Learning From Defects. What is a Defect? Anything you do not want to have happen again.

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Presentation transcript:

Learning From Defects

What is a Defect? Anything you do not want to have happen again

Slide 3 Sources Adverse event reporting systems Sentinel events Claims data Infection rates Complications Asking the question of frontline staff: where / how is the next patient going to be harmed?

Slide 4 The 4 Questions for Learning from Defects What happened? – From the view of the person involved Why did it happen? What will you do to reduce the chance it will recur? How do you know that you reduced the risk that it will happen again?

Slide 5 What Happened? Reconstruct the timeline and explain what happened Put yourself in the place of those involved, in the middle of the event as it was unfolding Try to understand what they were thinking and the reasoning behind their actions/decisions Try to view the world as they did when the event occurred Source: Reason, 1990;

Slide 6 Why did it Happen? 6 Develop lenses to see the system (latent) factors that lead to the event Often result from production pressures Damaging consequences may not be evident until a “triggering event” occurs Source: Reason, 1990;

Slide 7 System Factors Impact Safety Hospital Departmental Factors Work Environment Team Factors Individual Provider Task Factors Patient Characteristics Institutional Adopted from Vincent

Slide 8 System Failure Example Catheter pulled with Patient sitting Communication between resident and nurse Lack of protocol For catheter removal Inadequate training and supervision Patient suffers Venous air embolism Pronovost Annals IM 2004; Reason

Slide 9 What will you do to reduce the risk of it happening again Prioritize most important contributing factors and most beneficial interventions Safe design principles – Standardize what we do −Eliminate defect – Create independent check – Make it visible Safe design applies to technical and team work

Factor Importance in current event 1 low to 5 high Importance in future events 1 low to 5 high

Slide 11 What will you do to reduce risk Develop list of interventions For each Intervention rate – How well the intervention solves the problem or mitigates the contributing factors for the accident – Rates the team belief that the intervention will be implemented and executed as intended Select top interventions (2 to 5) and develop intervention plan – Assign person, task follow up date 11

Slide 12 Rank Order of Error Reduction Strategies Forcing functions and constraints Automation and computerization Standardization and protocols Checklists and double check systems Rules and policies Education / Information Be more careful, be vigilant

Slide 13 How do you know risks were reduced? Did you create a policy or procedure (weak) Do staff know about policy or procedure Are staff using the procedure as intended – Behavior observations, audits Do staff believe risks were reduced

Slide 14 Summarize and Share Findings Summarize findings – 1 page summary of the 4 questions – Learning from defect figure Share within your organization M & M conferences Unit meetings (within and among) Share de-identified with others in the collaborative (pending institutional approval)

DefectInterventions Fellow 1Unstable oxygen tanks on bedsOxygen tank holders repaired or new holders installed institution-wide Fellow 2Nasoduodenal tube (NDT) placed in lungProtocol developed for NDT placement Fellow 3Medication look-alikeEducation, physical separation of medications, letter to manufacturer Fellow 4Bronchoscopy cart missing equipmentChecklist developed for stocking cart Fellow 5Communication with surgical services about night coverage White-board installed to enhance communication Fellow 6Inconsistent use of Daily Goals rounding toolGained consensus on required elements of Daily Goals rounding tool use Fellow 7Variation in palliative care/withdrawal of therapy orders Orderset developed for palliative care/withdrawal of therapy Fellow 8Inaccurate information by residents during roundsDeveloping electronic progress note Fellow 9No appropriate diet for pancreatectomy patientsDeveloping appropriate standardized diet option Fellow 10Wrong-sided thoracentesis performedEducation, revised consent procedures, collaboration with institutional root-cause analysis committee Fellow 11Inadvertent loss of enteral feeding tubePilot testing a ‘bridle’ device to secure tube Fellow 12Inconsistent delivery of physical therapy (PT)Gaining consensus on indications, contraindications and definitions, developing an interdisciplinary nursing and PT protocol Fellow 13Inconsistent bronchoscopy specimen laboratory ordering Education, developing an orderset for specimen laboratory testing

Slide 16 Key Lessons Focus on systems not people Prioritize Use Safe design principles Go mile deep and inch wide rather than mile wide and inch deep Pilot test Learn from one defect a quarter Post the stories of risks that were reduced

Slide 17 References Bagian JP, Lee C, et al. Developing and deploying a patient safety program in a large health care delivery system: you can't fix what you don't know about. Jt Comm J Qual Improv 2001;27: Pronovost PJ, Holzmueller CG, et al. A practical tool to learn from defects in patient care. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf 2006;32(2): Pronovost PJ, Wu Aw, et al. Acute decompensation after removing a central line: practical approaches to increasing safety in the intensive care unit. Ann Int Med 2004;140(12): Reason J. Human Error. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, Vincent C. Understanding and responding to adverse events New Eng J Med 2003;348: Wu AW, Lipshutz AKM, et al. The effectiveness and efficiency of root cause analysis. JAMA 2008;299: