BDS-KOM 1 Seismic Safety and Life Safety Consideration Fred Asiri-SLAC Acknowledgment: Atsushi Enomoto, Jean-Luc Baldy, John Osborne, Vic Kuchler Ray Arnold,

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Presentation transcript:

BDS-KOM 1 Seismic Safety and Life Safety Consideration Fred Asiri-SLAC Acknowledgment: Atsushi Enomoto, Jean-Luc Baldy, John Osborne, Vic Kuchler Ray Arnold, Tanaka Masami, Tom Lackowski

BDS-KOM 2 General Aspects of Seismic SafetyGeneral Aspects of Seismic Safety –Governing Regulations –Purpose –Intent –Approach –Analysis –Example: ILC-ESA Seismic Analysis for 10D37 Chicane Magnets General Aspects of Life SafetyGeneral Aspects of Life Safety –Governing Regulation –Safety category and respective requirements –Basic ideas of evacuation in case of fire –Case: Fire at beam tunnel near detector hall –Case: Fire at beam tunnel near detector hall. SummarySummary Seismic Safety and Life Safety ConsiderationContents:

BDS-KOM 3 Design and construction of permanent Buildings, Structures, Equipment, and System are governed by provision of the National, State and Local Codes Design document shall be submitted to the authority having jurisdiction for compliance with these provisions Seismic Codes

BDS-KOM 4 Purpose Main Purposes of the Seismic Regulations provides in these codes are: 1.To provide minimum design criteria for structures appropriate to their primary function and use considering the need to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the general public/its citizen by minimizing the earthquake- related risk to life and 2.To improve the capability of essential facilities and structures containing substantial quantities of hazardous materials to function during and after design earthquakes.

BDS-KOM 5 Modal Codes provide minimum seismic requirement to safeguard against the loss of life and to maintain the function of facilities required for post earthquake recovery –e.g. Every structure, and equipment, including components that are permanently attached to structures and their supports and attachments, shall be designed and constructed to resist the effects of seismic ground motion specific to the construction site The owner or the user of the facility sets the limit for the extent of the acceptable damage –e.g. The SLAC Earthquake Design Specification requires that building, structures, equipment, and systems should suffer very little damage from a moment magnitude 7.0 earthquake and should be “life safe” for moment magnitude for 7.5. Also, SLAC should be able to operate within a few months of the magnitude 7.0 events. Intent

BDS-KOM 6 Approach It is a relatively straight forward matter to assess design criteria for seismic load for structure or equipment at rest, but it is quite a different matter to come-up with criteria for equipment during the move. –Following are excerpts from SLAC seismic requirement The seismic design requirement for SLAC is amongst the most stringent and out of the three reference sites only the site in Japan could come close it. Q: What set of requirement should we design to?

BDS-KOM 7 The critical parameter is the Spectral acceleration expected for the components of the system during the design earthquake –Determine natural modes of vibration for major components of the system (Numerous computer programs available) –Determine from the site specific spectral (e.g. SLAC Response Spectra acceleration shown below) the design forces acting on the center of gravity of the system component –Provide a complete load path (by physical means) capable of transferring all loads and forces from their point of origin to the load-resisting elements (foundation) Analysis

BDS-KOM 8 Analysis Assumption All support points receive identical excitation at each support –This is rarely the case except for equipment having small support spacing Structures founded on ground, seismic excitation is the result of propagation of seismic waves through the foundation material –Implicit Assumption that Structural Foundations are Rigid and each point receives identical excitation –Reasonable assumption, provided structures having foundation plan dimension (L) small relative to the shear wave length ( λ s) When L/ λ s is not small, the passage of Wave having finite wave lengths leads to support excitations differing in phase –Such is the case for the ILC Beamline, Main Linac, Pipe line,

BDS-KOM 9 Excerpts from ILC-ESA Seismic Analysis for 10D37 Chicane Magnets (Ray Arnold/SLAC-Nov.06) 1. Design Performance Requirements The ILCESA Test Experiments T474, T475, and T480 will employ a system of magnets, microwave beam position monitors (BPM’s), wire scanners (WS) and related equipment in End Station A to perform tests of components for use in design of the planned International Linear Collider (ILC). The magnets and beamline components will be mounted on concrete girders decommissioned from SPEAR 2. The task of this analysis is to show that the design for the magnet supports satisfies the requirements.

