Capabilities Based Planning

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Capabilities Based Planning UNCLASSIFIED Air Force CONOPS & Capabilities Based Planning Title: Airborne Warning and Control System Reconstitution Study Date: Mar 2002 – Jul 2002 Sponsor: Brig. General Ben Robinson, Commander, 552 Air Control Wing Study Lead: Maj Nathan Titus, AFSAA/SAPP Analysts: Mr Mike Daggit, Booz-Allen Hamilton Dr Ed Robbins, Frontier Technology, Inc. We would like to thank everyone in the 552 ACW for their help in providing data and insights critical to this study. In particular, the following personnel helped make this study possible. LtCol Donald Clements, 963 AACS/CD LtCol Patricia Collins, 552 OSS Capt Tim Woodward, 552 OSS Lt Nate Terry, 552 OSS Lt Col Nathan Titus Resource Analyses Directorate Air Force Studies & Analyses Agency 19 Mar 04 UNCLASSIFIED

Overview UNCLASSIFIED Capabilities Based Planning Background Challenges to Implementation Recent Efforts in Air Force Capabilities-Based Planning Observations/Recommendations UNCLASSIFIED

Capabilities-Based Planning Background UNCLASSIFIED Capabilities-Based Planning Background “[P]lanning, under uncertainty, to provide capabilities suitable for a wide range of modern-day challenges and circumstances while working within an economic framework that necessitates choice.” Paul K. Davis, Analytic Architecture for Capabilities-Based Planning, Mission-System Analysis, and Transformation, MR-1513-OSD Focus on “possibilities” vs.. “specific validated threats” Central question must be “What do I need to do to achieve desired effects?” vs.. “How many of each system do I need?” Goal is to plan for robust, flexible forces, capable of meeting a wide variety of threats, rather than an “optimal” force for a narrow set of threats UNCLASSIFIED

Challenges to Implementation UNCLASSIFIED Challenges to Implementation Fundamentals: Defining terms: Effects and Capabilities Understanding the role of scenarios Analytic Issues: Proficiency vs. Sufficiency What do we mean by “Risk”? What does it cost? Determining priorities Organizational Challenges UNCLASSIFIED

Fundamentals UNCLASSIFIED Defining effects and capabilities Effects are associated with a desired Outcome or Result Capabilities are Non-solution Specific – Describe What must be done to achieve Effects Fix the level to create common perspective Avoid overlaps, redundancy Identify relationships Role of scenario Scenarios needed to provide context for capability assessment Suite of scenarios/vignettes must span the range of potential conflicts in all dimensions (political, geography, intensity, etc) In resource constrained environment, best solution is robust across all scenarios – not an optimal solution to a point scenario which may never occur UNCLASSIFIED

Master Capability List UNCLASSIFIED Fundamentals: Defining Effects and Capabilities Master Capability List Effects Construct Capability 1 Capability 2 Sub- Capability Effect Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Sub-Sub- Capability Functional decomposition of capabilities Collectively Exhaustive and Mutually Exclusive Provides a “menu” from which all CONOPS can choose required capabilities Builds on Master Capability List Links capabilities to effects Explicitly identifies crosslinks and interdependencies between capabilities Highlights “enabler” capabilities

Analytic Issues: Defining Risk UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Defining Risk Risk is derived from two independent assessments Our capability to deal with events or to provide effects (y axis) The severity of impact of the event if we fail to provide the capability (x axis) Risk concept not strictly ORM No attempt to determine the probability of adverse event (no validated data exists, this is left to senior leadership judgement) Measures capability to achieve required effects C4 C3 C6 C5 C8 C7 C2 C1 Capability Severity of Impact

Analytic Issues: Capability Proficiency vs. Sufficiency UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Capability Proficiency vs. Sufficiency Answering questions like “How much capability do we have?” or “How much capability do we need?” leads to two different looks at capability Proficiency – “how well” e.g., radar detection range Sufficiency – “how many” Force Structure Proficiency Key scenario elements are adversary and location Amenable to subjective or objective analysis techniques Sufficiency Key scenario elements are time related – how fast to arrive and how long to sustain Best addressed with an objective, quantitative analysis technique UNCLASSIFIED

Gen Jumper’s “Sight Picture” UNCLASSIFIED Gen Jumper’s “Sight Picture” Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) ... will guide our planning and programming, requirements reform, and acquisition. ...make warfighting effects, and the capabilities we need to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do. …Air Staff designed a new review to replace the ‘Quarterly Acquisition Review Program’--we call this new approach a Capabilities Review and Risk Assessment (CRRA). ... shift from a program review to a review of how our programs contribute to warfighting capabilities and effects.

