Identity Standards (Federal Bridge Certification Authority – Certificate Lifecycle) Oct, 17 2012.

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Presentation transcript:

Identity Standards (Federal Bridge Certification Authority – Certificate Lifecycle) Oct,

4.1 APPLICATION Entities seeking to cross-certify with the FBCA shall fulfill the application requirements as specified in the U.S. Government Public Key Infrastructure Cross-Certification Criteria and Methodology. 4.2 CERTIFICATE APPLICATION PROCESSING Information in certificate applications must be verified as accurate before certificates are issued. Entity CPs shall specify procedures to verify information in certificate applications. The Entity CP must identify the CA or RA that are responsible for authenticating the Subscriber’s identity in each case. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.3 ISSUANCE Entity CAs shall verify the source of a certificate request before issuance. 4.4 CERTIFICATE ACCEPTANCE Before a subscriber can make effective use of its private key, a PKI Authority shall convey to the subscriber its responsibilities Certificates shall be published in Entity repositories. FPKI PA shall be notified upon issuance of new inter-organizational CA cross-certificates.. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.5 KEY PAIR AND CERTIFICATE USAGE For High, Medium Hardware, Medium, and Basic Assurance, subscribers shall protect their private keys from access by other parties. Restrictions in the intended scope of usage for a private key are specified through certificate extensions 4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL Certificate renewal consists of issuing a new certificate with a new validity period and serial number while retaining all other information in the original certificate including the public key. Frequent renewal of certificates may assist in reducing the size of CRLs. After certificate renewal, the old certificate may or may not be revoked, but must not be further re-keyed, renewed, or modified. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.6 CERTIFICATE RENEWAL (continued) A certificate may be renewed if the public key has not reached the end of its validity period, the associated private key has not been compromised, and the Subscriber name and attributes are unchanged. Certificates may also be renewed when a CA re-keys. Renewal shall only be accepted from certificate subjects, PKI sponsors or RAs. CA may perform renewal of its subscriber certificates without a corresponding request, such as when the CA re-keys. All CA certificates shall be published in the FBCA or Entity repositories. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY Re-keying a certificate consists of creating new certificates with a different public key (and serial number) while retaining the remaining contents of the old certificate that describe the subject. The new certificate may be assigned a different validity period, key identifiers, specify a different CRL distribution point, and/or be signed with a different key. Re-key of a certificate does not require a change to the subjectName and does not violate the requirement for name uniqueness. Subscribers of Entity CAs shall identify themselves for the purpose of re-keying. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.7 CERTIFICATE RE-KEY (continued) After certificate rekey, the old certificate may or may not be revoked, but must not be further re-keyed, renewed, or modified. For Entity CAs that support re-key, such requests shall only be accepted from the subject of the certificate or PKI sponsors. Additionally, CAs and RAs may initiate re-key of a subscriber’s certificates without a corresponding request. All CA certificates shall be published in the FBCA or Entity repositories. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.8 MODIFICATION Certificate modification consists of creating new certificates with subject information (e.g., a name or address) that differs from the old certificate. For example, an Entity CA may perform certificate modification for a Subscriber whose characteristics have changed (e.g., has just received a medical degree). The new certificate may have the same or different subject public key. After certificate modification, the old certificate may or may not be revoked, but must not be further re-keyed, renewed, or modified. The Entity Principal CA may request certificate modification for currently cross-certified Entity Principal Cas. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.8 MODIFICATION (continued) The validity period associated with the new certificate must not extend beyond the period of the MOA. For Entity CAs, proof of all subject information changes must be provided to the RA or other designated agent and verified before the modified certificate is issued. All CA certificates shall be published in the FBCA or Entity repositories.. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION Revocation requests must be authenticated. Requests to revoke a certificate may be authenticated using that certificate's associated private key, regardless of whether or not the private key has been compromised. For High, Medium Hardware, Medium, and Basic Assurance, all CAs shall publish CRLs. Entity CAs that implement certificate revocation shall accept revocation requests from subscribers. Entity CAs that issue certificates in association with Affiliated Organizations shall accept revocation requests from the Affiliated Organization named in the certificate. Requests for certificate revocation from other parties may be supported by Entity CAs... Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION (continued) Entity CAs that implement certificate revocation shall revoke certificates upon receipt of sufficient evidence of compromise or loss of the subscriber’s corresponding private key. A request to revoke a certificate shall identify the certificate to be revoked, explain the reason for revocation, and allow the request to be authenticated (e.g., digitally or manually signed). Entity CAs will revoke certificates as quickly as practical upon receipt of a proper revocation request. Revocation requests shall be processed before the next CRL is published, excepting those requests validated within two hours of CRL issuance. Revocation requests validated within two hours of CRL issuance shall be processed before the following CRL is published.. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION (continued) CRL issuance encompasses both CRL generation and publication. The interval between CRLs shall not exceed 24 hours. CRLs may be issued more frequently For Entity Principal CAs that are operated in an off-line manner, routine CRLs may be issued less frequently than specified above if the CA only issues: CA certificates, CSS certificates, and end user certificates solely for the administration of the principal CA. However, the interval between routine CRL issuance shall not exceed 31 days. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION (continued) CRLs shall be published within 4 hours of generation. CRL shall be published no later than the time specified in the nextUpdate field of the previously issued CRL for same scope. If on-line revocation/status checking is supported by an Entity CA, the latency of certificate status information distributed on-line by Entity CAs or their delegated status responders must meet or exceed the requirements for CRL issuance Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION (continued) A CA may also use other methods to publicize the certificates it has revoked. Any alternative method must meet the following requirements: –The alternative method must be described in the CA’s approved CPS. –The alternative method must provide authentication and integrity services commensurate with the assurance level of the certificate being verified. –The alternative method must meet the issuance and latency requirements for CRLs Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.9 CERTIFICATE REVOCATION & SUSPENSION (continued) In the event of an Entity Principal CA private key compromise or loss, the cross- certificate shall be revoked and a CRL shall be published at the earliest feasible time by the FPKI Management Authority. For Entity CAs, when a CA certificate is revoked or subscriber certificate is revoked because of compromise, or suspected compromise, of a private key, a CRL must be issued within 18 hours for medium and 6 hours for high. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

4.10 CERTIFICATE STATUS SERVICES No stipulation ENDOFSUBSCRIPTION No stipulation KEYESCROW&RECOVERY CA private keys are never escrowed. Subscriber key management keys may be escrowed to provide key recovery. CAs that support private key escrow for key management keys shall document their key recovery practices. Under no circumstances will a subscriber signature key be held in trust by a third party. Entity CAs that support session key encapsulation and recovery shall identify the document describing the practices in the applicable CP. Chapter 4 – Certificate Lifecycle

Are FBCA guidelines good enough for esMD? If not, what is missing? Should we compare with Direct Trust? Session on DEA interim rule Draft/edit position paper Next Steps