Russia Enters the War: The Battle of Tannenberg- Mid August 1914 Russia’s weaknesses had convinced Schlieffen and his successor Moltke that it would take forty days for the Tsar’s armies to mass on Germany’s border. The Germans believed they had forty days to overwhelm France before they had to turn and face the Russians.

Besides time, the Germans also believed space was on their side. Russia’s immense spaces separated the population centers from which soldiers must mobilize. There were also sparse railroad connections between the cities and the frontiers. The Germans believed that what would take them days, would take the Russians weeks.

In 1914, Russia was committed to Plan A. Two- fifths of it’s army would be concentrated around Warsaw, from which it’s forces could be deployed into East Prussia. Germany had little left over from the Western Front to defend East Prussia with. Only one of it’s eight armies and some reservists were available. They were far outnumbered by Russian forces.

However large their numbers, Russia’s forces had serious problems. They had far greater cavalry numbers than any other army. This put a large burden for animal feed on the already weak transport system. It took forty trains to supply four thousand men in a cavalry division, when the same number could supply sixteen thousand infantry men. Russian officers were often poorly educated, while their men were generally illiterate peasants.

Despite their overwhelming numbers, the Russians exposed themselves to defeat in detail-- that is they allowed a weaker force to concentrate against on portion of their army and then the other, defeating both. Geography provided Germany with some definite advantages. The Russian army was faced with a chain of lakes nearly fifty miles long. The easiest option was to split the forces and work around the lakes. The armies would be separated by three days marching time and not able to come to each other’s aid easily.

The Germans also had better intelligence gathering methods. The Russians knew they outnumbered the Germans, but had no way of determining the German positions. Even with the largest aerial reconnaissance in Europe, the Russians failed to detect German movements all together. German aircraft however, began to detect Russian movement a full week before they crossed the frontier.

By the time the Russian troops arrived in force, the Germans were already planning a sneak attack under cover of darkness. The Russians however, had prepared trenches and fortified farm buildings. The harder the Germans pressed, the higher their casualties. The Tsar’s artillery were the best trained arm of his army. To add to the slaughter, the Germans mistakenly, but effectively fired on their own troops.

Molke was appalled by the reports he was receiving from the front. Only twenty of the vital forty days had elapsed. He feared the Schlieffen Plan was beginning to crumble. He decided to change commanders and sent in Ludendorff and Hindenburg. The plan was to defeat Russian forces on one side of the lake, then use the railway lines to send forces behind them and repeat the process.

Radio insecurity was to be a key feature of the Tannenberg campaign. Both sides were guilty of signaling en clair. The Russians had difficulty distributing code books, while the Germans operators felt pressed for time and sent messages hoping they would be missed by listeners. On the morning of August 25, Hindenberg had a stroke of luck when an entire Russian First Army order was received. He used the information to surround the Russian army

The Germans counted 50,000 Russian dead as well as 92,000 prisoners. The Germans had saved the Prussian heartland and was celebrated as saving Germany from the barbarians of Russia. Tannenberg also reversed the German way of thinking about the war. Initially, the west was to be won quickly, while the east was held as best as possible, now the east seemed tamed while victory continued to be elusive in the west.

Tannenberg temporarily devastated the Russians. The Russian commander, Samsonov was inconsolable. Riding back with his officers, he found an excuse for a moment alone and shot himself. Beyond stories like this, it is difficult to represent the stories of the Russian army on an individual level. The army was 80% peasant and illiterate. Few personal memoirs remain.