UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/2015 10:30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 33 Pages Space Policy Issues - Space Strategies - 14 June, 2010.

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UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 1 of 33 Pages Space Policy Issues - Space Strategies - 14 June, 2010

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 2 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence  Deter (Pre-Conflict)  Persuade  Confuse  Deter (Trans-Conflict)  Protect  Deny Space Force Enhancement  Deny Space Support  Destroy Space Infrastructure  Space-Supported Reconstruction

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 3 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (1)  Deter (Pre-Conflict)  Overt Weapon JDemonstrated Capability JCan Be Secretly Linked To Covert  Space Treaty Allows JEmbargo Gray Country Space Support U Jam U Blind JDestruction of Threatening Space Systems  Saber Rattling  Space Mutual Defense Alliances

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 4 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (2)  Persuade  Diplomatic Request  Economic Action  Legal Action  Administrative Action JTurn-Off Own Systems

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 5 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (3a)  Confuse  Hide JPassive U Camouflage U Cease Activities When Sensor Is Overhead U Move Out of the Way of Sensor JActive U Jam U Blind

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 6 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (3b)  Confuse (Continued)  Change Adversary Confidence JCovertly Disrupt Space Systems U Adversary Can’t Trust the Reliability Or Validity of His Space Systems  Change Adversary Perceptions JMake Blue Side Look Bigger Than They Are U Fake Forces U Blind Sensors Where No Forces Exist JMake Red Side Look Smaller Than They Are U Adversary Can’t Determine Location & Status of His Own Forces U Convince Adversary Future Space or Terrestrial Weather Is Not Favorable for Attack

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 7 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (4a)  Deter (Trans-Conflict)  Linked Attack JDeclare That Use of Gray/Red Space Assets Will Precipitate Attack On Terrestrial Systems  Demo Attack JDestroy Derelict Space System To Show Real Space Control Capability & Willingness To Use It U Covert Space Control Capability Can Actually Be Used To Cover for Weak Overt Capability

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 8 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (4b)  Deter (Trans-Conflict, Continued)  Alternate Country Attack JDestroying Red Space Systems Deters Gray From Supporting Red  Covert Attack JRed/Gray Space Systems Temporarily Stop Working, Even Though Blue Does Not Admit Attack, The Message Is Clear

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 9 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (5)  Protect  Passive JHarden JManeuver JHide  Active JDeny Adversary Space Control Capability U Deny Terrestrial Space Control Capability U Deny Space-Based Space Control Capability

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 10 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (6)  Deny Space Force Enhancement  Deny Imagery Info  Deny Weather Info  Deny Navigation Info  Deny Missile Warning Info JIf Within Rules of Engagement  Deny Communications

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 11 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (7)  Deny Space Support  Deny Access To and From Space JDeny Space Launch JDeny Space De-Orbit/Retrieval U Space Planes U Film Capsule Return U Hijacked Satellite Parts U Astronaut Return

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 12 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (8a)  Destroy Space Infrastructure  Set Back Adversary Space Capabilities For Years To Come (Watch Out For Poisonous Materials) JLarge Earth Terminals & Antennas JLaunch Pads & Space Plane Airfields JSpace Production Facilities U Rocket Fuel Production U Satellite Construction U Missile Construction JSpace Design Facilities & Personnel

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 13 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (8b)  Destroy Space Infrastructure (Continued)  Critical Utilities Leading to Space Facilities U Electrical Transmission Towers U Pipelines U Roads, Bridges, Tunnels & Passes

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 14 of 33 Pages Space Strategy Sequence (9)  Space-Supported Reconstruction  Employ Space Assets for Allied/Red Post- Conflict Rebuilding  Clean Up Space Debris?

