Chapter 7 Rate-Setting Principles And Procedures.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
FSR Training course Florence, October 10-14, 2011 REGULATION OF ENERGY UTILITIES Module 12 Electricity tariff design Ignacio J. Pérez-Arriaga Instituto.
Advertisements

Foundations of Chapter M A R K E T I N G Copyright © 2003 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited. Understanding Pricing 13.
Public Goods and Tax Policy
International Center For Environmental Finance. Series A - Course #3 Water Tariffs and Subsidies: Policy Alternatives For Decisionmakers.
Cost Behavior and Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis
By: John T. Wenders Ama Agyeiwaa Ferkah Eco 435. INTRODUCTION  The traditional theory of peak-load pricing argues that peak period users should bear.
Chapter 12 Managerial Decisions for Firms with Market Power
Managerial Decisions for Firms with Market Power
A Two-Level Electricity Demand Model Hausman, Kinnucan, and Mcfadden.
TARIFF REGULATION IN THE NIGERIAN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY
1 Northeast Public Power Association Electric Utility Basics Electric Rates and Cost of Service Studies.
Chapter 14 Advanced Pricing Techniques
DO AMERICANS CONSUME TOO LITTLE NATURAL GAS?An Empirical Test of Marginal Cost Pricing. By Lucas W. Davis and Erich Muehlegger. Key words :Efficient pricing,
Chapter 5 Cost Measurement. Figure: The framework for Developing Regulated Services and Prices Pricing and Services Regime Tariffs Pricing Structure Terms.
Chapter 3 – The Role of the Revenue Requirement Revenue Requirement – Operating cost – Capital cost Firm is allowed to make a return on investment called.
Chapter 2 – Economic Concepts of Regulation Public Utility – for-profit firm whose operations were strictly controlled so as to not jeopardize the public.
Chapter 12 - Forecasting Forecasting is important in the business decision-making process in which a current choice or decision has future implications:
1 Econometric Load Forecasting Peak and Energy Forecast 06/14/2005 Econometric Load Forecasting Peak and Energy Forecast 06/14/2005.
© 2014 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
1 RELIABILITY AND COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS POWER Research Conference UC Berkeley March 19, 2004 Paul Joskow MIT, CEEPR, CMI and Jean Tirole IDEI,
2011 Long-Term Load Forecast Review ERCOT Calvin Opheim June 17, 2011.
CHAPTER 5 SUPPLY.
Revenue Decoupling: A proposed solution to the utilities’ traditional incentive to encourage wasteful energy use Christopher Grubb
NARUC Energy Regulatory Partnership Program The Georgian National Energy Regulatory Commission and The Vermont Public Service Board by Ann Bishop Vermont.
Do Americans Consume too little Natural Gas? An empirical test of marginal cost pricing By : Lucas W. Davis & Erich Muehlegger Presented by: Fadhila.
The Pricing Decision and Customer Profitability Analysis
Welcome and Introductions CoServ Presentation & Member Input.
KATHOLIEKE UNIVERSITEIT LEUVEN ENERGY INSTITUTE Pricing and Liberalisation Pricing in a Liberalised Energy Market Guido Pepermans Economics Department.
1 TRADITIONAL PRODUCT COSTING METHODS Accounting Principles II AC Fall Semester, 1999.
Generation Expansion Daniel Kirschen 1 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington.
1 THE RATE CASE PROCESS A Blend of Science and Superstition Presentation to the Mongolian Energy Regulatory Board By Burl Haar Executive Secretary Minnesota.
Chapter 14: Advanced Pricing Techniques McGraw-Hill/Irwin Copyright © 2011 by the McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
Chapter 12: Managerial Decisions for Firms with Market Power
Farmers Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 2006 Load Forecast Prepared by: East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. Forecasting and Market Analysis Department.
Cost of Service Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) presented by Nick Phillips Brubaker.
Chapter 5 Demand Forecasting.
Strategies for Addressing Fixed Cost Recovery Issues Dan Hansen Christensen Associates Energy Consulting August
Utah Cost of Service and Rate Design Task Force
Rate Design: Options for addressing NEM impacts Utah NEM Workgroup 4 1 July 8, 2015 Melissa Whited Synapse Energy Economics.
Grayson Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 2006 Load Forecast Prepared by: East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. Forecasting and Market Analysis Department.
Financial Projections Forecast—Budget—Analyze. Three Methods of Analyzing Financial Statements Vertical analysis Horizontal analysis Ratio analysis.
“Demand Response: Completing the Link Between Wholesale and Retail Pricing” Paul Crumrine Director, Regulatory Strategies & Services Institute for Regulatory.
September 24, 2007Paying for Load Growth and New Large Loads APPA September 2007.ppt 1 Paying for Load Growth and New Large Loads David Daer Principal.
Rate Design Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) Indiana Industrial Energy Consumers, Inc. (INDIEC) presented by Nick Phillips Brubaker &
Cost of Service Based Water and Wastewater Rates City of Lawrence, Kansas February 11, 2004 J. Rowe McKinley Keith D. Barber.
Chapter 17 Pricing and product mix decisions. Major influences on pricing decisions §Customer demand and reactions §Competitor behaviour §Costs l price.
Developing A Price Structure Chapter 16. Price Administration Price administration is also concerned with handling price adjustments for sales made under.
1 Demand Response A 28 Year History of Demand Response Programs for the Electric Cooperatives of Arkansas by Forest Kessinger Manager, Rates and Forecasting.
Managerial Decisions for Firms with Market Power BEC Managerial Economics.
Modeling the Market Process: A Review of the Basics Chapter 2 © 2004 Thomson Learning/South-Western.
NASUCA Annual Meeting Austin, Texas November 10, 2015 Scott J. Rubin, Attorney + Consultant 333 Oak Lane + Bloomsburg, PA Office: (570)
Blue Grass Energy Cooperative Corporation 2006 Load Forecast Prepared by: East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. Forecasting and Market Analysis Department.
Talha Mehmood Chapter # 5 TARIFF. Introduction The electrical energy produced by a power station is delivered to a large number of consumers. The supply.
Licking Valley Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation 2006 Load Forecast Prepared by : East Kentucky Power Cooperative, Inc. Forecasting and Market Analysis.
© 2014 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part, except for use as permitted in a license.
2010 NASUCA Mid-Year Meeting NASUCA 2010 Mid-Year Conference Presented by: Lee Smith Senior Economist and Managing Consultant Presented to: June ,
Demand Side Investment Planning Transmission Planning Code Workshop 2 1 st May 2008.
Financial Statements, Forecasts, and Planning
Electricity Power Market: Competitive and Non-competitive Markets Ito Diejomaoh.
LOAD FORECASTING. - ELECTRICAL LOAD FORECASTING IS THE ESTIMATION FOR FUTURE LOAD BY AN INDUSTRY OR UTILITY COMPANY - IT HAS MANY APPLICATIONS INCLUDING.
State Regulation in the Natural Monopoly Sphere Agency of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Regulation of Natural Monopolies ALMATY – 2006.
14-1 Learning Objectives  Explain why uniform pricing does not generate maximum possible total revenue and how price discrimination can generate more.
INTRODUCTION OF COST ACCOUNTING
Chapter 8: Selecting an appropriate price level
Rate-of-Return Regulation
Chapter 6: Estimating demand and revenue relationships
Transmission Pricing & Regional Electric Markets
Generation Expansion Daniel Kirschen
Beartooth Electric Cooperative Rate Design Analysis
Presentation transcript:

Chapter 7 Rate-Setting Principles And Procedures

7.1 Introduction Final (five) step---determining prices Basic level: dividing the allocated costs by appropriate consumption measures. In practice, more complex: different rate-setting and tariff design; different social and economic goals

7.2 Billing Determinants ---the units on which prices are levied. Based on: (1) overall energy consumption & peak demand (2) types of cost allocators used to divvy up costs bw the diff rate classes Components: (1) accurate forecast: naïve forecast; sophisticated forecast; simultaneous equations (2) weather normalization

 Estimation Methods Regulators: (1)Select the types of billing determinants to be uses (2)Choose to base on historical test year data or rate year Why rate and tariff structures take numerous forms—the design characteristics of natural gas and electric distribution. (1)Serve peak loads (both NG &electric) (2)So regulated rates and tariffs always incorporate multiple consumption measures and take one different structures.

(3) Electric: both consumption and peak demand will change constantly NG: more complex, depends on whether the focus is on local distribution to retail consumers or pipeline transport for wholesale consumers (4) Different types of peak demand are calculated by utilities to estimate rates and tariffs. coincident peak; non-coincident peak (5) Utilities also estimate load factors for rate and tariff setting. system load factor; sector load factor; customer load factor

Demand info is more difficult to gather than usage info. peak demand studies NG faces measurements issues different from those of electric utilities. (cold weather, storage  retail tariffs)

 Forecasting Focus on conceptual aspects of forecasting billing determinants. 1.Forecasting Energy Consumption (easier) (1) econometric way: time series data (2) bottom-up engineering approach: special equipments

2. Forecasting peak demand (harder) Reasons for the difficulty: (1) forecasters tend to be less adept at predicting extreme events (peak demand) (2) the physical characteristics of a distribution or transmission system (solved by simultaneous equations) (3) investment impacts of additional demand and additional customers classified into: horizontal growth & vertical growth conflicting goals: obligation to serve & fair, just and reasonable

 Weather Normalization Method Degree day: heating degree day (HDD)=diff bw average temperature for the day & a reference average temperature (68 F) cooling degree day (CDD)= (same manner) Humidity; cumulative temperatures over the past few days; hours of daylight

Linear regression techniques energy consumption= Fn (energy price, no. of customers, weather conditions) Defining “normal weather: the average over the previous 30 years (not the best predictor)

7.4 Alternative Design Structures Under traditional ratemaking principles (excluding incentive rate designs such as performance-based regulation), there are 8 broad types of tariff design: (1)One-part tariffs (2)Two-part tariffs (3)Multiblock tariffs (4)Incentive rate structures (5)Entry-exit tariffs (6)Interruptible rates (7)Time-of-use rates (8)Seasonal rates

(1) One-part tariff: simply a single volumetric charge based on consumption (but any single price is charged with welfare loss) (2) Two-part tariff: combines a fixed charge with a volumetric charge. (See Figure next page): the variable cost component would be set such that.P*=MC, consumption Q* the firm collect the shaded area to cover the fixed costs So the regulator could set a fixed charge equal to this amount divided by the expected number of customers in the rate year.

