Warren M. Stern Revolution in Nuclear Detection Affairs

Nuclear Security 2 “The danger of nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security…” President Obama, March 2012 Hankuk University, Seoul, ROK Material Security Detection InterdictionRender Safe Consequence Mgmt. Recovery Nuclear Defense Spectrum

333 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA )

Challenges of Nuclear Detection Radiation Emitted by Material Some materials self- shield their emitted radiation Radiation Transmitted through Intervening Materials Radiation Propagates through Environment Sensor Detects Background Radiation Energy Spectra

Urban variations in background radiation 5 Gross Counts x 10 4 In urban environments local variations can be large

6 Background Challenges: Signal to Noise Can greatly impact a systems False Alarm Rate and Minimum Detectable Source Activity Black: natural background radiation Green : 1 mCi Cesium-137 source at 300 ft from the detector Red: 1 mCi Cesium-137 source 150 ft from the detector Background Background + Source Background + 4*Source (or Half Distance)

1. Get more signal with a bigger detector Same source, same background, 30 times larger detector Very large detectors 2. Reduce the background Same source, 10 x less background (imaging or spectroscopic detector) Quantum-dot activated scintillator and semiconductor detectors 3. Make the source brighter Source 10x brighter Active interrogation Event Bring sensor closer – distributed sensor nets

Revolution in Military Affairs Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense defines a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA): “RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations.”

Revolution in Military Affairs

From the laboratory to the field

Revolution in technology & gamma spectroscopy 11 “Electronics” for a 1964 gamma ray spectrometer And an even more capable version today “Output” device for 1964 gamma ray spectrometer And an even more capable version today 26,000 bytes in ,000,000,000 bytes today

Technology Deployments-DHS  CBP: 1468 RPMs; 1631 RIIDS; PRDs –60 mRPMS or mobile systems  USCG: 6,065 PRDs; 922 Handheld RIIDs –240 Wide-Area Search Backpacks (RADPACKs), –8 Advanced RIIDs, –36 Handheld Radiation Monitors (HRMs), –12 Linear Radiation Monitors (LRMs)  TSA-VIPR: 275 PRDs; 75 RIIDs; 50 Backpacks 12

Support to S&L and Securing the Cities  DNDO provides technical assistance and program support to state and local rad/nuc detection efforts  Mobile Detection Deployment Units –Available for S&L –Each unit has 48 PRDs; 22 Backpack Systems; RSI700 Mobile Radiation Search Systems; 8 NaI RIIDs  Securing the Cities Program (NYC-region) –more than 5,800 pieces of detection equipment – trained nearly 11,000 personnel –conducted more than a hundred drills 13  There is a radiation portal monitor in Georgia, deployed to scan cargo trucks at a weigh station on Interstate 20.

Next and Future Generation Technology 14 Generation Product Area CurrentNext Generation Advanced Technology Demonstration Exploratory Research Static systems: Portals and Imaging Spectroscopic systems Improved radiography Automated detection of high-Z Active systems for detection of shielded threats (SNAR) Increased PD and range, decreased FAR Passive, automated detection of shielded SNM Improved materials- higher resolution, larger, lower cost Detection “at speed,” virtual tagging of vehicles Improved materials – room temperature sensors approaching HPGe, improved electronics, solid state neutron sensors Mobile systems Better capabilities Increased detection range Better materials, better range Tracking and localization Hand-Held Detectors Radiation Isotope Identification Device Radiation pagers Directional high- resolution spectroscopic handheld (IPRL) Intelligent networked sensor systems (IRSS)

Detecting, Identifying, Locating, Tracking 15 Radiation Image Compton Image Overlay Color Codes Threat – Red Suspect – Yellow Medical – Blue Industrial – Purple NORM – Green Isotope ID Co-60 Range Data Range = 25m Coded Aperture Image

Intelligent Radiation Sensor System (IRSS)  Characterize the ability of a system of detectors to improve the detection, identification, and localization of threats as compared to the individual detectors  Characterize the relative importance of individual detector capabilities: NaI (2”x2”, 2”x1”), CZT (imaging and non-imaging), LaBr3 (RadSeeker)  Demonstrate search and monitoring capabilities across complex operational environments 16 network device rad detector node base station (optional) Reachback Center Detector PTU and Measured ‘Heat’ Map Indoor Measurement Campaign

Conclusion  Radiation detection must be part of a broader nuclear security strategy  Architecture should be defined by overall strategy  Architecture options facilitated by technological developments  Revolutionary changes in detection have occurred in the past two decades  Need to reinforce these changes with new technology and craft an Architecture that takes advantage of these technological changes. 17