© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Uncertainty and Information CHAPTER 19 C H A P T E R C H E C K L I S T When you have completed your study of this chapter, you will be able to 1 Explain.
Advertisements

Information Economics Consider the following variants on the game of poker: The Certainty Game – 5 cards dealt face up so that all players can see them.
Economics: Principles in Action
Chapter 37 Asymmetric Information In reality, it is often the case that one of the transacting party has less information than the other. Consider a market.
Chapter 14 Markets with Asymmetric Information. Chapter 17Slide 2 Topics to be Discussed Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons Market Signaling.
Adverse Selection The good risks drop out. A common story.  Insurer offers a new type of policy.  Hoping to make money.  It loses money.  Reason.
© 2009 Pearson Education Canada 20/1 Chapter 20 Asymmetric Information and Market Behaviour.
Prepared by: Jamal Husein C H A P T E R 8 © 2005 Prentice Hall Business PublishingSurvey of Economics, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Market Failure: Spillovers.
Slide 1  2002 South-Western Publishing An assumption of pure competition was complete knowledge of all market information. But knowledge can be unevenly.
1 of 22 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall · Economics · R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 3e. Chapter 17: The.
1 C H A P T E R 6 1 © 2001 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Market Efficiency and Government.
© 2013 Pearson. How do you avoid buying a lemon?
The Economics of Information. Risk a situation in which there is a probability that an event will occur. People tend to prefer greater certainty and less.
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Chapter 9 THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION Copyright ©2002 by South-Western, a division of Thomson Learning. All rights reserved. MICROECONOMIC THEORY BASIC.
18 Private Information Information  One common assumption in economic analysis: perfect information …  … buyer and seller have the same information.
Game theory v. price theory. Game theory Focus: strategic interactions between individuals. Tools: Game trees, payoff matrices, etc. Outcomes: In many.
Information and Advertising Lemons and Insurance Insurers have incomplete information on the quality of those seeking insurance. Some may be creampuffs.
By Edgar K. Browning & Mark A. Zupan John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Market Failure and the Role of Government
1 Chapter 9 Knowledge and Information In this chapter we want to see what happens in a market when the amount of information participants have is different.
CHAPTER 17 Uncertainty and Asymmetric Information © 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall Principles of Microeconomics 9e by Case, Fair.
Economics: Principles in Action
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Industrial Economics Fall INFORMATION Basic economic theories: Full (perfect) information In reality, information is limited. Consumers do not know.
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
1 C H A P T E R 13 1 © 2001 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Using Market Power: Price Discrimination.
Economics for Leaders Open Markets. Economics for Leaders How much should we do? Work Play Study Sleep.
The Market System Demand, Supply and Price Determination.
© 2007 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Principles of Economics 8e by Case and Fair Prepared by: Fernando & Yvonn Quijano 3 Chapter Demand, Supply, and.
Imperfect Information: Quality Uncertainty and the Market for Lemons
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Economics of Information Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Chapter 17.
Chapter 37 Asymmetric Information. Information in Competitive Markets In purely competitive markets all agents are fully informed about traded commodities.
Asymmetric Information
Welcome to the Jeopardy Game Template This presentation was saved in template format so that you can customize it for student use. To use this template,
Chapter 18 Asymmetric Information
1 C H A P T E R 11 1 © 2001 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 2/eO’Sullivan & Sheffrin Entry and Monopolistic Competition.
Chapter 17: The Economics of Information © 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 2e. 1 of 21 Asymmetric.
Asymmetric Information
Supply & Demand. Before We Start Economic Terms: Market Competitive Market Perfectly Competitive Normal Good Inferior Good Substitutes Complements Ceteris.
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Markets with Asymmetric Information
© 2008 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 2e. Fernando & Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Chapter 17 The.
© 2010 W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. 37 Asymmetric Information.
Asymmetric Information
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
EFL: Lesson 3 Markets. Consumers in Markets Demand = Desire for a product Willingness and ability to pay for it.
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Microeconomics 2 John Hey. Asymmetric Information The seller of the good knows more about its quality than the buyer.. Perhaps the market does not exist.
Chapter ElevenCopyright 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall. 1 Chapter 11 Game Theory and Asymmetric Information.
© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER.
Information. Information Problems Adverse Selection: The Market for Lemons Two types of cars: ½ are good cars ($100) and ½ are lemons ($50). Sellers know.
C. Bordoy UWC Maastricht Market Failure HL material HL material (Tragakes, 2012, pp )
Economics for Leaders 2/25/15 BR: 1.Think about the law of demand. Why would consumers “substitute” a good or service. 2. What is income effect and give.
© 2009 Prentice Hall Business Publishing Economics Hubbard/O’Brien UPDATE EDITION. Fernando & Yvonn Quijano Prepared by: Chapter 17 The Economics of Information.
Econ 2301 Dr. Jacobson Mr. Stuckey Week 3 Class 3.
20 UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION © 2012 Pearson Education.
Econ 2610: Principles of Microeconomics Yogesh Uppal
1 of 46 Copyright © 2010 Pearson Education, Inc. Publishing as Prentice Hall · Macroeconomics · R. Glenn Hubbard, Anthony Patrick O’Brien, 3e. Chapter.
Copyright © 2015, 2012, 2009 Pearson Education, Inc. All Rights Reserved Economics NINTH EDITION Chapter 29 Imperfect Information: Adverse Selection and.
Lecture 8 Asymmetric Information: Adverse Selection
Markets with Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric Information and Market Failure
Imperfect Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Economics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e. “Does.
Copyright © 2012 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved.
Imperfect Information: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Microeconomics: Principles, Applications, and Tools O’Sullivan, Sheffrin, Perez 6/e.
Presentation transcript:

