Rennes, 23/10/2014 Cristina Onete Key-Exchange Protocols. Diffie-Hellman, Active Attacks, and TLS/SSL.

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Presentation transcript:

Rennes, 23/10/2014 Cristina Onete Key-Exchange Protocols. Diffie-Hellman, Active Attacks, and TLS/SSL

 Assume we share a Key Alice Bob  Symmetric encryption : Confidentiality of exchanged messages Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 2 Shared Long-term security as long as key is “safe”

 Assume we share a Key Alice Bob  Symmetric authentication – MACs : Authenticity of exchanged messages Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 3 Shared Nobody else can sign while the key is safe But: slightly weaker demand on key-secrecy than for encryption schemes

 Assume we share a Key Prover Verifier  Authentication and Identification Legitimacy of a prover with respect to a verifier Shared Nobody can impersonate prover while the key is safe challenge response Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 4

 How do we get the keys? TTP Alice Bob Generate Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 5

 Key-Exchange: Diffie Hellman Alice Bob Part of Key  Can we send the key part in clear? Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 6

 Secure Key-Exchange Alice Bob  Security goal: If Alice and Bob share a session, their key is indistingui- shable from a random key  All the messages exchanged in that sessions are private and securely authenticated Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 7

 Active attacks on DH Alice Bob Cruella  Exercise 1: Show how Cruella can intercept and inject messages between Alice and Bob Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 8

 Active attacks on DH Alice Bob Cruella  Exercise 2: Show how you prevent this by using a signa- ture scheme Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 9

 Client-Server scenario Bob = Amazon.fr Client  Say server’s transmissions are authenticated during Key- Exchange, but the client’s are not  Say the key exchange is secure  Exercise 3: What does this say about the security against a MiM adversary Cruella? Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 10

 TLS-RSA Bob = Amazon.fr Client  Exercise 4: Explain how the Client and server can agree on a key by using RSA-encryption. What are the security guarantees in this case? Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 11

 TLS-DH Bob = Amazon.fr Client  Exercise 5: How about now? Cristina Onete || 17/11/2014 || 12

CIDRE Thanks!