BDS-KOM 10 Excerpts from ILC-ESA Seismic Analysis for 10D37 Chicane Magnets (Ray Arnold/SLAC-Nov.06) Analysis of SPEAR 2 Girders In preparation for design of the girder supports for the SPEAR 3 upgrade, the designers measured the vibrations in the SPEAR 2 girders and performed and analysis (Ref. 5) with ANSYS of the SPEAR 2 configuration. The SPEAR 2 configuration is similar to our design, with 10D90 dipoles (4 times the mass of the 10D37 in our design), quads and sextupoles mounted on the same type of magnet supports we plan to use. The measurements showed strong vibration modes around 4 Hz and 12 to 13 Hz, which were also found in the model. The model considered rebar, concrete, magnet mounts, and magnets, and assumed that the SPEAR girder support was flexible. In our case the girder support will be somewhat constrained to the base supports by the seismic bracing. Nevertheless it is likely that our configuration will also have significant vibration modes with T > 0.06 Sec.

BDS-KOM 11 Excerpts from ILC-ESA Seismic Analysis for 10D37 Chicane Magnets (Ray Arnold/SLAC-Nov.06)

BDS-KOM 12 Life Safety IssuesRegulation: Because there are no existing laws and standards in any region which directly and comprehensively stipulate the safety measures for a facility like ILC, the currently planned safety measures are based on examples of existing accelerator tunnels and the regulations for buildings and underground structures of various types. The final plan will be subject to the approval of the competent authority that has jurisdiction over the selected site.

BDS-KOM 13 Safety category and respective requirements: Fire Safety –Fire safety measures are the main subject to be considered by CFS group. Radiation Safety and Safety Access Control –Wall thickness for shielding radiation from Beam Tunnel is determined according to studies by radiation control experts. –Access control equipment such as a card lock is installed at the entrances to the radiation control areas as required by the radiation safety plan. Helium –The helium supply system is equipped with an oxygen meter which activates an alarm and stops the gas supply in case of oxygen deficiency. Air in the Beam Tunnel is automatically pressurized. Other Safety Control Life Safety Issues

BDS-KOM 14 Fire Safety Requirements: Structures of tunnels and caverns –Primary concern. Enough space and smooth path for evacuation Safety Equipments –Smoke detector, fire alarm, fire extinguisher, etc. Smoke Exhaust or Control –To have enough time to escape Materials –Incombustible cable, etc., to prevent spread of fire. Existing guideline and regulations of LHC will be a good example, if ILC finally takes deep tunnel scheme. Anyway the final plan will be subject to the approval of the competent authority that has jurisdiction over the selected site. Life Safety Issues

BDS-KOM 15 ~1.5 x tunnel diameter, necessary for excavation, enough for radiation shield necessary for maintenance, emergency egress necessary for installation Evacuation Space in Accelerator Tunnels

BDS-KOM 16 Evacuation Path : “Access to a different fire compartment (isolated from heat and smoke) within 500m.” (CERN) Life Safety Issues

BDS-KOM 17 Summary Seismic Regulations are well established Design criteria is site specific Minimum design criteria are set by the authority having jurisdiction for the compliance to the governing regulations (codes) It is a relatively straight forward matter to assess design criteria for seismic load for structure or equipment at rest, but it is quite a different matter to come-up with criteria for equipment during the move. CFS is not responsible for seismic design of the ILC machine nor the detector. CFS is responsible for providing adequate foundation for the support of the detector and the machine. Thus, we need required seismic forces from the major subsystem to design and cost it. CF structures for evacuation space and path will be designed based on considerations of fire safety and earthquake. Smoke control will be taken into account in air ventilation system. General safety equipment, for example, that for fire safety, is included in CFS work. As for other safety requirements like radiation shielding will be mitigated accordingly.