China’s Participation in the UN Security Council Joel Wuthnow Hong Kong Political Science Association August 21,

Argument China has become a highly engaged actor in the UN Security Council, which itself has taken a much more active role in collective security since the end of the Cold War. China’s positions in Council deliberations are pragmatic and instrumental, not ideological. It is especially motivated by two calculations: strategic interests and political reputation vis- à-vis the international community. 2

The Post-Cold War Security Council Cold War: superpower contestation; frequent vetoes; few sanctions; “traditional” peacekeeping; rare invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Post-Cold War: consensus-oriented; few vetoes; adoption of sanctions; “non- traditional peacekeeping;” frequent use of Chapter VII. 3

The UNSC: Cold War vs. Post Security Council meetings/year Vetoes/year5.3 ( )2.4 ( ) Resolutions/year Chapter VII Resolutions - Total 8423 New Sanctions Committees – Total 221 New Peacekeeping Operations – Total 1845 Peacekeeping Personnel17,900 (1989)91,300 (2009) 4

China’s Path to Engagement : Passive learner. Frequent abstentions on peacekeeping votes. Aligned with the Third World : Increasing engagement. Begins to take initiative present: Active engagement. Approval of most resolutions. Participation in PKOs. 5

Voting with the Rest 6

China’s Troop Contribution to UN Peacekeeping 7

China’s Strategic Rationale The Security Council as a vehicle to check U.S. unilateralism. Building an image of a “responsible great power” that accepts pre-existing institutions and norms. Veto power  inherent influence on a range of regional issues, from East Asia to the Middle East to Africa. 8

Cooperativeness Post-Cold War voting record: 4 vetoes, 49 abstentions, 1149 affirmative votes. Worked to keep Iraq (2003) off the agenda. Contention difficult to observe, because most of it will have happened prior to the final text that is voted on. Nevertheless, China’s position impacts the extent to which others (e.g. the West) is able to accomplish viz. sanctions, PKO mandates. 9

Chinese vetoes, DateIssueEffectReasonNote 1/10/1997GuatemalaPrevent military observer mission Taiwan 2/25/1999MacedoniaDiscontinue UNPREDEP mission Taiwan 1/12/2007MyanmarFail to condemn Myanmar regime jurisdictionw/ Russia 7/11/2008ZimbabweFail to approve sanctions Jurisdictionw/ Russia 10

Two Logics of Action Logic of Appropriateness: Positions determined by consistency with prior- established norms and values. China’s positions should be based on sovereignty concerns, non-use of force. Logic of Consequences: Positions determined in relation to material (economic/security) interests. China should respond to two types of calculations: strategic and political. 11

Cases: North Korea & Sudan North Korea: Nuclear detonation prompts re- evaluation of strategy  support for Chapter VII resolutions, new sanctions. Sudan: Prospect of Western intervention and boycott of “genocide Olympics” causes PRC to pressure Sudan to allow UN-AU hybrid force. Both cases involve territorial security. Strategic calculations apparent, political reputation less vital. Norms as post-hoc justification. 12

Cooperation Mechanisms When the issue at stake is central to China’s perceived interests, there is probably little its interlocutors can do to affect its position. But these issues should be relatively few. When the issue is more peripheral, social pressure may be employed by tying China’s reputation to cooperation. This would depend on China being highly isolated. 13