Figure: two-part tariff pricing

(3) Block tariffs: --distribute the price among blocks of consumption. P can be set efficiently w/o resorting to a fixed charge. Figures: next two pages Three-part declining block price structure Increasing block price structure Reasons for designing increasing block rates: subsidies for low-income consumer; increasing MC structures; social policy designed to reduce energy consumption)

Figure: Bock Rate Design

Figure: Block rate design under increasing marginal cost

(4) Incentive rate: --paired with special economic development rates that provides lower-cost energy in exchange for a firm creating new jobs. Problem: easy to go from incentive to cross-subsidy. (5) Entry-exit: Ex: European natural gas pipeline similar to multipart tariff with fixed charges (entry and exit fees) and variable charges ( commodity usage fees)

(6) interruptible rates: ---the utility offers lower price in exchange for an ability to curtail or interrupt service to customers. (usually during periods of high demand) interruptible rates: depends on how the firm’s fixed costs are allocated among customers Customers frequently argues that they are allocated additional fixed costs that would otherwise be allocated to interruptible customers. --price discrimination

Above argument is weak for reasons as: (1) probability of service interruption, not a guarantee of interruption. (2) a guarantee of interruption lacks foundation of economic efficiency and equity (3) many interruptible customers, will have alternatives to taking regulated service.

(7)Seasonal rates (8) time-of-use rates --incorporate the time dependence of consumption. Drawbacks of these two: (1)Customers do not like overall rates to increase in peak seasons, wrongly perceiving that the regulated firm is taking advantage of them. (2)Time-of-use rates can only be implemented if customers have more sophisticated meters that measures consumption in each hour. (3)Both conflict with regulatory goals of rate stability.

 Embedded and Marginal Cost Method 1. Embedded Cost Approaches adding up the prudent and known-and-measureable costs incurred by a firm to establish the firm’s revenue requirement. Rely on accounting costs on company’s books for the test year.

2. Marginal Cost Approaches Based on the principles of competitive markets—the amount consumers are willing to pay for the last (marginal) unit of a good or service is the cost of producing that unit. Allocative efficiency take observed demand as a given, set rates equal to MC at that level of output. Revenue checks show whether over- or underrecovery.  apply revenue reconciliation (Ramsey Pricing, Inverse Elasticity) Equal Proportion of MC (EPMC): increasing MC in proportion to the revenue diff. (additional cost are allocated w/o regard to price sensitivity.)

Problem: charging all customers the marginal P  firms collect revenue requirements only by chance  needs reconciliation. otherwise, if P diverges from MC, no way to know whether allocatively efficient.

3. Which Approach is Better? Difference lies in—how to define “cost” Embedded cost: accounting costs on the company’s books for the test year as the basis for setting rates and tariffs. Marginal cost: incremental costs of the firm providing an additional unit of production. Supporters of— Embedded: outweigh imperfect approximations to MC pricing MC pricing: efficient resource allocation cannot be had w/o it.

1. Pipeline Tariff Methods: --key point: whether access to pipeline capacity is based on a contract carriage or an entry-exit regime. Contract carriage: (US, Canada, most Latin America) a pipeline assigns a contract amount of capacity to the shipper on any given day; Take-or-pay; capacity right. Two methods to allocate fixed and variable pipeline costs: zone-gate & Mcf-mile

Zone gate: cost are first allocated by geographic zone, then based on zone-specific billing determinants. Problem: arbitrary Mcf-mile: to calculate “distance-weighted” allocation factors. Good side: No specific zones

2. Peaker Methods: --whereas energy revenues are simply revenues from the sale of electricity on a volumetric, capacity revenues are meant to compensate generators for the fixed costs of providing capacity to the system.  ensure enough investment in new generating plants and to maintain long-term system reliability. Same concept of regulators: capacity payments are designed to compensate investors for the fixed investment and operation costs associated with a peaking unit.

In determining the capacity payments, regulators: (1) choose an “efficient” peaking plant (2)calculate the total fixed investment cost for the plant. (3) levelize the total fixed investment cost over the plant’s expected lifetime. (4) add a fixed O&M cost to the annual fixed cost

3. Electric Transmission Tariffs: --electric transmission: large fixed costs and small variable ones. None methods we are aware of has provided appropriate economic signals to encourage long-term investment. Ex: Argentina: transmission usage charge (locational pricing) Great Britain: a connection charge and a usage charge (MC pricing)