The Victor’s Dilemma & Regime Change: Postwar Enforcement as a Commitment Problem Melissa Willard-Foster UCLA EITM July 19, 2007

Gulf War 1991  Iraq Invasion 2003 Data & Literature: Why regime change? Puzzle: Why not always remove the defeated government? Why not negotiate a bargain to avoid risks & costs? Basic Model: Commitment Problem Work in Progress The Victor’s Dilemma & Regime Change: Postwar Enforcement as a Commitment Problem

Data & Literature Pleasing domestic audiences Bueno de Mesquita, et. al 2003; Werner 1996 Enhancing Security Owen 2002 Siverson and Starr 1994 Does regime change alter alliance patterns? Externally imposed regime changes show strongest effect S&S: A response to neo-realism It’s structure, not who rules If true, then regime change should be rare

Wars to Remove or Alter Foreign Governments, Source: Holsti, Kalevi J Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sources: Gurr, Ted Robert Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change, ; Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza Archigos: A Data Set of Leaders 1875—2004. Regime Change as a Percent of States in the International System,

Puzzle Victor’s Dilemma: Conflicting incentives of victor and vanquished Why not always remove the defeated government? Why not negotiate a bargain to avoid the risks & costs of postwar instability?

Basic Model: Regime Change as a Commitment Problem FightAccept RemoveKeep Victor Defeated Gov’t x Є [0,1] Victor p-C V, 1-p-C W q-C V, 1-q-C W 1-X, X Assume C v and C w > 0; 0<p<1; 0<q<1; DG prefers x=1; V prefers x=0

Solution Two Scenarios: 1) Acquiesce Equilibrium {Keep, Accept, x=1} Defeated Gov’t: x=1 1-x > q-C v C v > q Victor Keeps the DG if: p-C v < 0 FightAccept RemoveKeep V DG x Є [0,1] V p-C V, 1-p-C W q-C V, 1-q-C W 1-x, x

Removal & punishment are so costly that V prefers x=1. Example: Iraq after the Gulf War Costs: Dick Cheney (BBC Radio 4, 2/16/92) “If we’d gone into Baghdad and got rid of Saddam Hussein …we’d have had to put a lot of forces in…. Then you’ve got to put a new government in his place and then you’re faced with the question of what kind of government are you going to establish in Iraq? … How many forces are you going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many casualties are you going to take through the course of this operation?” x = 1: Chemical & Biological Weapons Implication

Solution “Deal or No Deal” Equilibrium If DG wants V to play Accept : 1-x ≥ q-C v x* ≡ 1-q+C v Will DG offer x* ? x* ≥ 1-q-C DG C v + C DG ≥ 0 (True) Will the V prefer x* to Remove ? 1-x* ≥ p-C v q ≥ p FightAccept RemoveKeep V DG x Є [0,1] V p-C V, 1-p-C DG q-C V, 1-q-C DG 1-x, x

Implication Relative Power Tomorrow versus Today If q>p: {Keep, Fight, x*} If q<p: {Remove, Fight, x*} DG’s Commitment Problem & Indefinite Coercion Examples {Keep, Fight, x*} China 1901, Post-Boxer Rebellion {Remove, Fight, x*} Post-Napoleonic Wars, World War II

Hypotheses H1: When power is asymmetric between belligerents, victors will retain the defeated government. H2: When power is symmetric between belligerents, victors will remove the defeated government. H3: Given a complete victory, states engaged in enduring rivalries will be more likely to remove each other.

Work in Progress: Altering Assumptions Adding a Third Party Rival to Victor Removal in cases of asymmetric power Rival to Defeated Government Distance of Ideal Points Giving the DG more bargaining power Voluntary versus Involuntary Defection Observed & Unobserved Effects on Monitoring