Land titles in risk-constrained rural markets Boucher, Barham and Carter Discussion: Karen Macours

Impacts of land titles Mixed evidence on the impact of titles on supply and demand for credit for small-holder agriculture This paper considers the role of risk –40% of households in Honduras, Nicaragua and Peru are credit constrained –Many of those report not to apply for credit for fear of losing collateral  What then is the likely impact of titling programs  Are there complementary interventions: insurance?

Comments Theory: credit-mechanisms Variation in titles Variation in risk rationing Interpretation results Attrition? Changes instead of levels?

Value of collateral? Which credit-mechanisms are available plays a role in value of title –Is all titled land accepted as good collateral? –How important are MFIs compared to others… ~ theory assumes that if title, land can be used as collateral

Variation in the data : titles Panel data, and subset of households (from peasant communities) received title between 2 panel years –Unclear what determines variation in timing of title within peasant communities (~ exogenous?) –Empirics use both time-series and cross-section variation: data is used as a pooled cross-section, and possibility to control for unobservables hence not exploited

Variation in data: risk rationed Increase in risk rationing for private land and peasant communities: –Other changes in the period? –Past shocks? –Changes in financial system? –Permanent change in perceptions?

Interpretation of results Table 4: title is negatively correlated with 3 types of rationing => if title: more likely to obtain loan Coefficient estimates do not appear to be significantly different –How to account for that in graphical interpretation?

Changes instead of levels? Analyzing changes in rationing category will allow to control for many unobservables Consider how change in title interacts with different types of rationing when considering changes in efficiency or welfare outcomes?