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/eO’Sullivan/Sheffrin Prepared by: Fernando Quijano and Yvonn Quijano CHAPTERCHAPTER 15 Imperfect Information and Disappearing Markets

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Imperfect Information and Disappearing Markets A mixed market is a market where low-quality goods and high-quality goods are mixed together.A mixed market is a market where low-quality goods and high-quality goods are mixed together. AA market will break down, or the high-quality goods will tend to disappear, if either buyers or sellers are unable to distinguish between low- quality goods and high-quality goods.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin The Mixed Market for Used Cars In the model of supply and demand, the efficiency of markets is based on the assumption that buyers and sellers are fully informed.In the model of supply and demand, the efficiency of markets is based on the assumption that buyers and sellers are fully informed. Asymmetric information occurs when one side of the market – either buyers or sellers – has better information about the good than the other.Asymmetric information occurs when one side of the market – either buyers or sellers – has better information about the good than the other.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin The Mixed Market for Used Cars In such a market, the odds of getting a plum are small. The high-quality goods will tend to disappear and, in the extreme case, will be completely nonexistent.In such a market, the odds of getting a plum are small. The high-quality goods will tend to disappear and, in the extreme case, will be completely nonexistent. If buyers cannot distinguish between lemons (low-quality cars) and plums (high-quality cars), both will be sold together in a mixed market for the same price.If buyers cannot distinguish between lemons (low-quality cars) and plums (high-quality cars), both will be sold together in a mixed market for the same price.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Ignorant Consumers and Knowledgeable Sellers To determine the price in a mixed market we must answer these questions:To determine the price in a mixed market we must answer these questions: How much is the consumer willing to pay for a plum—a high-quality car?How much is the consumer willing to pay for a plum—a high-quality car? How much is the consumer willing to pay for a lemon—a low-quality car?How much is the consumer willing to pay for a lemon—a low-quality car? What is the chance that a used car purchased in the mixed market will be a lemon?What is the chance that a used car purchased in the mixed market will be a lemon?

