© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 1 Participating in Electricity Markets.

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Presentation transcript:

© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 1 Participating in Electricity Markets

Perspective Generator Consumer Retailer Operator of a pumped-hydro plant © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 2

Participating in Electricity Markets: The Generator’s Perspective © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 3

Marginal, infra-marginal, extra-marginal producers Everything is sold at the market clearing price. Price is set by the “last” unit sold Marginal producer: – Sells this last unit – Gets exactly its bid Infra-marginal producers: – Get paid more than their bid – Collect economic profit Extra-marginal producers: – Sell nothing No difference between centralized auction and bilateral market © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington4 Extra-marginal Infra-marginal Marginal producer Price Quantity supply demand

Load profile © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 5 Time Load 00:0006:0012:0018:00 24:00 Minimum load Peak load

Demand curves for electricity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 6 $/MWh MWh Minimum loadPeak load Daily fluctuations

Supply curve for electricity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington7 $/MWh MWh Base generation Peaking generation Intermediate generation

Supply and demand for electricity © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington8 $/MWh MWh Minimum loadPeak load Price of electricity fluctuates during the day π max π min

Supply curve for electricity In a centralized market, the supply curve is built by ranking the offers made by the generators An offer specifies the quantity that the generator is willing to sell at a given price © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 9 $/MWh MWh

Bidding in a centralized market How should a generator bid to maximize its profit? It depends on how much competition it has! © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 10

Market Structure Monopoly: – Monopolist sets the price at will – Must be regulated Perfect competition: – No participant is large enough to affect the price – All participants act as “price takers” Oligopoly: – Some participants are large enough to affect the price – Strategic bidders have market power – Others are price takers © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 11 MonopolyOligopolyPerfect Competition

Short run profit maximization for a price taker © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 12 Adjust production y until the marginal cost of production is equal to the price π Production cost Revenue Independent of quantity produced because price taker Output of one of the generators

Bidding under perfect competition Since there are lots of small producers, a change in bid causes a change in the order of the bids If I bid at my marginal cost – I get paid the market clearing price if marginal or infra-marginal producer If I bid higher than my marginal cost – I could become extra-marginal and miss an opportunity to sell at a profit If I bid lower than my marginal cost – I could have to produce at a loss No incentive to bid anything else than marginal cost of production © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 13 Price Quantity supply demand

Profit of an infra-marginal producer © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 14 π Variable cost of producing energy Economic profit $/MWh MWh

Profit of an infra-marginal producer Selling at marginal cost covers the variable cost of production The difference between the market price and the marginal cost must pay for the fixed costs: – No-load cost, startup cost – Cost of building the plant – Interest payments for the bank, dividends for the shareholders A plant must therefore be infra-marginal often enough to cover its fixed costs – Market price > marginal cost for enough hours of the year © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 15

Profit of a marginal producer © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 16 Variable cost of producing energy $/MWh MWh No economic profit!

Profit of a marginal producer If a marginal generator bids at its marginal cost, it makes no economic profit – Covers only its variable cost of production – Does not cover its fixed cost Generators that are too often marginal or just below marginal will not recover their fixed costs if they bid at their marginal cost of production – They must include part of their fixed costs in their offer price – Their offer price is therefore higher than their marginal cost – They can do it because competition is not perfect when the load is high because most generators are already producing © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 17

Price spikes because of increased demand © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington18 $/MWh MWh Normal peak Small increases in peak demand cause large changes in peak prices Extreme peak π ext π nor

Price volatility in the balancing mechanism © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 19

Price duration curve © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 20 PJM system (USA) for 1999 Actual peak price reached $1000/MWh for a few hours (Source:

Oligopoly and market power A firm exercises market power when – It reduces its output (physical withholding) or – It raises its offer price (economic withholding) in order to change the market price © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 21

