ENEA’s Virtual e-Seminar FPN- RADCASS Unit New Research Ideas 2008 Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy Adam Maria Gadomski, Massimo Sepielli, Corrado Kropp Italian National Research Agency ENEA, FNP Research Center Casaccia, 0123 Roma, Italy casaccia.enea.it, ENEA Oct. 13, 2008

Super-Safety Nuclear Integrated Management and On-Line Monitoring Strategy Super-Safety Nuclear Integrated Management: a new vision of safety ENEA Oct. 13, 2008 Rationality The safety of potentially high-risk and large humans-technology systems, such as nuclear power plants, becomes nowadays the problem of not only classical engineers focused on the improvements of technological solutions reliability. The possible consequences of disasters and involving together technological, environmental and human factors, are more and more jeopardise for modern societies. On the other hand, an individual social safety and security have became one of the critical requirements of sustainable development, for industrial managers, policy makers and stakeholders. Super-Safety Nuclear Integrated Management: a new vision of safety

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy Presentation Outline Introduction: Super-Safety – Why and What is it Identification Plant supervision lifecycle On-Line Monitoring Strategy from NSSS viewpoint Top-down Methodology in work - New Challenger Final comments: ENEA Oct. 13, 2008

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy -Stop to nuclear energy was continued in Italy 15 years from referedum in Nov New national policy on Nuclear Energy -Available new technological solutions -New social requests and democratic pressure 2008 ENEA New advanced research New advanced research responses relate to the integrated life cycle of plant nuclear systems : - Production & Technologies, - Economy of exploitation, - Integrated Super-Safety - Production & Technologies, - Economy of exploitation, - Integrated Super-Safety ENEA/S Responses Introduction Italian situation

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy ENEA Oct. 13, 2008 Super-Safety (SS) –What is it? SS is the unified and complete supervision of critical systems its dynamic functions and consequences involved in the operators and managers decisions. SS is a total protection extendend in time and space, as well as related to the cause-consequences propagation managed together in technological, cognitive and socio-organizational layers SS has to satisfy current society requirements related to its self and the environment safety (on sustaiability level) New tasks New technologies + New social constrains  New RTD approach is necessary SS Strategy (SSS)

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy SS Strategy (SSS) SS Strategy (SSS) is systemic strongly interdisciplinary design and managerial approach. SSS is a methodological framework for systemic design and integrated socio-cognitive and technological management SSS paradigms SSS paradigms are constrains for the top-down detailed SS specification and concrete management of human- technology aggregate. ENEA Oct. 13, 2008 The objective The objective of SSS is to obtain and maintain SS.

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy SS Strategy (SSS) SS Strategy (SSS) is a methodological framework for systemic integrated design and socio-cognitive and technological management SSS paradigms SSS paradigms are meta-models and constrains for the detailed design and concrete management of human- technology aggregate. SSS top-constrains SSS top-constrains: Feasibility for the SS realization, internal Congruence i.e. lack of conflicts, and Completness of specifications on every level of managerial competences. ENEA/S Oct. 13, 2008 How it can be achived? SSS has to be total, intelligent and computer supported (IDSSs)  Tool: the TOGA meta-theory framework (1994)

SAFETY: Four layers of safety building The systemic socio-cognitive TOGA meta-theory (Top-down Object-based Goal- oriented Approach) is applied to the meta-modelling of the problem. Applying TOGA, we distinguished 4 layers of safety building from the operator goal-oriented points of view: (1) natural safety, it employs only the safety properties of physical processes engaged in the system external functions. (2) critical safety; it is realized by the shut-down of the system functions under critical conditions. An automatic switch-off equipment is installed. (3) controlled safety; a supervision of safety-indicating variables and the model-based regulation of their control variables (in open and close loops) are realized. (4) super-safety; an integrated supervision of the controlled safety is performed, the models employed in the controlled safety layer can be modified according to the managerial preferences of the object/process owner or some external normative requirements. An intrinsically safe nuclear technology is included in the safety analysis in the above defined layers.

Super-Safety Constrains for Nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy Allocation of nuclear On-Line Monitoring Strategy (OLMS) in frame of SSS Operational Supper Safety Policy-Making Supper Safety Technological Supper Safety Human-technology & Organizational Safety Top-down Approach … On-Line Monitoring Strategy ? Operational Supper-Safety

Intelligent Operational Supper Safety (IOSS) IOSS is Safety managed by plant operator + intelligent computerised support IOSS may apply the TOGA formal frames(Top-down Object-based Goal-oriented Approach, Gadomski, 93) : Main schemes: Intelligent Agent (IA)  Interaction  Activity Domain Actiity Domain Specification conceptualization framework: IA Goal  Task  IA World SystemProcessFunctionDesign-Goal

Goal from operator SS perspective : Operator monitoring viewpoint Function status monitoring System status monitoring Process status monitoring Components & Variables verification Most important! Models and Computer support are needed

MIND Organization Controlled Nuclear Plant Control and Measurement System (in- core, …) Computer Console System Physical environment Psycho-social environment System-based Perspective : Plant Context, Operator Level Cognitive Interactions Human operator Constrains MachineOrganization Casaccia Research Center, May 24, 2005 A.M.Gadomski, M.Sepielli

Proces-based representation in SSS Production process Strategic D-M activity Maintaining process Fuel providing process Control process   Managementa ctivity    Waste neutralization process  DESIGN  ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES (natural and human) Managementa ctivity   Management actiity    Production process Strategic D-M activity Maintaining process Fuel providing process Control process   Managementa ctivity    Waste neutralization process  DESIGN  ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES (natural and human) Managementa ctivity   Management actiity    Production process Strategic D-M activity Maintaining process Fuel providing process Control process   Management activity    Waste neutralization process  DESIGN  ENVIRONMENTAL PROCESSES (natural and human) Management activity   Management actiity    Energy providing process  Types of posssible loss of safety: external, structural/material, processual, functional, goal-dependent, they refer to every mentioned processes  Activity or process with human component … The processes and activities network which should be safe for their envirinments and for themself.

Function-based Representation Decomposition

Situational safety assessment: it is a system diagnostics relied on identification of existing or possible lack of safety (LOS), i.e. threats; by detection of losses generation, and risk assessment Intervention (removing of lack of safety) Processes are monitored by their measured and observed attributes (A): System state depends on variables and parameters S (v,p), Model-supported functional Interpretation design of OLMS Design -Goal Functions & servicies Processes System & components Attributes/ properties /Indicators Models of processes & safety margins Detection of LOS Design -Goal Functions & servicies Processes System & components Attributes/ properties /Indicators Models of processes & safety margins Detection of LOS Conceptual Design: Progation of IPK during modelling and design Extended Operational monitoring: Progation of IPK during plant operation.

ENEA’s SPECIFIC INTERESTS Intelligent Console Network 1. New Approach to Intelligent Console Network for Nuclear Supper Safety 2. Suggested initiative: to propose for UE and IAEA the organization of: European Network of the Research and Consulting Centers for the development of Super-Safety & High Intelligent Nuclear Operations Grid (SSHINO). This new SS Strategy should: - include in the safety operation human management and organization responsibility - extend the concept of safety on the emergency propagation in space and time -adapt technology to humans by high-intelligent ICT support network. Operational Super-Safety mission. ENES intents to follow two main closely interdependent RTD directions: -1. Nuclear integrated super safety management -2. High intelligence add network for design, planning and operations.

ENEA’s SPECIFIC INTEREST Casaccia Research Center, May 24, 2005 A.M.Gadomski, M.Sepielli perspective development of SINAC The both are seen from the perspective of the development of SINAC Super-safety Intelligent Network of Add Consoles More advanced interdysciplinary Italian studies of SINAC oriented are in progress and could be an important subject of international debates/negotiations and a research workshop. Among others, they refere to: - Core dynamics control - Robustness of software grids - Operator tasks and behaviours - Intelligent Decision-support - Cognitive operators’ errors - Abnormalities and -- Organization barriers/pathologies Emergency Management.

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