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Market for Used Cars If buyers have neutral expectations (assume that there is a 50% chance of getting a lemon), they are willing to pay $3,000 for a used car.If buyers have neutral expectations (assume that there is a 50% chance of getting a lemon), they are willing to pay $3,000 for a used car.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Market for Used Cars The minimum price for plums is $2,500. At any price less than $2,500, no plums will be suppliedThe minimum price for plums is $2,500. At any price less than $2,500, no plums will be supplied The minimum price for lemons is $500. No lemons will be supplied at any price less than $500.The minimum price for lemons is $500. No lemons will be supplied at any price less than $500.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Market for Used Cars At a price of $3000, the supply of plums is 4 (point n ).At a price of $3000, the supply of plums is 4 (point n ).

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Market for Used Cars At a price of $2000, only lemons will be supplied (9 lemons, as show by point p ).At a price of $2000, only lemons will be supplied (9 lemons, as show by point p ). At a price of $3000, the supply of lemons is 16 (point m ).At a price of $3000, the supply of lemons is 16 (point m ).

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Equilibrium in the Mixed Market Neutral Expectations Assumed chance of lemon 50% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $3,000 Number of lemons supplied 16 Number of plums supplied 4 Total number of used cars 20 Actual chance of lemon 80% Neutral Expectations Assumed chance of lemon 50% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $3,000 Number of lemons supplied 16 Number of plums supplied 4 Total number of used cars 20 Actual chance of lemon 80%

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Equilibrium in the Mixed Market Pessimistic Expectations Assumed chance of lemon 100% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $2,000 Number of lemons supplied 9 Number of plums supplied 0 Total number of used cars 9 Actual chance of lemon 100% Pessimistic Expectations Assumed chance of lemon 100% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $2,000 Number of lemons supplied 9 Number of plums supplied 0 Total number of used cars 9 Actual chance of lemon 100%

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin All Used Cars are Lemons WhenWhen consumers’ expectations are consistent with their actual experiences, the equilibrium price of used cars is $2,000, and the plums will disappear from the market. Neutral Expectations Pessimistic Expectations Assumed chance of lemon 50%100% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000$2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000$4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $3,000$2,000 Number of lemons supplied 169 Number of plums supplied 40 Total number of used cars 209 Actual chance of lemon 80%100%

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Equilibrium in the Mixed Market The domination of the used-car market by lemons is an example of the adverse- selection problem. The quality of the goods left in the market is adverse, or undesirable.The domination of the used-car market by lemons is an example of the adverse- selection problem. The quality of the goods left in the market is adverse, or undesirable. Adverse selection is the result of the dynamics of asymmetric information (one side has better information than the other), which generates a downward spiral of price and quantity

