Free will Am I ever really free? Determinism: the entire state of the world at any given time fixes, determines, necessitates, all the subsequent states

“Man’s life is a line that nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth, without his ever being able to swerve from it, even for an instant. He is born without his consent; his organization does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the control of those who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes, whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control….”--Paul Holbach, 1770

Determinism vs. Fatalism Fatalism: some events are predestined: no matter what happens now, the outcome is the same---whether I do x or y now, z will result Fatalism: some events are predestined: no matter what happens now, the outcome is the same---whether I do x or y now, z will result Determinism: if I do x now, z will result; if I would do y now, w would result. But the past determines that I will do x now. Determinism: if I do x now, z will result; if I would do y now, w would result. But the past determines that I will do x now.

Compatibilism: determinism is compatible with freedom/moral responsibility Incompatibilism: determinism is incompatible with freedom/moral responsibility Argument for incompatibilism: 1. Suppose determinism is true 2. Then my choices are fixed by causes stretching back to before my birth 3. I have no control over those causes 4. Therefore, I have no control over what I do now 5. Therefore, I cannot be blamed or praised for what I do now 6. So, if determinism is true, no one is morally responsible

3 kinds of incompatibilism: Libertarianism: we are capable of making free and responsible choices, which are not determined by the prior state of the world Hard determinism: Determinism is true, and this implies that we are never free/responsible Hard incompatibilism: whether determinism is true or not, we are never free/responsible

An Argument for Hard Incompatibilism 1. Every event is either caused or random 2. If my willing is caused, then it’s not free 3. If my willing is random, then it’s just something that happens to me and therefore, not free 4. Either way, the willing is not free 5. Therefore, our willing is never free

Resistance to hard incompatibilism We feel free We feel free It’s degrading to think we are mere automata It’s degrading to think we are mere automata If no one is responsible, then punishment is pointless If no one is responsible, then punishment is pointless If we’re not free, there’s no point in trying to accomplish anything If we’re not free, there’s no point in trying to accomplish anything If others aren’t free, we can’t have normal “reactive attitudes” toward them If others aren’t free, we can’t have normal “reactive attitudes” toward them

If we’re not free, then what’s the point of …..? 1. If we’re not free, then there’s no point to …. 2. But there is a point to …. 3. Therefore, it’s false that we’re not free. 4. I.e., we are free.

Libertarianism Can only events cause other events? Event-causal libertarianism: only events are causes, but some choices are free Agent-causal libertarianism: non only events are causes; agents are also sometimes causes. An agent-caused choice is free.

Chisholm: Human Freedom and the Self What’s crucial is the freedom of the will. The fact that I could have done otherwise, had I willed otherwise, is irrelevant. What’s crucial is the freedom of the will. The fact that I could have done otherwise, had I willed otherwise, is irrelevant. If the will is determined by character (beliefs, desires), the choice is not free. If the will is determined by character (beliefs, desires), the choice is not free.

If all causation is event-causation, there is a regress of causes. If all causation is event-causation, there is a regress of causes. If the self is the start of a new causal chain, the willing is If the self is the start of a new causal chain, the willing is Caused, so nonrandom Caused, so nonrandom The product of the self, so not something that happens to the agent The product of the self, so not something that happens to the agent

Kane: Free Will: Ancient Dispute, New Themes Self-forming actions: even if current action is determined, freely shaping character in the past makes current actions free. Self-forming actions: even if current action is determined, freely shaping character in the past makes current actions free.

Indeterminism is necessary for freedom, but not sufficient Indeterminism is necessary for freedom, but not sufficient Assassin with nondeterministic gun is responsible Assassin with nondeterministic gun is responsible

Equally balanced conflicting desires: Equally balanced conflicting desires: I want to stop for help, and I want to keep driving I want to stop for help, and I want to keep driving Which desire produces action is nondeterministically decided Which desire produces action is nondeterministically decided Whatever I do, I do what I wanted to do Whatever I do, I do what I wanted to do It was not fixed in advance that I would do this It was not fixed in advance that I would do this Therefore, it’s free. Therefore, it’s free.

Compatibilism Freedom/responsibility is compatible with determinism Compatibilism + determinism = “soft determinism” Compatibilism + determinism = “soft determinism”

Arguments for Compatibilism: Resiliency: We simply would not give up belief in freedom upon finding out that causal determinism is true We simply would not give up belief in freedom upon finding out that causal determinism is true 100% instead of 99.9% physical probabilities 100% instead of 99.9% physical probabilities

Arguments for Compatibilism: Commonsense understanding of freedom: Based on the type of cause, not on the absence of cause, or indeterminacy of cause Based on the type of cause, not on the absence of cause, or indeterminacy of cause

Run to my arms, you dearest boy, cried his father in transports, run to my arms; glad am I, George, that you killed my tree; for you have paid me for it a thousand fold. Such an act of heroism in my son, is more worth than a thousand trees, though blossomed with silver, and their fruits of purest gold.

No distinction? Incompatibilism implies that there is no difference between actions determined by agent’s character and those determined by outside forces Incompatibilism implies that there is no difference between actions determined by agent’s character and those determined by outside forces But clearly, there’s a difference, even if determinism is true But clearly, there’s a difference, even if determinism is true

Conditional Analysis S was free in doing x iff S could have done otherwise; i.e., iff S would have done otherwise, had S chosen to do otherwise Choice-dependence

Problems with conditional analysis Conditional analysis holds that ability to do otherwise (if so chosen) is both necessary and sufficient for freedom Conditional analysis holds that ability to do otherwise (if so chosen) is both necessary and sufficient for freedom However, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for freedom However, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for freedom Two types of counterexamples: Two types of counterexamples: Agent could have done otherwise but is not free; Agent could have done otherwise but is not free; Agent is free but couldn’t have done otherwise Agent is free but couldn’t have done otherwise

Frankfurt-style cases

Fischer Two kinds of control: Guidance control: a process of causal influence, not mere triggering, but ongoing guidance Guidance control: a process of causal influence, not mere triggering, but ongoing guidance Regulative control: ability to do otherwise Regulative control: ability to do otherwise

Argument for incompatibilism (Consequence Argument) shows that we don’t have regulative control: we can’t change the future without changing the past (and we can’t do that) But Frankfurt-style cases show that regulative control is not necessary for freedom, provided that agent has guidance control So Consequence Argument does not undermine freedom