Using the MCL Example Data Collection Tool UNCLASSIFIED Using the MCL Example Data Collection Tool

Using the MCL Example Activity Diagram (Time Sensitive Targeting) UNCLASSIFIED Using the MCL Example Activity Diagram (Time Sensitive Targeting) Deconflict target Assess Cue(s) Determine Sensor Availability Task Sensor Collect Data Detect Target Determine Environment Track until Stopped ID Target Geolocate Target Update Target List Assign weapon to target Update Mission Plans Issue Execution Order Support Weapon Flyout DDD Target BDI / BHI Remove from Target List Task

Using Value Functions When More is Better UNCLASSIFIED Using Value Functions When More is Better More doesn’t matter Good Enough Example – More is better Measure: Detection range Units of measure: NMI Can’t do with less than 250 NMI Good enough is 500 NMI Over 1000 NMI doesn’t matter Elicitation - in units of the measure Is more of this good or bad? When can’t you do it with less? What is good enough? When does more not matter? Can’t do it with less

Air Force CONOPS Construct Focus for Planning & Programming UNCLASSIFIED Global Power Global Reach Global Vigilance Joint Vision USAF Vision Talking Points: - Three key pillars of the USAF vision are: Global Power, Global Reach and Global Vigilance. - The key construct is the Air and Space Expeditionary Force construct and the ten air expeditionary forces. - Air Force concepts of operations build on these pillars and construct. - Consequently, the Air and Space Expeditionary Forces CONOPS and its six supporting task forces will redefine who and what we will become. The AEF CONOPS is the overarching CONOPS that describes how the Air Force presents combat-ready forces to combatant commanders, while the six TF CONOPS describe the capabilities needed to solve problems that combatant commanders are likely to face in the future. Brief Descriptions of each Task Force CONOPS: Air and Space Expeditionary Forces (AEF): Meets the Air Force requirement to provide Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) with ready and complete air and space force packages that can be tailored to meet the spectrum of contingencies Global Strike Task Force (GSTF): Rapidly responds to areas where an enemy could attempt to deny access. It combines Stealth, Standoff, Precision, Space and Information with the other services to create the conditions for access. Global Response Task Force (GRTF): Combines with special operations forces and other services to rapidly respond to incidents of Global Terrorism. Using actionable intelligence for fleeting targets, it combines alert strike platforms based in selected locations with the ability to launch and receive updates en-route to enable rapid response. Homeland Security Task Force (HLSTF): Orchestrates specific Air Force capabilities as a stand alone force or for use in joint and interagency efforts to effectively prevent, protect against, and respond to a variety of threats to the US homeland Global Mobility Task Force (GMTF): Organizes the capabilities necessary to provide rapid and effective air mobility support to theater combatant commanders during contingencies. GMTF partners with all the other Task Force CONOPS to cover the full spectrum of operations, from global strike, to Humanitarian Relief Operations/Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (HUMRO/NEO). Nuclear Response Task Force (NRTF): Acts as AEF topcover; providing safe, reliable and proficient nuclear forces—the deterrent umbrella under which conventional forces operate—and, if deterrence fails, will execute a variety of nuclear attack options Space and Command, Control, Computers and Communications Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Task Force (S&C4ISRTF): Provides fully integrated manned, unmanned and space forces to focus on a particular area of interest using traditional methods of collection or seamlessly transition to Time Sensitive Targeting in the F2T2EA cycle. It does so by harnessing Air Force capabilities to achieve the horizontal integration of manned, unmanned, air, surface, information and space systems, to provide executable decision-quality knowledge to the commander in near real-time from anywhere. Air & Space Expeditionary Forces Global Strike CONOPS Homeland Security CONOPS Global Mobility CONOPS Global Persistent Attack CONOPS Nuclear Response CONOPS Space & C4ISR CONOPS Agile Combat Support UNCLASSIFIED