Example A firm sells 10 units and the market price is $15 – Option 1: offer to sell only 9 units and hope that the price rises enough to compensate for the loss of volume – Option 2: offer to sell the 10th unit for a price higher than $15 and hope that this will increase the price Profit increases if price rises sufficiently to compensate for possible decrease in volume © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 22

Price spikes because of reduced supply © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington23 $/MWh MWh Normal peak Small reductions in supply cause large changes in peak prices π ext π nor Normal supply Reduced supply

Short run profit maximization with market power © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 24 is the total industry output Production of generator i Not zero because of market power

Short run profit maximization with market power © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 25 is the price elasticity of demand is the market share of generator i < 1  optimal price for generator i is higher than its marginal cost

When is market power more likely? Imperfect correlation with market share Demand does not have a high price elasticity Supply does not have a high price elasticity: – Highly variable demand – All capacity sometimes used – Output cannot be stored èElectricity markets are more vulnerable than others to the exercise of market power © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 26

Mitigating market power Increase elasticity Increase number of competitors © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 27

Increasing the elasticity reduces price spikes and the generators’ ability to exercise market power © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington28 $/MWh MWh π min π max

Increasing the elasticity of the demand Obstacles – Tariffs – Need for communication – Need for storage (heat, intermediate products, dirty clothes) Not everybody needs to respond to price signals to get substantial benefits Increased elasticity reduces the average price – Not in the best interests of generating companies – Impetus will need to come from somewhere else © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 29

Further comments on market power ALL firms benefit from the exercise of market power by one participant Unilaterally reducing output or increasing offer price to increase profits is legal Collusion between firms to achieve the same goal is not legal Market power interferes with the efficient dispatch of generating resources – Cheaper generation is replaced by more expensive generation © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 30

Modelling Imperfect Competition Bertrand model - Competition on prices Cournot model - Competition on quantities © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 31

Game theory and Nash equilibrium Each firm must consider the possible actions of others when selecting a strategy Classical optimization theory is insufficient Two-person non-co-operative game: – One firm against another – One firm against all the others Nash equilibrium: – given the action of its rival, no firm can increase its profit by changing its own action: © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 32

Bertrand Competition Example 1 – C A = 35. P A $/h – C B = 45. P B $/h Bid by A? Bid by B? Market price? Market shares? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington33 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB Inverse demand curve

Bertrand Competition Example 1 – C A = 35. P A $/h – C B = 45. P B $/h Marginal cost of A: 35 $/MWh Marginal cost of B: 45 $/MWh A will bid just below 45 $/MWh B cannot bid below 45 $/MWh because it would loose money on every MWh Market price: just below 45 $/MWh Demand: 55 MW P A = 55MW P B = 0 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington34 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB

Bertrand Competition Example 2 – C A = 35. P A $/h – C B = 35. P B $/h Bid by A? Bid by B? Market price? © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington35 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB

Bertrand Competition Example 2 – C A = 35. P A $/h – C B = 35. P B $/h A cannot bid below 35 $/MWh because it would lose money on every MWh A cannot bid above 35 $/MWh because B would bid lower and grab the entire market Market price: 35 $/MWh Paradox of Bertrand model of imperfect competition – Identical generators: bid at marginal cost – Non-identical generators: cheapest gets the whole market – Not a realistic model of imperfect competition © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington36 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB

Cournot competition: Example 1 C A = 35. P A $/h C B = 45. P B $/h Suppose P A = 15 MW and P B = 10 MW Then D = P A + P B = 25 MW π = D = 75 $/MW R A = = $ 1125 ; C A = = $ 525 R B = = $ 750 ; C B = = $ 450 Profit of A = R A - C A = $ 600 Profit of B = R B - C B = $ 300 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 37 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB

Cournot competition: Example 1 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 38 Summary: For P A =15MW and P B = 10MW, we have: Price Profit of A Profit of B Demand

Cournot competition: Example 1 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 39 P A =15P A =20P A =25P A =30 P B =10 P B =15 P B =20 P B =25

