Conceding to Thrive: Taiwan’s Alternative Path to Democracy Joseph Wong Halbert Professor of Innovation Canada Research Chair & Professor, Political Science Director, Asian Institute University of Toronto

The preferences of party cadres are much simpler than those of [military] officers. Like democratic politicians, they simply want to hold office. -Barbara Geddes, 1999

[T]here is a strong wind of change blowing over the country …. the day when freedoms and human rights could be slighted in the name of economic growth and national security has ended. The day when repressive force and torture in secret chambers were tolerated is over. -Roh Tae-Woo, 1988

[T]he times are changing, the environment is changing, the tide is also changing. -Chiang Ching-Kuo, 1986

Dominant parties can be incentivized to concede democratization from a position of exceptional strength and not only from a position of extreme weakness. -Slater and Wong, 2013

1. Antecedent Strengths stability confidence victory confidence

Conceding democracy does not mean conceding defeat.

2. Ominous Signals bittersweet spot

3. Legitimation Strategies conceding reform

Taiwan Developmental State Limited Elections Tangwai mobilization Geopolitics

The KMT ultimately chose to concede democracy because the party was in a position not of desperation, but of fairly strong confidence that democratic concession would ensure both the KMT’s electoral victory and the maintenance of stability. -Slater and Wong, 2013

KMT’s Victory Confidence KMT’s Stability Confidence

The Paradox of Conceding-to-Thrive When a ruling party enjoys substantial incumbent capacity, this not only increases its ability to sustain authoritarian rule, but can lessen its imperative to do so. -Slater and Wong, 2013

(since 1986) Enduring Dominant Parties: 35 Competitive (Major): 18 Competitive (Minor): 15 Obsolete / Defunct: 15

Candidate Case: China’ CCP Apex of power? Bittersweet spot? Hurtled through?

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