Integrated CRRA Analysis Process Overview UNCLASSIFIED Integrated CRRA Analysis Process Overview Phase 2B – Analysis (Leveraging Existing Efforts & New Focused Work) Phase 3 – Apply Professional Military Judgment Phase 1 - Foundations Define Master Capability Library Define Scenarios Pair-wise Comparisons Warm Database Mining Architecture-Based Thread Analyses Define CONOPS Activity Models Define Metrics CRRA Briefing Trail Product: Focus Areas List CONOPS-Specific Analyses Product: Prioritized Courses of Action Product: Candidate Courses of Action Product: Capability Performance Framework Assess Proficiency Phase 2C – Analysis (Characterization and Optimization of Solutions) Product: Planning and Programming Guidance to MAJCOMS (APPG) Assess Sufficiency Assess Impact Characterization of Resource Constraints Characterization of Warfighting Effects Phase 2A – Analysis (Subjective Assessment) Optimization of Alternatives

Relationship of Assessments UNCLASSIFIED Relationship of Assessments RAT Teams RAT View Global Strike Global Persistent Attack Space & C4ISR Nuclear Response Homeland Security Global Mobility Air Force View Surveillance & Reconnaissance Intelligence Command & Control Communications Force Application Force Projection Protect Prepare & Sustain Create the Force CONOPS View

CONOPS MCL Connection to Joint Functional Concepts UNCLASSIFIED CONOPS MCL Connection to Joint Functional Concepts Joint Functional Concepts Battlespace Awareness Joint Cmd & Ctrl Force Application Protection Focused Logistics AF CONOPS Capabilities 1.0 Surveillance & Reconaissance 3.0 Command & Control 5.0 Force Application 7.0 Protect 6.0 Force Projection 2.0 Intelligence 4.0 Communications 8.0 Prepare & Sustain 9.0 Create the Force

Observations/ Recommendations UNCLASSIFIED Observations/ Recommendations Measuring individual capabilities is not difficult; comparing the value/worth of different capabilities is the hard part Scenarios are still important! Maybe even more important than in threat-based planning Difficult to measure DOTLPF solutions vs. M solutions – need techniques to help do this Definitions are important – build consensus early! Rigorous application of a framework is necessary but not sufficient for success UNCLASSIFIED

Summary UNCLASSIFIED The USAF is moving forward to establish Capabilities Based Planning as the foundation for how we conduct business in the future A constant communication between HQ/AF and MAJCOMs essential to understand contributions to warfighter, investment strategies to mitigate shortfalls and capability priorities Our task: make warfighting effects, and the capabilities needed to achieve them, the drivers for everything we do UNCLASSIFIED

Back Up

Analytic Issues: Cost Linking capabilities to cost demands a discussion of solutions – Should you even talk about costs? Decision makers need the input, but leads to other questions: What cost to use? NPV, LCC, Acquisition, O&M? How are currently owned systems valued? Will this approach stifle innovation? Bottom line is that we need to analyze solutions and costs, but do the capability analysis up front to ensure we are solving the most important problems

Analytic Issues: Determining Shortfall Priorities UNCLASSIFIED Analytic Issues: Determining Shortfall Priorities Determining “Importance” of capability shortfalls How extensive is the shortfall? What is the impact if not fixed? How much of the Air Force is affected? No well-defined set of tools/models exists – need objective & subjective tools as well as military judgment Sensitivity Analysis Multiattribute Utility Analysis Prioritized Shortfalls C4 C3 C6 C2 C1 C5 C8 C7 Determine Weights Combine with Risk Assessment Scores Shortfall priority = f(shortfall importance, risk, cost) UNCLASSIFIED

Methodology Build Master Capability Library for all CONOPS Each CONOPS describes desired effects and capabilities required to achieve these effects Capabilities drawn from MCL to facilitate later integration Interdependencies and linkages between capabilities are explicitly defined in each CONOPS From CONOPS descriptions (above), effects construct built to aid subjective determination of “effects drivers”: Effects linked to capabilities, sub-capabilities Weights associated with the contribution of a capability or sub-capability determined by SME or from quick-turn analysis tools Weights are developed in the context of an overarching scenario Risk Assessment Charts – Depicts capability assessment vs.. severity of impact for capability in the context of an overarching scenario Integration is straightforward extension when common capability definitions and overarching scenarios are used – Required additional assumption is that all CONOPS Effects are of equal value