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Thin Market for Plums It is possible that asymmetric information generates a thin market—one in which some high-quality goods are sold, but fewer than would be sold in a market with perfect information.It is possible that asymmetric information generates a thin market—one in which some high-quality goods are sold, but fewer than would be sold in a market with perfect information.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Thin Market for Plums If the chance of getting a plum is 10%, buyers are willing to pay $2,200 for a used car.If the chance of getting a plum is 10%, buyers are willing to pay $2,200 for a used car. Assumed chance of lemon 90% Willingness to pay for lemon $2,000 Willingness to pay for plum $4,000 Willingness to pay for used car $2,200 Number of lemons supplied 18 or 90% Number of plums supplied 2 or 10% Total number of used cars 20 or 100% Actual chance of lemon 90% TheThe market is in equilibrium because consumers accurately assess the chances of getting a lemon. AtAt an equilibrium price of $2,200, 20 cars are sold, 10% of which are plums.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Thin Market for Plums If buyers assume that there is a 90% chance of getting a lemon, they are willing to pay $2,200 for a used car.If buyers assume that there is a 90% chance of getting a lemon, they are willing to pay $2,200 for a used car.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Thin Market for Plums At this price, the supply of plums is 2 (point s ).At this price, the supply of plums is 2 (point s ). The supply of lemons at this price is 18 (point t )The supply of lemons at this price is 18 (point t ) The actual chance of getting a lemon is 90%, the same as the assumed chance of getting a lemon.The actual chance of getting a lemon is 90%, the same as the assumed chance of getting a lemon.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Money-Back Guarantees and Warranties The large gap between the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept provides clever entrepreneurs a profit opportunity if they can persuade skeptical consumers that a car is a plum and not a lemon.The large gap between the willingness to pay and the willingness to accept provides clever entrepreneurs a profit opportunity if they can persuade skeptical consumers that a car is a plum and not a lemon. Suppliers can identify a particular car as a plum in a sea of lemons by offering a guarantee:Suppliers can identify a particular car as a plum in a sea of lemons by offering a guarantee: Money-back guarantee: The seller offers to refund the price of the car if it turns out to be a lemon.Money-back guarantee: The seller offers to refund the price of the car if it turns out to be a lemon. Warranty and repair guarantee: The seller offers to cover any extraordinary repair costs for one year.Warranty and repair guarantee: The seller offers to cover any extraordinary repair costs for one year.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Lemons Laws Lemons laws require automakers to buy back cars that experience frequent problems in the first year of use.Lemons laws require automakers to buy back cars that experience frequent problems in the first year of use. A vehicle repurchased under the lemons law must be fixed before it is sold to another customer and must be identified as a lemon.A vehicle repurchased under the lemons law must be fixed before it is sold to another customer and must be identified as a lemon. A problem with enforcing these laws is that lemons can cross state lines without paper trails. New interstate commerce laws requiring the branding of cars as lemons on vehicle titles have been established.A problem with enforcing these laws is that lemons can cross state lines without paper trails. New interstate commerce laws requiring the branding of cars as lemons on vehicle titles have been established.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Used Baseball Players Baseball pitchers who are more prone to injuries tend to switch teams more often than pitchers who aren’t.Baseball pitchers who are more prone to injuries tend to switch teams more often than pitchers who aren’t. ThisThis happens because of asymmetric information and adverse selection. The new team has much less information than the old one.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Malpractice Insurance A person who buys an insurance policy knows much more about his or her risks than the insurance company.A person who buys an insurance policy knows much more about his or her risks than the insurance company. InsuranceInsurance companies must pick from an adverse or undesirable selection of customers. Buyers of insurance policies have more information than sellers.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Malpractice Insurance Careful physicians do not buy malpractice insurance because insurance companies are unable to distinguish between careful and reckless doctors.Careful physicians do not buy malpractice insurance because insurance companies are unable to distinguish between careful and reckless doctors. TheThe mixed market increases the cost of providing insurance and the price of the malpractice policy.

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Pricing Health Insurance Until recently, insurance prices were based on a community rating—a price equal to the cost of providing coverage to the community or metropolitan area (every firm pays the same price for medical insurance).Until recently, insurance prices were based on a community rating—a price equal to the cost of providing coverage to the community or metropolitan area (every firm pays the same price for medical insurance). MostMost insurance companies now use experience rating—a price based on the medical history of the firm’s employees (a different price for each firm).

© 2003 Prentice Hall Business PublishingEconomics: Principles and Tools, 3/e O’Sullivan/Sheffrin Moral Hazard Moral hazard is a situation that encourages risky behavior.Moral hazard is a situation that encourages risky behavior. Insurance causes people to take greater risks. They don’t buy a fire extinguisher, or tend to drive recklessly. These are unobserved actions that increase the probability of a grim outcome.Insurance causes people to take greater risks. They don’t buy a fire extinguisher, or tend to drive recklessly. These are unobserved actions that increase the probability of a grim outcome. The moral hazard is pervasive. The availability of insurance, for example, decreases investment in prevention programs that reduce risk.The moral hazard is pervasive. The availability of insurance, for example, decreases investment in prevention programs that reduce risk.