Cournot competition: Example 1 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 40 P A =15P A =20P A =25P A =30 P B =10 P B =15 P B =20 P B =25 Price decreases as supply increases Profits of each affected by other Complex relation between production and profits

Let’s play the Cournot game! © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 41 P A =15P A =20P A =25P A =30 P B =10 P B =15 P B =20 P B =25 Equilibrium solution! A cannot do better without B doing worse B cannot do better without A doing worse Nash equilibrium

Cournot competition: Example 1 Generators achieve price larger than their marginal costs The cheapest generator does not grab the whole market Generators balance price and quantity to maximize profits Warning: price is highly dependent on modeling of demand curve and are thus often not realistic © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 42 Price Profit of A Profit of B Demand P A =25 P B =15 C A = 35. P A $/h C B = 45. P B $/h

Cournot competition: Example 2 C A = 35. P A $/h C B = 45. P B $/h … C N = 45. P N $/h A is a “strategic” player – i.e. with market power The others are “the competitive fringe” © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 43 A B C A (P A )C B (P B ) PAPA PBPB N C N (P N ) PNPN...

Cournot competition: Example 2 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 44

Cournot competition: Example 2 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 45

Cournot competition: Example 2 © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 46

Other competition models Supply functions equilibrium – Bid price depends on quantity Agent-based simulation – Represent more complex interactions Maximising short-term profit is not the only possible objective – Maximizing market share – Avoiding regulatory intervention © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 47

Conclusions on imperfect competition Electricity markets do not deliver perfect competition Some factors facilitate the exercise of market power: – Low price elasticity of the demand – Large market shares – Cyclical demand – Operation close to maximum capacity Study of imperfect competition in electricity markets is a difficult research topic – Generator’s perspective – Market designer’s perspective © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 48

© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 49 Participating in Electricity Markets: The consumer’s perspective

Options for the consumers Buy at the spot price – Lowest cost, highest risk – Must be managed carefully – Requires sophisticated control of the load Buy from a retailer at a tariff linked to the spot price – Retailers acts as intermediary between consumer and market – Risk can be limited by placing cap (and collar) on the price Interruptible contract – Reasonable option only if cost of interruption is not too high – Savings can be substantial © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 50

Options for the consumers Buy from a retailer on a time-of-use tariff – Shifts some of the risk to the consumer – Need to control the load to save money Buy from a retailer at a fixed tariff – Lowest risk, highest cost – Two components to the price: average cost of energy and risk premium © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 51

Choosing a contract Best type of contract depends on the characteristics of the consumer: – Cost of electricity as a proportion of total cost – Risk aversion – Flexibility in the use of electricity – Potential savings big enough to justify transactions cost © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 52

Buying at the spot price Must forecast prices – Much harder than load forecasting because price depends on demand and supply – Supply factors are particularly difficult to predict (outages, maintenance, gaming, locational effects) – Good accuracy for average price and volatility – Predicting spikes is much harder Must optimize production taking cost of electricity into account – Complex problem because of: Production constraints Cost of storage (losses, loss of efficiency in other steps,…) Price profiles © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 53

© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 54 Participating in Electricity Markets: The retailer’s perspective

The retailer ’ s perspective Sell energy to consumers, mostly at a flat rate Buy energy in bulk – Spot market – Contracts Want to reduce risks associated with spot market Increase proportion of energy bought under contracts Must forecast the load of its customers Regional monopoly: traditional top-down forecasting Retail competition: bottom-up forecasting – Difficult problem: customer base changes – Much less accurate than traditional load forecasting © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 55

© 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 56 Participating in Electricity Markets: The hybrid participant’s perspective

Example: pumped storage hydro plant © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 57

Example © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 58

Example Energy cycle in a pumped storage plant is only about 75% efficient Difference between high price and low price periods must be large enough to cover the cost of the lost energy Profit is unlikely to be large enough to cover the cost of investments Pumped hydro plants can also make money by helping control the system © 2011 D. Kirschen and the University of Washington 59