IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Module 2.2: Erroneous use of TPS (UK) IAEA Training Course.

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Presentation transcript:

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency Module 2.2: Erroneous use of TPS (UK) IAEA Training Course

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy2 Background Until 1982, a hospital relied on manual calculations for the correct dose to be delivered to the tumour Treatments were generally performed at standard SSD (100 cm) SSD = 100 cm

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy3 Background Isocentric treatments were rarely given in the hospital, because calculations were cumbersome Isocentric

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy4 Background Some non-standard SSD treatments were performed. SSD-correction was then applied. SSD = 120 cm SSD-correction!

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy5 Isocentric treatment Machine used principally for SSD treatments would have been calibrated at 100 cm SSD + d max For isocentric treatment, patients generally positioned with center of PTV at machine isocentre isocenter Calibration in water phantom Standard SSD isocenter Calibration in water phantom

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy6 Isocentric treatment Using a different SSD, means a change in output factor compared to the standard calibration (and a change in depth dose which can often be ignored) The change in output factor depends on inverse square law isocenter Calibration in water phantom Standard SSD

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy7 SSD = 90 cm, E = 6 MV Example: ((100+d max ) / (90+d max )) 2 (101.5 / 91.5) 2 = 1.23 (Indicating that the dose rate at the shorter distance is 23% greater than at 100 cm SSD) Calculation procedure A non-written procedure was in effect for treatments at non- standard SSD (including the few isocentric treatments). Technologists calculated a correction factor based on the actual SSD used.

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy8 TPS installation 1982 A computerized treatment planning system was acquired in 1981, and after some preliminary testing brought into clinical use in autumn of 1982 Partly because TPS simplified the calculation procedures, the hospital began treating with isocentric techniques more frequently

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy9 First isocentric treatment plan from TPS When the first isocentric TPS plan was ready and presented to the planning technologists, the following happened: It was assumed by the technologists that correction factors for non-standard SSD should be applied Hospital physicists approved this procedure

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy10 First isocentric treatment plan from TPS It was not recognized that the TPS already correctly applied an inverse-square correction for isocentric treatments!

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy11 The technologists continued to apply the distance correction factor to all subsequent calculations Consequently, distance correction factor was applied twice for all patients treated isocentrically, or at non-standard SSD This error caused patients to receive doses lower than prescribed Subsequent isocentric treatment plans

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy12 Discovery of error In 1991 a new computer planning system was installed and a discrepancy was discovered between the new plans and those from the previous system Further investigation revealed that the original TPS already contained within it the correction for calculations at non-standard SSD. Systematically re-applying the correction factor resulted in underdosage

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy13 A formal investigation was initiated The incorrect procedures were in place until 1991, or for approximately nine years During the 9-year period, 6% of patients treated in the department were treated with isocentric technique; for many of these patients it formed only part of their treatment Investigation of error

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy14 All patients receiving isocentric treatment (performed on two linear accelerators) between Autumn 1982 and December 1991 were identified Evaluation by Ash and Bates showed that of 1045 patients whose calculations were affected by the incorrect procedures, 492 developed local recurrences that could be attributed to the error Underdose varied between 5 and 35% Evaluation of error

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy15 Dose reduction distribution for patients

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy16 Patient identification Data stored on floppy discs had become unreadable due to age Instead: systematic examination of log books for each of the two linear accelerators was necessary Log book records SSD for each treatment Patients with SSD < 100 cm were identified and doubly checked by referring to their treatment plan

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy17 Data reviewed Patient identification Diagnosis Stage Grade Treatment details Prescribed dose Shortfall in dose actually delivered Outcome Survival Patterns of recurrence

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy18 Clinical impact Based on the relationship between radiation dose and symptom control Difficult to asses the impact given the complexity of the factors affecting tumour growth, development and response to treatment Post mortem data was not available and information on death certificates may be unreliable

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy19 Clinical data SitePatient profileTreatment intentDose reductionOutcome Bladder242Radical 236 Palliative 3 Post operative % in 204 pts39 no effects 46 uncertain 150 adverse affect possible Cervix162Radical 160 Palliative 5 Post operative 30 RT alone % in 134 pts43 no effects 46 not assessable 70 adverse affect possible Endometrium104Post operative 88 RT alone % in 83 pts42 no effects 46 uncertain 13 adverse effect possible Lung206Radical 190 Palliative %in 103 pts79 no effects 15 uncertain 100 adverse effects possible Oesophagus134Radical 131 Palliative % in 95 pts34 no effects 10 uncertain 82 adverse effects possible Rectum75Pre or post operative 25 Recurrence 37 Palliative 9 Unknown % in 48 pts25 no effect 41 adverse effects possible Prostate47Radical 42 Palliative % in 39 pts20 no effect 9 uncertain 23 adverse effects possible

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy20 Actions advised Patients dead Information and counselling for family Patients alive Follow up with short intervals ? Further radiation to make up for missing dose Radiation completed 1 – 2 months before discovery: YES Radiation completed > 3 months before discovery: NO Radical surgery

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy21 Problems highlighted Lack of communication between the professional groups involved Failure to fully evaluate the new TPS Lack of education Failure to implement correct policies and procedures Lack of independent checks within the system Patients often followed up by non-radiotherapists (e.g. urologist)

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy22 Lessons: Radiotherapy Department Ensure that staff are properly trained in the operation of the equipment Ensure that staff understand the operating procedures Include in the Quality Assurance Programme: Procedures to perform complete commissioning of treatment planning equipment before first use Procedures for independent checking of patient treatment time calculations

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy23 Lessons: Radiotherapy Department Importance of reliable and comprehensive databases Need for follow up of patients by clinicians with a background in radiotherapy

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy24 Lessons: Radiotherapy Department Underdose is difficult to asses as it does not produce recognizable symptoms Audit of outcome Overall survival Disease free survival Local recurrence rate (related to stage and grade of the cancer) Publication of results at regular intervals

IAEA Prevention of accidental exposure in radiotherapy25 Reference Ash D, Bates T. Report on the clinical effects of inadvertent radiation underdosage in 1045 patients. Clin Oncol 6: (1994)