Ecology of Individuals: Using Game Theory to Understand Animal Behavior by Kyla M. Flanagan Department of Biological Sciences University of Calgary, Alberta,

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
The Basics of Game Theory
Advertisements

29 Nov 2010Artificial Life lecture 161 Game Theory: Evolution of Communication Artificial Life methods are used to model and synthesise and understand.
HEA STEM 2014 Understanding evolutionarily stable strategies: interactive games in the classroom Catherine Dennis.
News and Notes 4/13 HW 3 due now HW 4 distributed today, due Thu 4/22 Final exam is Mon May 3 11 AM Levine 101 Today: –intro to evolutionary game theory.
Evolution Matt Keeling MA 999: Topics in Mathematical Modelling Tuesday Thursday 2-4.
Evolution and Repeated Games D. Fudenberg (Harvard) E. Maskin (IAS, Princeton)
Defender/Offender Game With Defender Learning. Classical Game Theory Hawk-Dove Game Hawk-Dove Game Evolutionary Stable Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS)
Introduction to Game theory Presented by: George Fortetsanakis.
Hawks and Doves. Tastes In economics we largely take the tastes and preferences of the consumer to be a given piece of information. Within that context,
Playing Evolution Games in the Classroom Colin Garvey GK-12 Fellow.
Conflict resolution Evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) –Game theory –Assumptions Evolution of display –Hawks and doves –Arbitrary asymmetry.
The Evolutionary Games We Play Psychology Introduction Animals tend to behave in ways that maximize their inclusive fitness Usually pretty straightforward.
Chapter 7 McGraw-Hill/IrwinCopyright © 2010 The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved.
An Introduction to... Evolutionary Game Theory
Social Behavior & Game Theory Social Behavior: Define by Economic Interaction Individuals Affect Each Other’s Fitness, Predict by Modeling Fitness Currency.
Game Theory Eduardo Costa. Contents What is game theory? Representation of games Types of games Applications of game theory Interesting Examples.
What is a game?. Game: a contest between players with rules to determine a winner. Strategy: a long term plan of action designed to achieve a particular.
Community-Based Management and Conservation in Africa: Trade-offs and Synergies in Land- Use Decisions in Local Villages by Narcisa Pricope, Andrea Gaughan.
________ | | | Rich habitat Poor habitat Rewards Per Indiv. No. of competitors.
Multi-player, non-zero-sum games
Maynard Smith Revisited: Spatial Mobility and Limited Resources Shaping Population Dynamics and Evolutionary Stable Strategies Pedro Ribeiro de Andrade.
1 Economics & Evolution Number 2. 2 Reading List.
Conflict Resolution Threat-display contests Variable length contests
Evolutionary Game Theory
Game theory John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944) – How do humans make rational decisions between alternative.
Simulating the Evolution of Contest Escalation Winfried Just and Xiaolu Sun Department of Mathematics and Edison Biotechnology Institute Ohio University.
Introduction to Game Theory and Behavior Networked Life CIS 112 Spring 2009 Prof. Michael Kearns.
Introduction to Game Theory Yale Braunstein Spring 2007.
Animal BehaviorBIO 432 Spring 2014 Dr. T. Caraco Office: Biology 253 Hours: PM, Thursday Lectures, Assignments,
Evolutionary Game Theory. Game Theory Von Neumann & Morgenstern (1953) Studying economic behavior Maynard Smith & Price (1973) Why are animal conflicts.
Tom Wenseleers Dept. of Biology, K.U.Leuven
