Fisheries. efficient harvests biology biology economic economic.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Basic Bioeconomics Model of Fishing
Advertisements

Renewable Common-Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species Chapter 14.
Comments on Writing  Awkward modifiers  Example: By reading the clock, eleven thirty is the time.  Improvement: By reading the clock, we can tell the.
Economics of Forest Resources Ashir Mehta Source : Field, Barry (2001) : Natural Resource Economics : An Introduction, Chapter 12, McGraw Hill.
CHAPTER 5 Efficiency.
Upcoming in Class Homework #8 Due Thursday Quiz #4 Thursday Nov. 17th
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics
Public Goods and Common Property Resources Chapter 11.
Renewable, open-access resources: fisheries
The economics of fishery management The role of economics in fishery regulation.
11 PERFECT COMPETITION CHAPTER.
 Homework #8 Due Thursday  Quiz #4 Thursday Nov. 17 th  Homework #9 Thursday Nov. 17 th  Group Outline due Thursday Nov. 17th  Exam #4 Dec. 1st.
 Homework #8 Due Thursday  Quiz #4 Thursday Nov. 17 th  Homework #9 Thursday Nov. 17 th  Group Outline due Thursday Nov. 17th  Exam #4 Dec. 1st.
1 Open access resource economics Why the free market fails to protect resources.
Fishery Economics The role of economics in fishery regulation.
1 Part IV. Renewable Resources A.Fish – part 1: Biology and optimal harvest B.Forests C.Water D.Biodiversity.
Fisheries: The steady-state model
15 Monopoly.
Chapter 10: Perfect competition
Artificial Population Regulation n For regulation of populations n For commercial harvest n Maximum Sustained Yield (MSY) – Based on the logistic equation:
ERE7: Renewable Resources Fisheries Growth rates in biological resources Steady-state harvest –Perfect market –Open access Dynamic harvesting Policy intervention.
Economics of Biotic Resources Ecosystem Structure and Function.
Managing the Fishery How can we regulate the fishery to avoid problems of open access?
Renewable Resources Reading Perman et al (2nd ed.) Chapters 9 and 10
 Homework #8 due Wednesday  Homework #9 due next Wednesday  Quiz #4 Wednesday Nov. 14 th  Group Outline due Wed. Nov. 14th.
 Homework #8 due today  Homework #9 due next Wednesday  Quiz #4 Wednesday Nov. 14 th  Group Outline due Wed. Nov. 14 th  Exam #4 Wed. Nov 28 th 
An article for today Reminder: Homework 2 (due May 6) 6-1.
Your exams: graded, yes, but I forgot them at home.
7 7 Output, Price, and Profit: The Importance of Marginal Analysis Business is a good game...You keep score with money. NOLAN BUSHNELL, FOUNDER OF ATARI.
Economics of Renewable Natural Resources
Renewable Common-Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species.
1 Efficiency §Principles of Microeconomic Theory, ECO 284 §John Eastwood §CBA 213 § § address:
Chapter 10-Perfect Competition McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2015 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved. Chapter 14 Renewable Common- Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species.
Pure Monopoly Mr. Bammel.
Copyright McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2002 Chapter 23: Pure Competition.
Perfect Competition Chapter 7
AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 28 North Atlantic Cod Biomass Index (Source: FAO)
AGEC/FNR 406 LECTURE 27 Fisheries, Part II. Static-efficient sustained yield Gordon model (simplest approach) Goal: determine a catch level that provides.
McTaggart, Findlay, Parkin: Microeconomics © 2007 Pearson Education Australia Chapter 17: Public Goods and Common Resources.
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 10/1 Chapter 10 Monopoly.
Fishery Economics The role of economics in fishery regulation.
Exam 2 review. resource economics nonrenewable vs. renewable –maximize pv of net benefit –renewable includes growth functions characterize efficient allocations.
Economics of Fisheries © 2008 by Peter Berck. Economic Issues in Fisheries Present value maximizing fishing rules The open access outcome Regulation by.
Natural Resource Economics Academic year: Prof. Luca Salvatici Lesson 24: Optimal (harvesting) effort.
Renewable Common-Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species.
Chapter 14 Renewable Common-Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species.
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics Chapter 2 © 2007 Thomson Learning/South-WesternCallan and Thomas, Environmental Economics and Management,
The Fishery Resource: Biological and Economic Models Wednesday, April 12.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
Public Goods and Common Property Resources Chapter 11.
Managing the Fishery How can we regulate the fishery to avoid problems of open access?
Monopoly 1. Why Monopolies Arise Monopoly –Firm that is the sole seller of a product without close substitutes –Price maker Barriers to entry –Monopoly.
Monopoly 15. Monopoly A firm is considered a monopoly if... it is the sole seller of its product. it is the sole seller of its product. its product does.
Firm Behavior Under Perfect Competition
Chapter 10-Perfect Competition
Public Goods and Common Resources
ECON111 Tutorial 10 Week 12.
Growth rate (replacement) and size of the fish stock/pool
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
23 Pure Competition.
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics 3rd ed. Jonathan M
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.
Chapter 10: Perfect competition
Renewable Common-Pool Resources: Fisheries and Other Commercially Valuable Species Chapter 14.
10 C H A P T E R Pure Competition.
Growth rate (replacement) and size of the fish stock/pool
Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
The Fishery Resource: Biological and Economic Models
Presentation transcript:

fisheries

efficient harvests biology biology economic economic

biological dimension Schaefer model (1957) Schaefer model (1957) abstracting from water temp / quality, age structure, etc. abstracting from water temp / quality, age structure, etc. relationship btw. growth of popn and size of popn relationship btw. growth of popn and size of popn

growth as a function of stock

carrying capacity vs. minimum viable popn : carrying capacity / natural equilibrium : carrying capacity / natural equilibrium  stable, movements away set forces in motion back towards it : minimum viable popn : minimum viable popn  below growth is negative  unstable to right, growth to natural equilibrium to right, growth to natural equilibrium to left, decline to extinction to left, decline to extinction

“sustainable yield” catch growth rate each period, catch and population can be maintained forever catch growth rate each period, catch and population can be maintained forever S*: “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) S*: “maximum sustainable yield” (MSY) –yields maximum growth –largest catch that can be perpetually sustained

economics: efficient yield is MSY synonymous with efficiency? (no) is MSY synonymous with efficiency? (no) for efficient solution: maximize net benefits from use of resource for efficient solution: maximize net benefits from use of resource need to include costs and benefits of harvest, not just quantity need to include costs and benefits of harvest, not just quantity examine static efficient sustainable yield (largest annual net benefit) examine static efficient sustainable yield (largest annual net benefit)

3 assumptions price of fish constant price of fish constant MC fishing effort constant MC fishing effort constant fish caught per unit effort is proportional to size of population (smaller popn, fewer fish caught per unit effort) fish caught per unit effort is proportional to size of population (smaller popn, fewer fish caught per unit effort)

efficient sustainable yield

efficient fishing effort TR follows Schaefer model since price constant TR follows Schaefer model since price constant TC linear since MC effort constant TC linear since MC effort constant Em: further effort reduces sustainable catch and revenue for all years (MSY) Em: further effort reduces sustainable catch and revenue for all years (MSY) net benefit: vertical distance btw B & C net benefit: vertical distance btw B & C Ee: efficient effort, where net benefits maximized Ee: efficient effort, where net benefits maximized  MB (slope of TB) = MC (slope of constant TC curve)

efficient fishing effort effort > Ee inefficient, since additional cost exceeds value of fish obtained effort > Ee inefficient, since additional cost exceeds value of fish obtained MSY not efficient unless MC effort = 0 (why?) MSY not efficient unless MC effort = 0 (why?) efficient level of effort LESS than MSY efficient level of effort LESS than MSY efficiency implies LESS harvesting and LARGER population efficiency implies LESS harvesting and LARGER population

efficient vs. market allocation with well-defined property rights, sole owner of fishery would max profit by increasing effort until MR=MC with well-defined property rights, sole owner of fishery would max profit by increasing effort until MR=MC –harvest at Ee (efficient) but…fisheries typically OPEN ACCESS but…fisheries typically OPEN ACCESS

open access solution sole owner of fishery chooses to not expend > Ee because to do so reduces profit of fishery (personal loss) sole owner of fishery chooses to not expend > Ee because to do so reduces profit of fishery (personal loss) if unrestricted access, decision to expend > Ee reduces total profit, but not to individual fisher if unrestricted access, decision to expend > Ee reduces total profit, but not to individual fisher in open access, Ec effort (net benefits zero) in open access, Ec effort (net benefits zero)

fishery prisoner’s dilemma Fisher B Fisher A Fish more! Fish less Fish more! 2,24,1 Fish less 1,43,3 Note: Payoffs in thousands $ (A, B)

too much effort! policy responses increase MC– require fishing farther from shore, use smaller nets, boats, or motors increase MC– require fishing farther from shore, use smaller nets, boats, or motors –but artificially increasing cost inefficient total allowable catch – restrictions on effort or size of catch total allowable catch – restrictions on effort or size of catch –monitoring, enforcement difficult, also creates race to catch individual transferable quotas –quotas allocated, then trade individual transferable quotas –quotas allocated, then trade –no race, allows most efficient fishers to buy rights from inefficient fishers

Sample problem Costs fisher $20 to fish salmon Costs fisher $20 to fish salmon Salmon sells for $10 Salmon sells for $10 Harvest rate given X fishers is S = 30X-2 Harvest rate given X fishers is S = 30X-2X 2 How many people will go fishing, how many salmon will be caught, and what are total profits under How many people will go fishing, how many salmon will be caught, and what are total profits under –Open access –Limited entry (how many fishers should be allowed to maximize profit?)