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 15 of 33 Pages Space Control Tempo (1)  Determine Most Vulnerable Blue/Gray Assets - Protect These  Satellites  Satellite Control/Receiver Sites  Satellite Tracking Sites  Space Weapons  Terrestrial Non-Space Linked To Space Assets JCommunications JCommand

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 16 of 33 Pages Space Control Tempo (2)  Determine Most Threatening Red/Gray Assets  Satellites  Satellite Control/Receiver Sites  Satellite Tracking Sites  Space Weapons  Terrestrial Non-Space Linked To Space Assets JCommunications JCommand

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 17 of 33 Pages Space Control Tempo (3)  Deter Red & Gray Use of Space Assets  Space Escalation Ladder Control JPre-Conflict JTrans-Conflict  Blue May Not Want to Escalate Space War All the Way JBlue May Have More Space Assets to Lose Than Red JBlue May Force Red to Use Gray Space Assets, Which Blue May Be Self-Deterred From Attacking JBlue May Be Monitoring Red/Gray Space Assets for INTEL

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 18 of 33 Pages Space Control Tempo (4)  Fix Space Assets Into Quiescent State Until Satellite Killers Are In Theater, On-Line, Targets Are Within Range & Employment Authorized  Satellites Cannot Get New Tasking, Re-Configure Into War Reserve Modes, Or Maneuver to Orbits Advantageous on Battlefield JConfuse/Deny TT&C and Tasking of Satellites JConfuse/Deny Data Down-Linked From Satellites JConfuse/Deny Command Centers Requesting Satellite Info JConfuse/Deny Communications Between Command Centers & Space Centers

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 19 of 33 Pages Space Control Tempo (5)  Employ Degrade/Destroy Space Control Weapons Where Authorized (ROE)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 20 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (1)

UNCLASSIFIED Space Strategies (2)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 22 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (3)

UNCLASSIFIED Space Strategies (4)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 24 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (5)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 25 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (6)

UNCLASSIFIED Space Strategies (7)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 27 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (8)

UNCLASSIFIED Page 28 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (9)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 29 of 33 Pages Space Strategies (10)

UNCLASSIFIED Other Space Strategies (1) Blind Blue capabilities to observe the terrestrial battlefield Blind Blue capabilities to support the terrestrial battlefield Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from terrestrial sensors Blind Blue capabilities to observe space from space-based sensors Spoof Blue capabilities to observe the battlefield Spoof Blue capabilities to support the battlefield Deny Blue ability to launch new satellites Destroy some Blue space capability as a warning to Gray space systems support to Blue Wear down Blue Defensive Counter-Space capabilities by instigating multiple false alarm attacks Attack Blue satellites before the start of the terrestrial conflict Spoof Blue perceptions of Red space strengths Conduct surprise attacks on Blue space systems

UNCLASSIFIED Other Space Strategies (2) Conduct diplomatic offensive to restrict Blue ability to employ ASAT's Actively defend key launch corridors and orbits critical to Red conduct of war Mass Red ASAT forces against high value Blue targets Preposition Red space assets to maximize their effectiveness at the start of the conflict Red exploits Blue space systems to Red advantage Disrupt Blue command and control capabilities for space systems Embargo Blue access to space systems Prevent Blue ability to service or re-fuel on-orbit satellites Develop propaganda campaign against Blue use of ASAT's Shape and delay Blue plans for space warfare Deny Blue ability to achieve Space Situational Awareness Deny Blue ability to use commercial and Gray space assets

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 32 of 33 Pages Other Space Strategies (3) Destroy Blue space infrastructure to have a long term impact on Blue space capabilities even after the war's end Disrupt Blue space attacks so they become uncoordinated Constantly shift points of application of space control weapons to confuse adversary response Cut off Blue access to satellites Herd Blue space communications paths to those that are more easily monitored by Red SIGINT assets Attack key Blue space personnel and technicians Allocate space defenses according to priority of space system defended Does Red conduct an active (attack ASAT's) or passive defense (satellite hardening)

UNCLASSIFIED 5/11/ :30:14 PM UNCLASSIFIED Page 33 of 33 Pages Other Space Strategies (4) Does Red conduct ASAT attacks over home territory What is Red attack priority timelines: terrestrial space systems or satellites first Disperse Red assets (maneuver satellites) just before launching first attack All-out first attack or gradual escalation of space attacks Is the strategy dependent upon a perception of the relative capability of the threat, for example, would Red do something different if the attacker were perceived to be stronger? Attach new ASAT to old space object that has been dead for a long time (1960's debris?). Maneuver this new "shield" along with your new ASAT. Drift with this debris, maybe making slight maneuvers until needed to attack with a major, final maneuver.