START Follow-on Update November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution November 30, 2009 Steven Pifer Center on the United States and Europe Foreign Policy Studies The Brookings Institution

Background: 1991 START Treaty No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers) No more than 154 heavy ICBMs No more than 6000 warheads No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs Detailed verification measures Expires December 5, 2009 No more than 1600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMS, SLBMs, heavy bombers) No more than 154 heavy ICBMs No more than 6000 warheads No more than 4900 on ICBMs/SLBMs No more than 1540 on heavy ICBMs No more than 1100 on mobile ICBMs Detailed verification measures Expires December 5, 2009

Background: 2002 SORT Treaty No more than strategic nuclear warheads No limits on SNDVs No verification measures Expires December 31, 2012 No more than strategic nuclear warheads No limits on SNDVs No verification measures Expires December 31, 2012

Background: US START- Accountable Forces, July 2009 SORT count at/near 2200 warheads Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs capable of carrying 5916 warheads: 550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs Trident I SLBMs Trident II SLBMs B-1 bombers B-2 bombers B-52 bombers 987 SORT count at/near 2200 warheads Per START data exchange, 1188 SNDVs capable of carrying 5916 warheads: 550 Minuteman/MX ICBMs Trident I SLBMs Trident II SLBMs B-1 bombers B-2 bombers B-52 bombers 987

Background: Russian START- Accountable Forces, July 2009 SORT count unknown Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs capable of carrying 3897 warheads: 465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs Bear/Blackjack bombers 608 SORT count unknown Per START data exchange, 809 SNDVs capable of carrying 3897 warheads: 465 SS-18/19/25/27 ICBMs SS-N-18/20/23/56 SLBMs Bear/Blackjack bombers 608

July Joint Understanding Strategic warhead limit of and SNDV limit of Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty New treaty to contain provisions on: Counting rules Elimination and verification (based on START, simplified and less costly as appropriate) Interrelationship between offense and defense Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs Strategic warhead limit of and SNDV limit of Exact numbers to be specified in the treaty New treaty to contain provisions on: Counting rules Elimination and verification (based on START, simplified and less costly as appropriate) Interrelationship between offense and defense Conventional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs

START Follow-on Treaty Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations Missile defense SNDV limit Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs Verification Will combine predictability of START with flexibility of SORT Key remaining issues at beginning of current round of negotiations Missile defense SNDV limit Conventional warheads on SLBMs or ICBMs Verification

Missile Defense Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms ” Russians sought to restrict missile defense US position: missile defense not a subject for START follow-on negotiation Joint Understanding says treaty to include “a provision on the interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms ” Russians sought to restrict missile defense US position: missile defense not a subject for START follow-on negotiation

SNDV Limit Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100) Reasons for higher US proposal: SNDVs converted to conventional roles “Phantom” systems Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US plans to download missiles Large gap between July Russian proposal (500) and US proposal (1100) Reasons for higher US proposal: SNDVs converted to conventional roles “Phantom” systems Russia plans to eliminate missiles while US plans to download missiles

Conventional Systems US strategic systems converted to conven- tional roles B-1 bombers Four Trident SSGNs How to assure no nuclear role? US strategic systems converted to conven- tional roles B-1 bombers Four Trident SSGNs How to assure no nuclear role?

“Phantom” Systems SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules US “phantoms” include: B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB MX ICBM silos Some Minuteman III silos SNDVs no longer in service or useable but not yet eliminated per START rules US “phantoms” include: B-52s at Davis Monthan AFB MX ICBM silos Some Minuteman III silos

“Phantom” and Eliminated B-52s

“Phantom” Systems -- MX Silo

Eliminated Minuteman Silo

Closing SNDV Limit Possible ways to address: Verification measures to confirm conventional systems have only conventional role Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on less demanding elimination requirement Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems Possible ways to address: Verification measures to confirm conventional systems have only conventional role Eliminate “phantoms” per START or agree on less demanding elimination requirement Resolving these issues should reduce US SNDV requirement by ~300 systems

Upload Potential Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three warheads will have five empty warhead slots The dog that’s not barking? May be issue for next round Upload potential: downloaded warheads could be returned to missiles Example: a Trident D-5 downloaded to three warheads will have five empty warhead slots The dog that’s not barking? May be issue for next round

Conventional Warheads US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven- tional warheads Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems US “prompt global strike” plan envisages Tridents or new ICBMs armed with conven- tional warheads Russia sought ban on conventional warheads on strategic systems

Counting and Verification Possible warhead counting regimes Type attribution rule (START) Actual load counting -- US plans to vary number of warheads on Trident SLBMs Simplifying verification measures Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems Possible warhead counting regimes Type attribution rule (START) Actual load counting -- US plans to vary number of warheads on Trident SLBMs Simplifying verification measures Russians wish to end telemetry provisions and loosen monitoring of mobile ICBM systems

Prognosis Treaty likely as both sides want it Russian and US motivations differ but strong on both sides Both presidents strongly endorse treaty Question = when will treaty be completed? Treaty likely as both sides want it Russian and US motivations differ but strong on both sides Both presidents strongly endorse treaty Question = when will treaty be completed?