5. Alternative Approaches. Strategic Bahavior in Business and Econ 1. Introduction 2. Individual Decision Making 3. Basic Topics in Game Theory 4. The.
A Game-Theoretic Approach to Strategic Behavior. Chapter Outline ©2015 McGraw-Hill Education. All Rights Reserved. 2 The Prisoner’s Dilemma: An Introduction.
Design of a real time strategy game with a genetic AI By Bharat Ponnaluri.
Department of philosophy and history of science
Presenter: Chih-Yuan Chou GA-BASED ALGORITHMS FOR FINDING EQUILIBRIUM 1.
Natural Computation and Behavioral Robotics Competition, Games and Evolution Harris Georgiou – 3.
Senior Project Poster Day 2007, CIS Dept. University of Pennsylvania Reversi Meng Tran Faculty Advisor: Dr. Barry Silverman Strategies: l Corners t Corners.
Figure One. Small Wars and the Theory of Games Open, Living Conflict EcoSystem DoveHawkRetailator Dove35,350, 10035,35 Hawk100, 0-25,-25 Retailator35,35-25,-2535,35.
2008/01/30Lecture 11 Game Theory. 2008/01/30Lecture 12 What is Game Theory? Game theory is a field of Mathematics, analyzing strategically inter-dependent.
Section 2 – Ec1818 Jeremy Barofsky
Joanna Tyrowicz What are institutions? Institutional Economics.
Strategic Behavior in Business and Econ Static Games of complete information: Dominant Strategies and Nash Equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies.
Senior Project – Computer Science – 2015 Effect of Display Size on a Player’s Situational Awareness in Real-Time Strategy Games Peter Miralles Advisor.
Bell Ringers Solve the following equations and write the commutative property equation and solve: (-74) + 54 (-87) + (-32) Solve the following equations.
1 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, IRVINE, GAME THEORY AND POLITICS 2, POL SCI 130B, Lecture 2.5: AGGRESSION, VIOLENCE, AND UNCERTAINTY Recall various interpretations.
ECO290E: Game Theory Lecture 3 Why and How is Nash Equilibrium Reached?
Design of a real time strategy game with a genetic AI By Bharat Ponnaluri.
Games, Strategies, and Decision Making By Joseph Harrington, Jr. First Edition Chapter 4: Stable Play: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Games with Two or Three.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma or Life With My Brother and Sister John CT.
Behavioral Adaptations for Survival Chapter 5. Adaptationist Approach – Assumes a behavior is adaptive (trait confers greater reproductive success than.
Taylor. Na, Amy. Hong, Brian. Sang, Luck Yoon. What is the Game Theory? intelligent rational decision-makers Game theory is "the study of mathematical.
4/30/12. Explain what gene frequency is. Measure gene frequency in a model population. Make and test predictions about whether and how gene frequency.
Biology Behavioural Ecology INTRODUCTION. A course to explore the relationships between animal behaviour and ecology, emphasizing the behavioural.
Week 6 Applications of ODEs to the evolution game theory
Mixed Strategies Keep ‘em guessing.
Game Theory and Cooperation
Lecture 13.
Replicator Dynamics.
Aggression, Creativity, Play, Sociability & Empathy
Evolution & Selection Modified from parts of a presentation by Diane Ebert-May Michigan State University.
Economics & Evolution Number 2.
Fighting ‘rules’ Assessment and possible escalation.
Caribou Conservation Conundrum
Vincent Conitzer Learning in games Vincent Conitzer
Caribou Conservation Conundrum
Jump-Shot Or Drive? (Using Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria to Predict Player Behavior) By Patrick Long.
Game Theory: The Nash Equilibrium
Vincent Conitzer CPS Learning in games Vincent Conitzer
Week 6 Applications of ODEs to the evolution game theory
Presentation transcript:

