EPM: Chs V & VI Pete Mandik Chairman, Department of Philosophy Coordinator, Cognitive Science Laboratory William Paterson University, New Jersey USA “RED!” / “RED!” \

2 Ch V: “Impressions and Ideas: A Logical Point” The fact that Jones sees that X is red is red is an experiencing (a success verb that requires the existence of a red thing) The fact that X looks red to Jones is not an experiencing (not a success verb that requires the existence of a red thing).

3 Don’t the two situations have something in common? Maybe, but probably not the sort of thing that will make Myth Lovers happy.

4 What the two situations might have in common: Seeing that X is red requires having a propositional attitude that something is red and the proposition is true. Something looking red requires having a propositional attitude that something is red and the mental state would be a seeing if the proposition were true.

5 This suggestion, however, has some problems: 1. It does not give us a name, but a predicate (we do not have a singular term that refers directly to immediate experiences but a general term that groups things into sorts (in this case, seeings and lookings)) 2. There is no good reason for thinking that the “of” in “…sensation of..” indicates that sensations have intentionality [aka epistemic aboutness]

6 Re: 2, against the intentionality of sensation Jones has a thought of a divine Huntress and Jones believes in the existence of a divine Huntress are both instances of mental states with intentionality (aboutness). The mental states don’t require the actual existence of a divine Huntress because of their intentionality.

7 Re: 2, against the intentionality of sensation Jones has a sensation of a red triangle doesn’t require the actual existence of a red triangle. Might this be explained by sensations having intentionality? Not necessarily. All this shows is that sensations are non-extensional, but non-extensionality does not entail intentionality. (For example, “It is possible that the moon is made of green cheese”).

8 Re: 2, against the intentionality of sensation Even if problem #2 could be solved, there is still problem #1 (whether there are names directly referring to private particulars), which is dealt with in the next chapter.

9 Ch VI: “Impressions and Ideas: A Historical Point” The alleged possibility of inverted spectra requires the possibility of direct awareness of sensations (private names) which in turn presupposes the Myth of the Given. “RED!” / “RED!” \

10 “ various forms taken by the myth of the given …all have in common the idea that the awareness of certain sorts -- and by "sorts" I have in mind, in the first instance, determinate sense repeatables -- is a primordial, non-problematic feature of 'immediate experience.’”

11 “ however much Locke, Berkeley, and Hume differ on the problem of abstract ideas, they all take for granted that the human mind has an innate ability to be aware of certain determinate sorts -- indeed, that we are aware of them simply by virtue of having sensations and images.”

12 “Now, it takes but a small twist of Hume's position to get a radically different view. For suppose that instead of characterizing the initial elements of experience as impressions of, e.g. red, Hume had characterized them as red particulars (and I would be the last to deny that not only Hume, but perhaps Berkeley and Locke as well, often treat impressions or ideas of red as though they were red particulars) then Hume's view, expanded to take into account determinates as well as determinables, would become the view that all consciousness of sorts or repeatables rests on an association of words (e.g. "red") with classes of resembling particulars.”

13 How is this association mediated? “ If, however, the association is not mediated by the awareness of facts either of the form x resembles y, or of the form x is f, then we have a view of the general type which I will call psychological nominalism, according to which all awareness of sorts, resemblances, facts, etc., in short, all awareness of abstract entities -- indeed, all awareness even of particulars -- is a linguistic affair. According to it, not even the awareness of such sorts, resemblances, and facts as pertain to so-called immediate experience is presupposed by the process of acquiring the use of a language.”

14 “ Once sensations and images have been purged of epistemic aboutness [aka intentionality], the primary reason for supposing that the fundamental associative tie between language and the world must be between words and 'immediate experiences' has disappeared, and the way is clear to recognizing that basic word-world associations hold, for example, between "red" and red physical objects, rather than between "red" and a supposed class of private red particulars.”

15 No Inverted Spectra If Jones and Smith have the same dispositions to utter color words in the presence of various physical objects, regardless of how divergent their neurophysiology, then there can be no possibility of something seeming red to Jones while seeming green to Smith. “RED!” / “RED!” \

16 THE END