, sea, rail & air Related documentation

Annexes Annex A Model for a Security Plan Annex B Weapon requirement calculation matrix (to assist with the determination of surplus stocks)