Ecology of Individuals: Using Game Theory to Understand Animal Behavior by Kyla M. Flanagan Department of Biological Sciences University of Calgary, Alberta, Canada

Objectives By the end of this lecture, you should be able to: Explain what game theory is and how/why it is applied to ecology. Explain how novel behavioral strategies can invade a population. Explain evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) and frequency dependent selection. Describe why natural selection acts on relative fitness and how this fitness can depend on the frequency of other “types” of individuals in the population. Explain how coexistence of multiple behavioural strategies in a population is possible.

Game Theory Game Theory is “a branch of mathematics devoted to the study of strategy in which players seek to maximize their individual returns” (Molles and Cahill). Forms the basis of many economic theories, war strategy, sociological theories (and board games!) John Maynard Smith emphasized the potential for its use in behavioral ecology John Nash John Maynard Smith

Game Theory What behavioral strategy should individuals adopt to maximize their individual fitness? Does the “best” strategy depend on the strategy of other individuals? Should individuals behave aggressively and fight for resources or behave non-aggressively?

The Big Question Use evidence from this case study to answer the following: If natural selection is “survival of the fittest,” then under what conditions should individuals engage aggressively in conflict for limited resources? Can aggressive and non-aggressive strategies coexist? “BIG QUESTION”

Hawk vs. Dove Game 2 behavioral approaches for interactions over a contested resource: Hawks Doves

The Rules: Hawks Always attack other individuals, taking the resource (R) if they win. If a hawk encounters another hawk, it will win only half the time. When it loses, it will suffer an injury cost (C). AGRESSIVE

The Rules: Doves When a dove encounters an opponent, it may put on a aggressive display, but it does NOT fight. When a dove encounters a dove, it will win the resource one half the time. When a dove encounters a hawk, the hawk will always win the resource. But since they don’t fight, they don’t incur any injury costs (C). NON-AGRESSIVE

Which behavioral strategy wins? Hawks vs. Doves? Is there an optimal behavioral strategy? Will hawks take over? Will doves be able to persist? 

Clicker Question 1 Which behavioral strategy do you think will “win”? Hawks Doves Both Neither

Hawk Fitness You are all HAWKS Compete for resource! GO! The first behaviour the students will explore is the Hawks. At this point you will need to explain the “rules.” Everyone in the class is going to be a Hawk. They are going to compete over the 4 resource cards they hold in their hands. These resource cards are going to be used as a surrogate measure of FITNESS. The more resources an individual has, the more likely it is to survive and reproduce. To compete for the resource, they are going to turn to their neighbour and “fight” using ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS. The winner takes ONE RESOURCE card from the loser. The loser, because hawks fight aggressively over the resource, suffers an injury cost. So, the loser must put TWO RESOURCE cards in his/her back pocket (these are lost and can’t be used again). Ask everyone to have TWO INTERACTIONS (COMPETITIONS) for the resources. This must be exactly 2 interactions, no more, no less.

Clicker Question 2 How many resource cards do you hold in your hand? 1 1 2 3 4 5 6

Vulnerability to Invasion - Hawks Do you predict that a DOVE can invade a population of HAWKS? Now, let’s see if a DOVE can invade the population. Select a student (ideally someone you know won’t be embarrassed!). Tell the students that this individual has a random mutation that causes them to adopt a DOVE behavioural strategy. You may have to remind them of the rules that when a hawk and dove interact, the hawk always wins and just takes the resource. Let the Dove try to “invade” the population of hawks. What you should see is that the dove loses a resource card for each interaction and that after 4 interactions the dove is left with no resources. Then ask: Can a dove invade a population of hawks? NO! You could ask the first question as a clicker question, if you have the time.

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) ESS: “a behavioural strategy that is resistant to invasion and most likely to be maintained by natural selection” (Molles and Cahill 2013). Is a Hawk an ESS? A Dove? Do you think Hawks will take over the behavioral strategy of the population of Doves?

Dove Fitness Now you are all DOVES Compete for resources, GO! Now because the doves do not fight aggressively, they do not suffer injury costs. When they compete over resources (using Rock-paper-scissors), 50% of the time they win and 50% of the time they lose. Ask the student to again have TWO interactions over a resource.

Clicker Question 3 How many resource cards do you hold in your hand? 1 1 2 3 4 5 6

Vulnerability to Invasion - Doves Do you predict that a Hawk can invade a population of Doves? Now let’s see if a HAWK can invade a population of DOVES? ? I like to call on a TA to do this, for their very hawk-likeness as a TA. Now the TA Hawk enters the population of Doves. Because the hawk always wins against a dove, it just takes a resource from each dove and rapidly gets resources. Ask: Can the hawk strategy invade the population of individuals with a dove strategy? YES! You could ask the first question as a clicker question, if you have the time.

