Implementing an Effective Leniency Program March 2013.

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Presentation transcript:

Implementing an Effective Leniency Program March 2013

Difficulties in the Introduction of the Program Lack of the necessary planning on account of the political scene Cultural issues: immunity programs, as well as cartel prosecution, were not common in Brazil

Mechanisms that Facilitated its Introduction Cooperation between criminal and administrative authorities Awareness of the importance of a first successful case by antitrust agencies International cartel leniency cases Clear and uncomplicated standards and procedures for granting markers Building a reputation for transparency, confidentiality and trustworthiness

Key Features of the Brazilian Leniency Program Full criminal and administrative immunity for the first applicant to sign a leniency agreement Applicant should provide a detailed history of conduct and all documents and pieces of information related to the offense, as well as full cooperation during the administrative proceedings Immunity is conditional and must be confirmed by Cade’s Administrative Tribunal Partial immunity and leniency plus are also available

Recent Changes on Brazilian Law Cade’s General Superintendence is now responsible for the leniency program There’s no more prohibition on signing with the cartel leader Law n establishes that criminal immunity applies for cartel crimes and related crimes

Advocacy Initiatives National campaign on newspapers and magazines Distribution of brochures on the leniency program for the biggest companies and on the major Brazilian airports Postcards to companies on problematic sectors Comic book on fighting cartels Participation on seminars, congresses and business events

What’s Next? Revision of our leniency program to make it even more transparent regarding the negotiation procedures, the standards of evidence needed to sign a leniency agreement, proof of effects in Brazil and other related issues New settlement program to provide more transparency, predictability and alternatives to those interested on cooperating with Cade

Thank you Mr. Pedro Lucio Lyra Chief of Staff of the General Superintendent