Master Capability List (1 of 2) 1.0 Data Collection 2.0 Intelligence 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Communications 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 3.1 Planning 4.1 Exchange Information 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 3.2 Execution Management 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution

Master Capability List (2 of 2) 5.0 Force Application 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 7.0 Combat Support 8.0 Mobility 5.1 Countermeasures 6.1 Protect the Force 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 8.1 Airlift 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 7.2 Generate the Mission 8.2 Air Refueling 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 8.3 Space Lift 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 7.6 Public Affairs 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue

Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (1 of 2) 1.0 Data Collection 2.0 Intelligence 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Communications 1.1 Surveillance (Un-Cued Continuous Collection) 2.1 Process and Exploit Intel 3.1 Planning 4.1 Exchange Information 1.2 Reconnaissance (Cued Search, Focused Coll.) 2.2 Provide Intel Assessments 3.2 Execution Management 4.2 Provide for Data Storage and Retrieval 1.3 Collect Weather Related Information 3.3 Provide Positioning, Navigation, Timing Information 4.3 Provide Network Damage Assessment & Reconstitution

Global Mobility CONOPS: Notional Example (2 of 2) 5.0 Force Application 6.0 Full Spectrum Threat Response 7.0 Combat Support 8.0 Mobility 5.1 Countermeasures 6.1 Protect the Force 7.1 Establish Operating Locations 8.1 Airlift 5.2 Neutralize Air Threats/Targets 6.2 Provide Support for Civil Authorities 7.2 Generate the Mission 8.2 Air Refueling 5.3 Neutralize Space Threats/Targets 6.3 Defensive Information Operations 7.3 Support Mission and Forces 8.3 Space Lift 5.4 Neutralize Surface Threats/Targets 7.4 Posture Responsive Forces 5.5 Neutralize Sub-Surface Threats/Targets 7.5 Sustain Mission and Forces 5.6 Offensive Information Operations 7.6 Public Affairs 5.7 Combat Search and Rescue

Global Mobility Effects Construct Rapid Projection of Joint Power 0.4 0.6 7.0 Combat Support 8.0 Mobility 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 1.0 Data Collection 3.0 Command & Control 4.0 Comm 6.0 FSTR 8.1 Air Lift 8.2 Air Refueling 8.3 Space Lift 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0 The weights indicate the relative contribution of each of the necessary capabilities towards a given effect (or contribution of effects to CONOPS). The weights are determined by a series of independent assessments. This means that the weighting process can be broken into distinct pieces done at different levels and by different groups of SMEs without affecting the value of the input. However, Each group should be given the same set of scenarios to consider when making the decisions. The weights are normalized to sum to one in order to keep a consistent scale as scores are rolled up. 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.6 1.3 Collect Weather Info 3.1 Planning 3.3 Nav, Pos, & Timing 7.1 Establish Operating Location 7.2 Generate the Mission 4.1 Exchange Information 4.2 Data Storage 4.3 Network Damage Assess 5.1 Defensive Countermeasures 3.2 Execution Management 7.3 Support the Mission 7.4 Posture the Force 6.1 Protect the Force

Crosscutting Analysis: Using the Effects Construct Determination of contribution weights for each node can be done by separate pairwise comparisons or by M&S Contributions to each node sum to one to keep scale consistent Effect A Effect B Effect C Effect D 0.1 0.4 0.8 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 Capability 1 Capability 2 Capability 3 Capability 4 Capability 5 Capability 6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5 1.0 The weights indicate the relative contribution of each of the necessary capabilities towards a given effect (or contribution of effects to CONOPS). The weights are determined by a series of independent assessments. This means that the weighting process can be broken into distinct pieces done at different levels and by different groups of SMEs without affecting the value of the input. However, Each group should be given the same set of scenarios to consider when making the decisions. The weights are normalized to sum to one in order to keep a consistent scale as scores are rolled up. 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.4 0.2 Sub-Capability 1.1 Sub-Capability 2.1 Sub-Capability 2.2 Sub-Capability 3.1 Sub-Capability 4.1 Sub-Capability 4.2 Sub-Capability 6.1