Hawks vs. Doves OK, now we are going to start with ~10% of the population being Hawks, and ~90% Doves and track what happens to this ratio over time. NOW Hawks and Doves can reproduce! If you lose all your resource cards, sit down. If you get 8 resource cards, you find someone sitting down and convert them to whatever you are by giving them 4 cards! . If a Hawk and Hawk compete over a resource, they do Rock-Paper-Scissors to fight over the resource. The loser gives one resource card to the winner and loses (into the back pocket) 2 resource cards for injury cost, just like before. When a Hawk encounters a Dove, it always wins the competition, and doesn’t sustain an injury cost. When two Doves interact, they do Rock-Paper-Scissors over the resource, and sustain no injury cost. When students approach each other, they need to tell each other what they are (Hawk or Dove) and then proceed. Now if an individual loses all the resources in their hand, they are ‘dead’ and must sit down. If an individual has 8 resources cards in their hand, they must reproduce by giving someone who is sitting down 4 resource cards and telling that individual whether they are now a hawk or a dove. For this to work, you will need a TA to be a ‘decomposer’. This person will approach dead individuals and ask them for any resources they have in their back-pocket. If they retrieve cards, they should give them out randomly to those individuals that are still alive. Without the decomposers resources end up bound in the back pockets of individuals and there is a constant loss of resources from the ‘system’. Redistributing these resources when an individual has died mimics nature. By allowing individuals to ‘die’ and ‘reproduce’ you can now see that the proportion of individuals in the class that are hawks and doves evolve.

Clicker Question 4 Are you currently a hawk or a dove? Hawk Dove This question will need to be asked multiple times every few minutes to watch the frequency of hawks and doves evolve.

Simple versus frequency-dependent selection In this case, an individual’s fitness DEPENDS on the behavior (and the frequency of the behavior) of OTHERS. Is there a single optimal behavioral strategy in this case?

Frequency dependent selection Frequency dependent selection occurs when the fitness of an individual depends on the relative frequency of other phenotypes in the population. Positive frequency dependent selection – majority advantage (majority phenotype wins). Negative frequency dependent selection – minority advantage. Promotes genotypic and phenotypic diversity. Some combination of phenotype. Frequencies may exist at which all phenotypes have the same fitness.

The Big Question Revisited Use evidence from this case study to answer the following: If natural selection is “survival of the fittest,” then under what conditions should individuals engage aggressively in conflict for limited resources? Can aggressive and non-aggressive strategies coexist? “BIG QUESTION”

Hawk-Dove Relative frequency of Hawks = p Relative frequency of Doves = 1-p Average payoff for Hawk = p∙(0.5∙R - 0.5∙C) + (1 - p)(R) Average payoff for Dove = p ∙ 0 + (1-p) ∙ (0.5∙R)

Frequency dependent selection

Image Credits Slide 1: Description: Photo of fighting Hartebeest Source: Fickr user Filip Lachowski, http://www.flickr.com/photos/malczyk/5638599313/ Clearance: Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 Generic (CC BY-SA 2.0), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0/ Slide 3: John Nash (top left): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Forbes_Nash,_Jr. A beautiful mind poster (top right): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Beautiful_Mind_(film) Evolution and the Theory of Games (bottom left): http://books.google.ca/books/about/Evolution_and_the_Theory_of_Games.html?id=Nag2IhmPS3gC&redir_esc=y John Maynard Smith (bottom right): http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:John_Maynard_Smith.jpg Slides 6, 8, and 15: Description: Photo of mourning dove. Source: Modified (horizonatal flip and crop) from a photo by Flickr user Dawn Huczek, https://www.flickr.com/photos/31064702@N05/4821595992 Clearance: Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0), https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/ Slides 6, 7, and 11: Description: Photo of hawk (Buteo regalis) Source: Flickr user Tim Strater, http://www.flickr.com/photos/41601691@N02/5665779491 Slides 11 and 15: Description: Diagram of rules for Rock, Paper, Scissors Source: By Wikimedia Commons user Enzoklop, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rock-paper-scissors.svg Clearance: Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported (CC BY-SA 3.0), http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en Slides 24: Description: Graphs showing frequency dependent selection. Source: By Ross Lein. Clearance: Used with permission.