Accumulators and U-Prove Revocation Tolga Acar, Intel Sherman S.M. Chow, The Chinese University of Hong Kong Lan Nguyen, XCG – Microsoft Research.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Simulation-sound NIZK Proofs for a Practical Language and Constant Size Group Signatures Jens Groth University of California Los Angeles Presenter: Eike.
Advertisements

On the (Im)Possibility of Arthur-Merlin Witness Hiding Protocols Iftach Haitner, Alon Rosen and Ronen Shaltiel 1.
A Framework for Distributed OCSP without Responders Certificate
Anonymity without Sacrificing Performance Enhanced Nymble System with Distributed Architecture CS 858 Project Presentation Omid Ardakanian * Nam Pham *
This document and the information therein are the property of Morpho, They must not be copied or communicated to a third party without the prior written.
Vote privacy: models and cryptographic underpinnings Bogdan Warinschi University of Bristol 1.
Efficient Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems Jens Groth University College London.
1 Privacy Prof. Ravi Sandhu Executive Director and Endowed Chair March 8, © Ravi Sandhu World-Leading Research.
FIPS 201 Personal Identity Verification For Federal Employees and Contractors National Institute of Standards and Technology Information Technology Laboratory.
A New Approach for Anonymous Password Authentication Yanjiang Yang, Jianying Zhou, Feng Bao Institute for Infocomm Research, Singapore Jian Weng Jinan.
Claudia Diaz, Hannelore Dekeyser, Markulf Kohlweiss, Girma Nigusse K.U.Leuven IDIS Workshop 29/05/2008 [Work done in the context of the ADAPID project]
Analysis of Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) Sudip Regmi Ilya Pirkin.
7/11/2011Pomcor 1 Pros and Cons of U-Prove, Idemix and Other Privacy-Enhancing Technologies Francisco Corella Karen Lewison Pomcor.
Anonymous Credentials: How to show credentials without compromising privacy Melissa Chase Microsoft Research.
VIS-À-VIS CRYPTOGRAPHY : PRIVATE AND TRUSTWORTHY IN-PERSON CERTIFICATIONS IAN MIERS*, MATTHEW GREEN* CHRISTOPH U. LEHMANN †, AVIEL D. RUBIN* *Johns Hopkins.
PKI Implementation in the Real World
8.2 Discretionary Access Control Models Weiling Li.
CSCE 715 Ankur Jain 11/16/2010. Introduction Design Goals Framework SDT Protocol Achievements of Goals Overhead of SDT Conclusion.
CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 21 Jonathan Katz.
Oct 09, 2004CS573: Network Protocols and Standards1 GARP (Part 2) Network Protocols and Standards Autumn
Verification & Validation.  Validation  are we building the right product?  Verification  are we building the product right?
1 Using Certified Policies to Regulate E-Commerce Transactions Victoria Ungureanu Rutgers University.
CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 9 Jonathan Katz.
Anonymity and Security in Public Internet Forums Ho-fung LEUNG Senior Member, IEEE Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering The Chinese University of Hong.
CMSC 414 Computer and Network Security Lecture 19 Jonathan Katz.
Unlinkable Secret Handshakes and Key-Private Group Key Management Schemes Author: Stanislaw Jarecki and Xiaomin Liu University of California, Irvine From:
Team Skill 6 - Building The Right System Part 1: Applying Use Cases (Chapters of the requirements text) CSSE 371 Software Requirements and Specification.
Anonymous Credentials Gergely Alpár Collis – November 24, 2011.
PRESENTED BY CHRIS ANDERSON JULY 29, 2009 Using Zero Knowledge Proofs to Validate Electronic Votes.
Long-term Archive Service Requirements draft-ietf-ltans-reqs-00.txt.
September 20 th, 2006 U-Prove crypto overview Copyright © 2006, Quebec Inc. Proprietary and Confidential.
Anonymous Identification in Ad Hoc Groups New York, NY, USAApril 6 th, 2004 Yevgeniy Dodis, Antonio Nicolosi, Victor Shoup
The Evolution of Identity Management February 18, 2005 © Copyright 2004, Credentica – all rights reserved Dr. Stefan Brands.
Introduction to Modern Cryptography Sharif University Spring 2015 Data and Network Security Lab Sharif University of Technology Department of Computer.
SANDRA GUASCH CASTELLÓ PHD EVOTING WORKSHOP LUXEMBOURG, 15-16/10/2012 SUPERVISOR: PAZ MORILLO BOSCH Verifiable Mixnets.
CSCE 522 Identification and Authentication. CSCE Farkas2Reading Reading for this lecture: Required: – Pfleeger: Ch. 4.5, Ch. 4.3 Kerberos – An Introduction.
WISTP’08 ©LAM /05/2008 A Self-Certified and Sybil-Free Framework for Secure Digital Identity Domain Buildup Christer Andersson Markulf Kohlweiss.
Merkle trees Introduced by Ralph Merkle, 1979 An authentication scheme
Brian A. LaMacchia Director, XCG Security & Cryptography, Microsoft Research.
Grouper Training – Admin – Subject API – Part 4 Shilen Patel Duke University This work licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0.
A Simple Traceable Pseudonym Certificate System for RSA-based PKI SCGroup Jinhae Kim.
Micropayments and PKI Vít Bukač. Outline Micropayments overview Blacklisting performance PKI collaboration Scheme modification(?)
Security Analysis of a Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme.
Mona: Secure Multi-Owner Data Sharing for Dynamic Groups in the Cloud.
ICICS2002, Singapore 1 A Group Signature Scheme Committing the Group Toru Nakanishi, Masayuki Tao, and Yuji Sugiyama Dept. of Communication Network Engineering.
Verifiable Mixing Protocol How can a mixer prove its integrity?
1 Token–based Dynamic Trust Establishment for Web Services Zhengping Wu and Alfred C. Weaver Department of Computer Science University of Virginia March.
Manu Drijvers, Joint work with Jan Camenisch, Anja Lehmann. March 9 th, 2016 Universally Composable Direct Anonymous Attestation.
Authorized But Anonymous: Taking Charge of Your Personal Data Anna Lysyanskaya Brown University.
T Special Course in OS Security (Dan Forsberg) – Two possible steps from integrity-based remote attestation to the next level Property.
29/Jul/2009 Young Hoon Park.  M.Bellare, D.Micciancio, B.Warinschi, Foundations of Group Signatures: Formal Definitions, Simplified Requirements, and.
Unlinking Private Data
Geographic Information Systems GIS Data Databases.
CSCE 522 Identification and Authentication
Topic 36: Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Signing transactions anonymously with Identity Mixer in Hyperledger
Overview of Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc
NYMBLE: BLOCKING MISBEHAVING USERS IN ANONYMIZING NETWORKS
Foundations of Fully Dynamic Group Signatures
PLUG-N-HARVEST ID: H2020-EU
Device Apps Joseph Ngari| Program Manager.
Re(AC)t Reputation and Anonymous Credentials for Access Control (t=2)
The (post-quantum) future of data privacy
Post-Quantum Security of Fiat-Shamir
09 Zero Knowledge Proof Hi All, One more topic to go!
Signing transactions anonymously with Identity Mixer in Hyperledger
Geographic Information Systems
Presentation transcript:

Accumulators and U-Prove Revocation Tolga Acar, Intel Sherman S.M. Chow, The Chinese University of Hong Kong Lan Nguyen, XCG – Microsoft Research

Outline Accumulators Definitions and Security Anonymous Revocation New scheme U-Prove Overview Revocation methods Revocation with the new accumulator Implementation and Performance

Accumulator Primitives Accumulate: Aggregate a set of elements into a single value V. Non-Membership (NM) Proof: Prove that an element x is NOT accumulated in V without revealing any info about x. Membership Proof: Prove that an element x is accumulated in V without revealing any info about x. Efficient Update of V and Proofs’ Witnesses when the accumulated set changes.

Accumulator Security Member Completeness: x is accumulated ⇒ Member proof accepts. Member Soundness: x is not accumulated ⇒ Member proof rejects. NM Completeness: x is not accumulated ⇒ NM proof accepts. NM Soundness: x is accumulated ⇒ NM proof rejects. Information hiding: The proofs should be Zero- Knowledge or Witness Indistinguishable.

Revoking Anonymous Credentials For Blacklisting Anonymous Credentials, Accumulate blacklisted elements in an accumulator value. NM Proof proves that an element is not accumulated ⇒ The element is not blacklisted. NM Proof does not reveal the element ⇒ Privacy Protection. For Whitelisting Anonymous Credentials, it is similar in the opposite way.

Accumulator Scheme – Setup

Accumulator Operations

Efficient Accumulator NM Proof

Outline Accumulators Definitions and Security Anonymous Revocation New scheme U-Prove Overview Revocation methods Revocation with the new accumulator Implementation and Performance

U-Prove Participants: Issuer, User (Prover), Service Provider (Verifier). Issuing Protocol between Issuer and User User obtains Tokens from Issuer Token certifies attributes (Driver License, Age > 21,…) Presentation Protocol between User and Service Provider Users proves certain attributes to Service Provider Service Provider learns nothing about other attributes

U-Prove Crypto

Revocation in U-Prove Four Methods  ID Exposure. It breaks privacy. Force revoked user to reveal the ID (S/N or another attribute)  Credential Update. Not efficient. Short validity time encoded in an attribute Issuer periodically updates valid credentials for download  Credential Revocation Lists. Not efficient. List of proofs that the ID is not in blacklisted items  Accumulators Use an accumulator to aggregate the IDs

Pros and Cons of using Accumulators Advantages Costs to generate and verify unrevoked credential proofs do not depend on the blacklist’s size. It works for both whitelisting (membership proofs) and blacklisting (non-membership proofs). Anonymous and unlinkable credentials. Disadvantages Witness update is expensive. More complex.

Accumulator-Based Revocation Scheme U-Prove integration is based on non-membership proof Demo Scenario Both User A and User P are issued U-Prove tokens. User A is blacklisted, so A fails to update NM Witness ⇒ User A can not generate anonymous proofs. User P succeeds to update its NM Witness. ⇒ User P can generate valid anonymous proofs.

U-Prove Revocation Scenario

Setup and Issuing

Revocation and Presentation Timestam p OperationBlacklistAccumulator 1 2 3

Outline Accumulators Definitions and Security Anonymous Revocation New scheme U-Prove Overview Revocation methods Revocation with the new accumulator Implementation and Performance

Software Design Revocation API AnonProofU-ProveIdemix Accumulator API Proof List AccuF S AccuG S Others Application Revocation Method

Software Design Abstraction: Single definition of Revocation API (for all revoking methods), Single definition of Accumulator API (for all accumulators). No Redundancy: Single implementation of Revocation using Accumulators. Extendibility: Easy to add new Accumulators or Applications. Changeability: Easy to switch among Accumulators or Revocation methods.

Performance Compared with the only previous universal accumulator scheme ATSM

Thanks and Questions